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I. INTRODUCTION 
The preparation of a development plan proceeds at various levels -
national, sectoral, regional and project. At the national level 
attention is focused on the projection of major macro-economic variables 
such as income, consumption, savings and exports, consistent with al­
ternative national resource constraints and alternative direct and 
indirect public policies. The sectoral plan includes a detailed analysis 
of projected activity of the major sectors, e.g. mining, agriculture, 
fishing, energy and manufacturing. Of special importance is the identi­
fication of the interlinkages among the sectors and the direct and in­
direct public measures to be taken to achieve the desired sectoral growth 
rates. Finally, of the many alternative measures that are at hand, the 
public sector can make direct investment in each of the sectors. Thus, 
a key element in the preparation and implementation of a development 
plan is the identification, selection and construction of investment 
projects. This process of project planning involves the translation 
of national economic objectives through the use of appropriate investment 
criteria into a concrete investment program in each of the major economic 
sectors. 
Among the sectors that receive considerable attention by the 
Peruvian government and international lending institutions is the 
agricultural sector. The public activities relevant to this sector 
include such indirect measures as tax incentives and ranging to direct 
measures such as investment in agricultural penetration roads, agri­
cultural credit, extension services for direct technical aid to the 
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farmer and investment in water resource development projects. The 
overall budgetary constraint on annual recurring and capital expend­
itures is set at the national level but the agricultural planners have 
the responsibility of setting the appropriate mix among the the invest­
ment alternatives within the sector. 
A major decision element of public investment strategy in agri­
culture in Peru is the selection of irrigation project priorities. 
Historically, this investment has been a substantial component of total 
central government investment - at times exceeding 30 percent of the 
total. The investment decision in irrigation exhibits many of the 
choices inherent in all classes of public investment choices, both in 
the agricultural sector and in other sectors. There is first the 
choice of the regional distribution of the investment. The projects 
are located both on the coast and in the sierra. Since the regional 
income disparities between the two areas is great - the per capita 
income on the coast being higher than the sierra - an irrigation invest­
ment program emphasizing one region or the other will have implications 
for the regional distribution of income. There are also income distri­
butional effects arising from the organization of the tenure structure 
of the projects - they may be organized as large commercial farms or 
medium and small sized family farms. 
The irrigation investment program must also be viewed as having 
effects upon the balance-of-payments. The projects will have some 
mix of industrial and food crops. Decisions must, therefore, be made 
affecting whether projects will be oriented toward import substituting 
or export promoting activities. Likewise, the negative effect (the 
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foreign exchange component of investment and production costs) must 
be considered in the light of the projected availabilities of foreign 
exchange. 
Aside from the regional income redistributional and balance-of-
payments effects of an irrigation investment program, the efficiency 
objective of increasing income and production (independent of the 
above mentioned effects) may be treated separately. Hence, a basic 
activity of project planning is to select an investment strategy 
compatible with national and sectoral objectives through the use of 
appropriate investment criteria. 
Two major questions are treated in this study. The first is the 
identification and application of investment criteria which measure 
the impact of irrigation investment (or other types of agricultural 
investment) on the assumed national economic goals. The second is the 
establishment, at an operative level, of the types of irrigation projects 
that should be initiated by the Peruvian government in the near future 
consistent with a set of national objectives. 
A discussion of the theoretical construction of a wide range of 
investment criteria is given in Chapter II. The basic potulates of 
the perfectly competitive model are examined and compared with the 
prevalent market conditions of underdeveloped economies. Since the 
basic elements of the competitive market are not present due to market 
imperfections (monopolistic elements, institutionally established wages, 
exchange controls, legal limits on interest rates), this comparison 
indicates that criteria normally applied in advanced economies cannot 
be directly utilized in underdeveloped economies. Instead of market 
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prices for key imputs such as capital, labor and foreign exchange, 
shadow prices must be estimated reflecting the marginal productivity 
of each factor. 
Four major investment criteria are evaluated: 1) the benefit-
cost ratio; 2) the social marginal productivity of investment; 3) various 
partial static criteria such as the output-investment ratio and the 
labor-investment ratio; and 4) the reinvestment criterion. The benefit-
cost ratio is the relation between the discounted present value of 
benefits (usually defined as net income) and the discounted present 
value of costs (defined as public investment plus operating, maintenance 
and replacement costs) at a given discount rate. This criteria does 
not single out any one input (foreign exchange, for example) but takes 
the entire investment complex as the limiting resource. To properly 
account for the over-or under pricing of capital, labor and foreign 
exchange by the market, shadow prices are used in pricing benefits and 
costs. 
The social marginal productivity of investment (SMP) measures 
the increment in national income per unit of project investment. The 
ratio is adjusted for the social pricing of resources (shadow prices) 
as is required for all criteria applied in underdeveloped economies. 
The special feature of this criterion is the separation of the balance-
of-payments effect from the total effect. The balance-of-payments 
effect, the most useful component of the SMP, is divided into direct 
investment effects, direct operating effects and indirect operating 
effects. 
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A wide range of partial criteria, often referred to in development 
literature, are examined as simple measures of project performance. 
The output-investment ratio, the foreign exchange earnings-investment 
ratio and the labor-investment ratio are easily computed ratios that 
serve in a limited fashion to measure the contribution of the project 
investment to single objectives. 
In addition, the reinvestment criterion is examined to determine 
its practicality as a tool of project evaluation. This criterion 
consists in the measurement of the capital accumulation stemming from 
the reinvestment of savings generated by the project investment. Since 
it is very difficult to trace second (and successive) round investment 
effects the application of this criterion (although recognized as 
important) is, in practice, ruled out. 
Following the presentation of the theoretical bases of the invest­
ment criteria in Chapter II, the historical investment in water re­
source projects, the public institutions concerned with Irrigation 
investment and a set of proposed projects (with feasibility studies) 
are described in Chapter III. In Chapter IV eleven projects are se­
lected for the purpose of applying the investment criteria. 
Projects representative of five distinct types of water resource 
investment are selected: 1) small sierra land improvement projects; 
2) small coastal new lands projects; 3) medium and large combined new 
lands and land improvement projects; 4) coastal land improvement projects 
and 5) large coastal virgin land projects. A final selection of eleven 
projects is made. Due to tlie tendency of the feasibility studies to 
present an optimistic (or at times pessimistic) picture of the proposed 
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development of the projects and due to the differences in base year 
prices, each of the project output estimates is adjusted to the known 
average production conditions of each zone for the base year 1965. 
An index of construction prices is used to deflate the construction 
costs to 1965 prices. Thus, with output, net income and construction 
costs all in 1965 prices, the projects are comparable. 
In Chapter IV the benefit-cost ratio is the first criterion 
applied to the eleven projects. The ratio is first calculated relying 
solely upon the unadjusted feasibility study data; this analysis is 
followed with the inclusion of the adjusted output, cost and investment 
data yielding an adjusted ratio for each project. Both market and 
shadow prices are utilized for separate calculations, including alter­
native discount rates from 6 to 15 percent. 
The internal rate of return, a frequently mentioned conjunct to 
the benefit cost ratio, is applied to the projects and, furthermore, 
compared with the results obtained with the benefit-cost ratio. 
The projects are also ranked using the social marginal productivity 
of investment. Since the SMP, as originally formulated, does not fully 
account for time discounting of output and costs, a revision of the 
criterion is affected so as to include present values of the projected 
money flows. A preliminary list of priorities is given in the case in 
which output and costs are not discounted; then time discounting is 
introduced yielding a new ranking of the projects. By establishing the 
probable limits of the direct and indirect balance-of-payments effects, 
the differential foreign exchange effects of large versus small projects 
is compared. 
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Alternative forms of the three major partial static criteria are 
developed in detail. An output-investment ratio is calculated for each 
project for different definitions of output - including gross output, 
value-added and net income - and for alternative definitions of invest­
ment - including total investment and total investment plus annual 
operating, maintenance and replacement costs. Furthermore, the output-
investment ratio, as well as the other ratios - is constructed with and 
without time discounting. Two foreign exchange ratios are considered: 
the output in foreign exchange - total investment ratio and the output 
in foreign exchange - investment in foreign exchange ratio. Employment 
generation and labor productivity are measured for each project by, first, 
the labor-investment ratio and, secondly, the output-labor ratio. 
In the last section of Chapter IV is presented a sensitivity 
analysis of the benefit-cost ratio to variations in the shadow price of 
capital, labor and foreign exchange. A separate study is conducted 
of the variation in the benefit-cost ratio due to the systematic change 
in each shadow price: the discount rate is varied between 6 and 15 
percent; the shadow exchange rate (expressed in soles per dollar) is 
varied between 100 and 200 percent of the 1965 market rate; and a shadow 
wage from 100 to zero percent of the market wage is applied. Finally, 
a combined variation of the three shadow rates and an evaluation of the 
subsequent shifts in the benefit-cost ratio and project priorities is 
presented. 
The major Peruvian national economic objectives are considered 
in Chapter V. For each of the national objectives there corresponds 
one or more investment criteria and project rankings. To the national 
8 
economic goal of increasing income, corresponds the benefit-cost ratio, 
the social marginal productivity of investment and the income-invest­
ment ratio. The separate priorities yielded by each ratio are compared 
and a mean ranking for the three criteria is computed for each project. 
The objective of attaining balance-of-payments equilibrium is represented 
by the balance-of-payments component of the social marginal productivity 
of investment. The labor-investment ratio establishes the project 
priorities for the employment objective. The investment priorities for 
each objective are determined and then a combined ranking of the prior­
ities is constructed based upon the differential weighting of the national 
objectives. 
Finally, a near-term investment program in irrigation is con­
structed which gives not only specific project priorities but suggests 
the types of projects (small versus large, coastal versus sierra, virgin 
land versus land improvement) that are most convenient for further 
development. Special emphasis is placed upon the consistency of the 
project priorities with the Peruvian planning objectives. 
Chapter VI presents the major conclusions of the study. Several 
appendices follow which include the essential project data. 
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II. INVESTMENT CRITERIA FOR PROJECT EVALUATION 
This chapter treats the most widely discussed investment criteria 
and is oriented to their application as rules for project evaluation 
and the ordering of projects within an overall public investment 
program. 
The lack of a dynamic theoretical framework suitable for the 
analysis of a wide range of planning problems frequently requires that 
a partial equilibrium approach be adopted to the most urgent problems 
of development planning. Likewise, the data requirements of many of 
the general equilibrium models is often prohibitive and the planner is 
therefore forced to seek partial or second best solutions. The absence 
of consistent and accurate data weakens the usefulness of even these 
solutions and is thus one of the major difficulties to be overcome in 
development planning. 
The methodology of economic planning and its subsequent theoretical 
base forms several distinct but interdependent layers of analysis and 
aggregation. Beginning at the level of greatest aggregation, the general 
programming framework based upon the fundamental macro-economic relations 
is used to test and establish the principal national resource restraints 
and targets. The main purposes of this analysis is to solve for such 
variables as the level of aggregate income, savings, consumption and 
investment. Attention is given to the analysis of the international 
trade position of the country to determine the probable levels of im­
ports and exports and the resulting impact of the balance-of-payments 
position upon the national economy. Public accounts are analyzed to 
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determine the level and movement of public investment, revenues and 
other government expenditures at all political and administrative 
levels. 
In turn, the major relations are quantified employing mathematical 
models that indicate the functional relations among the major macro-
economic variables. Tinbergen has been a major contributor to this 
type of development planning and analysis. His models, as vjell as those 
developed by others, are characterized by a precise labeling of the 
specification of and functional relations among the major macro-economic 
variables, and were particularly the instrument and target variables. 
The former represent those variables that can in some way be manipulated 
by the planning or administrative units of the public sector. These 
variables include such measures as may be included within the monetary 
and fiscal jurisdiction of the public sector. Specifically, public 
investment at various political administrative levels, taxation, sub­
sidies, credit regulation and its availability, changes in the money 
supply and the many indirect controls including legal dispositions 
encompass some of the variables that can be affected by action of the 
public sector. 
Aggregate analysis is usually not sufficient to provide the policy 
maker the detailed information to formulate a consistent development 
program. Upon completion of the national aggregate plan, sector and 
regional programs must be constructed. Each of the major sectors 
contributing to economic development must be examined to establish the 
required levels of sectoral public and private investment and the 
attainable growth rates consistent with the set of resource restrictions. 
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In Peru; for example, the mining and fishing industries would require 
separate treatment when formulating sectoral plans due to their importance 
in Peru's development. 
In addition, when reliable historical data are available, the study 
of the regional implications of the national and sectoral programs can 
contribute to the evaluation of investment programs that may have a 
variable impact among regions with large income differences. This can 
be useful if the public authorities have established well-defined regional 
economic objectives. Thus, a development program could be formulated 
in which one of the targets is to reduce the level of income disparity 
among regions consistent with national and regional income, growth and 
saving rates. 
The economic evaluation and ranking of public investment projects 
is an important part of the process of establishing the magnitude and 
timing of the physical implementation of public investment. The macro-
economic programs, based upon generalized input and output data, estab­
lish national and sectoral public investment levels and, consequently, 
the planning offices must proceed to identify and rank the available 
investment projects in a manner consistent with the national plan. The 
national plan establishes the aggregate and sectoral levels of public 
investment and the project planning offices select those projects that 
exhaust the public investment and are related to the target variables 
of the national development plan. 
The central theoretical and analytical problem in national project 
evaluation is to establish a generalized set of methods and choice rules 
that measure the economic impact of the investment projects upon the 
set of national development objectives. Some of the principal invest­
ment criteria discussed in the literature of economic growth and develop­
ment are examined in the following section to determine their usefulness 
in the selection of investment projects designed to promote economic 
development. These criteria are examined from the point of view of 
establishing practical choice rules for planning and administrative 
institutions whose responsibility is the formulation and evaluation 
of public investment programs. 
The application of investment criteria to investment projects 
takes two forms: the evaluation of a particular investment project 
and, secondly, comparisons among projects wiuhin a feasible set of proj­
ects. The former analysis, which is herein termed the "within" project 
analysis involves a detailed and comprehensive study of each project 
from the standpoints of optimal design and economic feasibility. Ex­
amples of criteria useful for within project analysis are: a) the eco­
nomic criterion that the benefit-cost ratio of "feasible" projects 
exceed a pre-specified value and b) the financial criterion that the 
payment capacity of the project exceeds the amortization and interest 
charges incurred to construct and operate the project. The within 
project analysis is performed by those designated to prepare the feasi­
bility study and is ultimately employed to select the feasible set of 
acceptable projects which are then submitted to a comparative analysis 
designed to establish a set of project rankings consistent with the pre­
conceived development objectives. These objectives may fall within the 
domain of national, regional, sectoral and local development plans. 
The completion of this "between" project evaluation depends upon the 
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ability of the central planning authority to define the development 
objectives, construct the relevant indicators and extract the needed 
information from the individual project studies. 
A. Investment Theories And Project Choice 
There are investment criteria that have been applied predominantly 
to the allocation of public resources in advanced economics. The 
commonly employed benefit-cost ratio is such a criterion; it can be 
demonstrated that this criterion is a restatement of the first-order 
optimality conditions of the perfectly competitive model. There are 
other investment choice coefficients that are elaborated on the basis 
of the conditions of underdevelopment reflecting the apparent disparity 
between the actual structure of the market and its deviation from the 
postulates of the perfectly competitive model. The investment criteria 
which are employed in advanced countries must be adopted to the objective 
of establishing the conditions for the maximum rate of economic develop­
ment. The criteria used for the selection of economic development proj­
ects are examined to analyze the basic assumptions underlying their 
formulation. The efficiency conditions determined by one class of 
investment criteria-especially the benefit-cost ratio are not necessarily 
consistant with the maximization of economic growth. Therefore, the 
classical criteria for the solution of the static competitive equilib­
rium conditions must be adjusted for the fundamental market disequilibria 
prevalent in underdeveloped economies. 
In advanced economies the market prices can be assumed to be a 
reasonable approximation of equilibrium prices for the perfectly 
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competitive solution. In underdeveloped countries the direct application 
of market prices, especially for the key inputs, will lead to the 
systematic misallocation of resources. Those factors which are in rel­
ative abundance will be underutilized relative to the major limiting 
resources; i.e., labor which is overvalued by the market will be under­
utilized relative to capital, which is undervalued by the market due 
to capital rationing, an imperfectly functioning capital market and 
legal limits on interest rates. 
The well known postulates of the theory of perfect competition are 
reviewed below. The market conditions extant in underdeveloped countries 
are examined and the principal deviations from the ideal market conditions 
that affect the application of investment criteria are presented. 
1. Underdeveloped economies and the competitive model 
The classical competitive market analysis is based upon a few 
fundamental postulates from which are generated the optimality condi­
tions for the efficient allocation of resources, the maximization of 
producer profits and consumer utility. 
In the construction of investment criteria for advanced economies 
the market prices can be employed without the need for adjustment. The 
conclusions and recommendations stemming from the results of using market 
prices will not affect substantially the projected outcome. However, 
in the case of underdeveloped economies there are compelling reasons not 
to accept the prices as registered by the market. Whereas, in advanced 
economies it can be assumed that the resultant allocation of resources 
15 
will be sufficiently close to that signaled by market prices, in under­
developed nations the presence of market imperfections will lead to 
continued resource misallocation. 
Consider the manner in which economic distortions in underdeveloped 
countries hinder the application of criteria based upon the perfectly 
competitive model. A perfectly competitive economy is characterized 
by well-defined and consistent consumer preferences. Preferences of 
each consumer are independent of all other consumers, hence the utility 
function of each individual is not affected by a change in utility of 
any other consumer. The shape of each individual utility function must 
conform to the requirement of a diminishing marginal rate of substitu­
tion among goods. Finally it is assumed that the consumer acts to 
maximize utility. 
The corresponding assumptions regarding the behavior of producers 
are that each independent producer maximizes profits. Each producer 
operates under decreasing returns. Likewise, there is a complete 
absence of externalities be they pecuniary or technological. 
The basic market assumptions require perfect information for all 
economic agents which also implies perfect foresight in the dynamic 
competitive model. All resources are fully employed due to complete 
interdependence and price flexibility coupled with perfect information. 
In addition, the income distribution is given in the static sense and 
over time; no normative significance can be attached to the resultant 
income distribution achieved in a perfectly competitive economy. In the 
competitive model the income distribution is given and is not necessarily 
consistent with the social welfare function of the society. 
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The presence of a certain "fundamental disequilibrium", in under­
developed countries results in market prices that do not correspond 
to the marginal productivity of the factors. Consequently, accounting 
or shadow prices must be estimated for some key inputs and outputs. 
There are essentially two points of view regarding the accept­
ability of the investment criteria based upon the optimality conditions 
of the perfectly competitive model. On the one hand, it is contended 
that the efficiency conditions derived from the theory of perfect 
competition are the appropriate criteria for public investment selection; 
but, since the actual market conditions do not correspond with the 
theoretical preconditions, a series of modifications are employed to 
permit an approximation of the competitive equilibrium market prices. 
Hence, we construct the investment criteria using shadow prices as if 
the competitive conditions are operative. This approach is prevalent 
in the writings of Tinbergen (37), Eckstein (8) and various project 
manuals including that of the United Nations (38). 
An alternative point of view is based upon a fundamental criticism 
of the perfectly competitive model, especially in reference to the 
problem of establishing the relationship between individual and social 
time preference. This position has been stated most clearly by Marglin 
(26,28) in his analysis of the opportunity costs of public investment. 
He argues that the existence of externalties imply that the market 
prices, especially of capital, are unacceptable data for project plan­
ning. It is contended that, even if the perfectly competitive system 
were operative, the market determined rate of interest is inappropriate 
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for the planning of public investment -- what is required is a social 
rate of discount. Each of the above opposing views is now discussed 
in detail. 
Tinbergen indicates that the failure of the market to reflect 
the intrinsic values of labor and capital is reflected by low capital-
labor ratio and institutional pressures for higher than marginal product 
wage rates and institutional restrictions on interest rates. Because 
of the shortage of complementary resources for labor (capital and 
land) a substantial portion of the labor force, especially in agri­
cultural, is underemployed, i.e., the movement of labor out of agri­
culture will cause little if any reduction in output. In addition, the 
organized strength of trade unions may push wages above the level re­
flecting marginal productivity, particularly if the shadow price of labor 
is less than the subsistence wage. This latter argument is not valid 
in the agricultural sector in which farm workers are not organized. An 
exception is large commercialized farms near urban centers. 
The market conditions in underdeveloped countries bear minimal 
resemblance to the "ideal" market conditions of perfect competition. 
First, the economic information channels limit the producers and con­
sumers to less than optimal decisions regarding production possibilities 
and utility maximization. The chronic lack of information covering 
current prices of both inputs and outputs lead to decisions which would 
not have been made if complete market data were available. Questions 
of what to produce, the quantity to produce and the decision as to when 
to sell become a function of historical habits and customs rather than 
of current economic rationale. 
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The market size is a second element in the distortion of the 
perfectly competitive conditions. Because of the smallness of the market 
only a limited number of producers can attain levels of production and 
plant size beyond the range of decreasing costs. This frequently gives 
rise to monopolistic and oligopolistic market structures and their 
respective pricing systems. 
Third, as indicated above, the presence of under-and unemployment 
negates the ideal full employment solution of the perfectly competitive 
model. 
Fourth, the prevalence of externalities, both in production and 
consumption, is an additional element in restricting smooth functioning 
of the market economy. The assumption that consumer decisions are taken 
independently is rendered inoperable. 
Finally, the income distribution given by the market has no norma­
tive meaning; the social and political standards of each society may 
require an extensive intervention of the public sector by means of 
direct and indirect policy instruments to alter the income distribution. 
2. The social pricing of resources 
In this section the social pricing of labor, capital and foreign 
exchange are considered with a view to establishing the basic rationale 
for the selection of the shadow wage rate, the shadow rate of exchange 
and the shadow rate for discounting future project returns and costs. 
The selection of the shadow prices of labor, capital and foreign 
exchange can best be viewed with reference to a programming model in 
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which the objective function is defined as the future stream of consump­
tion, employment, value-added or any weighted combination thereof. (4) 
This function is accompanied by a set of resource restrictions; thus, 
the objective function is maximized subject to these restriction. In 
the optimum solution, i.e., that which maximizes the objective function, 
the marginal productivity of each primary input is defined as the in­
crease in the value of the objective function resulting from a unit in­
crease in the supply of the factor assuming that the supply of all remain­
ing inputs is held constant. This marginal increase in the objective 
function is defined as the accounting or shadow price of the respective 
input and is the marginal productivity of the input in the optimum 
solution. 
The selection of the discount rate in project evaluation is the 
single most important choice problem since it will have a marked effect 
upon the composition of the investment program.! A high rate of time 
discount will call for an investment program with less capital intensive 
projects whose returns are obtained in a relatively short time span; 
whereas, a low rate of discount will permit the construction of capital 
intensive projects showing production gains far into the future. 
iThe terminology used todefine the relative weights attached to 
money flows at different points in time is frequently confusing. The 
term discount rate refers solely to the rate used to calculate the 
discounted present value of a money flow. The term interest rate 
is understood to be the price of capital but is frequently used as an 
equivalent term for the discount rate. In fact, the interest rate 
(the price of capital) may be employed as the discount rate. The rate 
of return is also a term employed in the literature that may be confused 
with the terms interest rate and discount rate. It is properly defined 
as the discount rate at which a given initial investment is equal to 
the discounted value of its future income stream. The primary purpose 
of the discussion in the text is to select the rate of discount - this 
rate may be equal to the rate of interest or the rate of return but, 
conceptually, it is distinct from the two. 
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The approaches to the determination of the interest rate in the 
literature are extensive in number. However, the central question is 
whether the market, assuming that the conditions of perfect competition 
are operative, does or does not signal the proper rate of interest for 
the social pricing of capital employed in public investment projects. 
It has been shown, that due to the absence of atomistic market conditions 
the market price in underdeveloped countries will not reflect the shadow 
price of many inputs. In the case of capital the shadow interest rate 
will be underestimated by the market. A more fundamental difficulty 
is that if one were to adjust the prices to simulate their values in a 
perfectly competitive market the adjusted price for capital might not 
necessarily be the appropriate rate for project evaluation. 
Among the alternative forms that the discount rate might take, 
the following have been discussed at length in the literature: 1) the 
opportunity cost of capital represented by a long-term risk free bor­
rowing rate such as the long-term rate on government bonds or the private 
rate of return on invested capital; and 2) the rate of social time 
preference. These approaches have been summarized by Eckstein (8) 
and Prest and Turvey (33). . 
3. The rate of social time preference 
Marglin (28) argues that the rate of social time preference is the 
appropriate measure for discounting project returns and costs. This 
rate is established outside of the market by the interaction of 
individual and policy maker time preferences through the political 
mechanism. 
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Marglin assumes that in the perfectly competitive market each 
individual will not choose to transfer resources to future generations 
beyond his life expectancy by way of the public sector since the 
decision is made completely independent of other individuals in the 
economy. Conse<|uent1 y, collective savings decisions arc divorced 
I roin private time preferences and the market fails to signal the dis­
count rate Cor public investment. The problem reduces to examining 
the choice mechanism and the precise manner in which individual 
preferences affect directly or indirectly the determination of the 
rate of social time preference assuming that individual preference 
functions are interdependent. 
According to Marglin, there are essentially three alternative 
ways of formulating the relationship between the rate of social time 
preference and individual time preferences. The first is the so-called 
authoritarian approach to determining the rate of social preference. 
ISs.sent ia 1 iy this viewpoint rejects individual time preferences as guides 
for public decisions due to the short-sighted character of individual 
utility functions. Thus, individuals must be coerced into making 
savings decisions favorable to future generations; the social welfare 
function includes both the preferences of present and future generations. 
Marglin rejects this welfare function on value grounds by arguing that 
the social welfare function includes only the preferences of the present 
generation. If individuals wish to make savings decisions in favor of 
lvituri> generations or, indeed, if they choose not to make such decisions 
then they should not be coerced by the government. As is shown later, 
even though the social welfare function includes the preferences 
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1)1 lIk- prc'.scmL yoneration public investment decisions can be made 
favoring future generations. 
The second approach is termed schizophrenic resting on the con­
tention that the preference function for each individual is not unique. 
Therefore, each individual has a dual set of possibly conflicting 
preferences-one for public decisions and one for private decisions. 
Thus, as a citizen, one may vote for higher taxes and as an Individual 
producer ''t; opposed to additional charges against profits. The basic 
dilficulLy witli this formulation is that optimality has no meaning in 
till! iifiual Pan-to sense: if contradictory preferences are revealed, one 
must ask which is chosen for public policy purposes. The rate of social 
time preference would not be unique. 
Finally, the third formulation admits the interdependence of 
individual and community savings and consumption decisions. The 
individual has a unique time preference map (as was not the case in 
the schizophrcnic argument). Since his personal utility depends upon 
the decisions of all others both present and future, he resorts to the 
political processes to achieve maximum personal utility. It is desirable, 
til en, for tlio individual to join with others through political coercion 
to make collective investments which will lead to higher levels of 
personal utility than if no public investment were made. This funda­
mental result derives directly from the proposition that individual 
utility functions are not independent. This Interdependence will favor 
collective investment decisions and a level of total Investment and 
rate of social time preference distinct from a market determined 
Ki) lut ion. 
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Thus, it is suggested that the market determined rate of interest 
derived from the competitive model is not the relevant parameter for 
planning public investment, but rather, a social rate of time preference 
that admits the inter-dependency of private and public investment deci­
sions. The choice rule reduces to equating the marginal productivity 
; investment to the social rate of time preference. 
4. The opportunity costs of capital 
It is argued that the opportunity cost of public investment is 
not measured by the public long-term, borrowing rate on government 
bonds (9). This rate can be rejected by examining the nature of the 
capital market. First, there is the implication that the government 
bond rate should be used to discount future costs and returns of public 
investment projects because it is a relatively risk free rate. It 
cannot be claimed that government investment projects are risk free, 
therefore, the social cost of the use of resources in public investment 
is not risk free. There are risks associated with all facets of planning 
and implementation of a public investment projects; in the demand pro­
jections, in the selection of the proper technology, in the achievement 
of maximum production and in the estimation of the investment and op­
erating costs. The interest rate on long-term government borrowing 
depends upon the repayment capacity of the government which does not 
depend simply upon the success or failure of one or more investment proj­
ects but upon general economic and political conditions. In addition, 
government borrowing is not the only source of capital resources for 
public investments. The resources can be taxed away from the private 
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sector or the country can resort to long or short-term international 
borrowing. 
B. Investment Criteria 
The ranking and selection of investment projects conducive to 
economic development depends critically upon the national development 
planning objectives and the corresponding investment criteria chosen 
to reflect these objectives. Investment choice rules can be divided 
into two major classes-those which incorporate the passage of time i.e., 
dynamic, and those which are to a major degree independent of inters 
temporal considerations. This latter class of static investment criteria, 
as well as the dynamic criteria can be classified as composite or partial. 
Composite criteria measure the effects upon particular target variables 
of the total investment complex and the partial criteria establish the 
impact upon the target variable of a single scare input,e.g., foreign 
exchange. The benefit-cost ratio exemplifies a composite criteron and 
the output-investment ratio a partial criterion. 
An examination of the large class of static investment criteria 
follows below. The benefit-cost ratio is a generalized evaluation 
coefficient which takes as the limiting resource the input complex of 
the project. The ratio of net value added to investment is a type of 
partial coefficient that is frequently suggested to determine the 
investment allocation. In addition, there are other criteria, such as 
the Social Marginal Product of Investment, which combine two partial 
relations. Chenery has formulated this relation as a combination of 
the increase in national income due to the project investment with an 
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adjustment term for the effect of the investment upon the balance 
of payments. 
In the following sections the major static investment criteria 
are examined which are sufficiently well-defined to be applied in a 
development plan. The fundamental rationale for each criterion is 
discussed and the major theoretical and practical objections to its use 
in development planning are presented. Of special concern are those 
investment criteria which are of sufficient practicality to be applied 
in the selection of a project investment program for Peru. 
1. The benefit-cost ratio 
The benefit-cost ratio is widely employed for project evaluation 
in both advanced and developing economies. This criterion has been 
employed in the United States for project evaluation as early as the 
1930's especially for the evaluation of water resource development pro­
jects. Likewise, it has been extensively employed in developing nations 
to determine the pre-investment economic feasibility of development pro­
jects. All major international lending institutions require or recommend 
the calculation of this ratio. 
The extensive use of the benefit-cost ratio as an economic evalu­
ation criterion is no doubt due to its apparent simplicity of inter­
pretation and ease of applicability. In spite of its simplicity, it is 
frequently employed improperly in the preparation of feasibility studies. 
Among approximately twenty-five feasibility studies of water develop­
ment and jungle colonization projects examined by the author only one 
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small irrigation had an unfavorable benefit-cost ratio. A revision 
of these results using consistent and well-defined criteria yielded 
numerous overstated ratios. 
The most lucid statement of the theoretical framework of benefit-
cost analysis is presented by Eckstein (8). Prest and Turvey (33) pro­
vide an excellent survey of the major theoretical and practical con­
siderations required for benefit-cost analysis. 
The benefit-cost criterion is analagous to the efficiency first-
order maximization conditions of the perfectly competitive market model. 
Consider the perfectly competitive model with numerous buyers and sellers. 
The marginal conditions for profit maximization require that price is 
equated to marginal costs for all firms. Costs are determined by the 
technical conditions of production embodied in the production function 
and factor input prices. Benefits represent the willingness of the 
consumers to pay, or, in other terms, the value of the product to the 
consumer. Consequently, the marginal conditions imply that the ratio 
of marginal benefits (or price) to marginal costs is equal to unity 
in equilibrium. In considering discontinuous units such as projects 
the marginal benefits must be redefined as the incremental benefit due 
to the entire project investment or, in the previous terminology, 
marginal benefits and marginal costs. Therefore, the project is 
marginal with respect to the national economy. 
The above conditions can be derived mathematically for the case 
in wliicli social welfare is measured by national income (6). Let a 
change in social welfare (national product) be equal to 
w h e r e i s  a  ( 2 . 1 )  
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measure of social welfare, the xj are outputs and inputs and 
pj the respective prices subject to 
y(x =0, the project production function (2.2) 
Now maximize the relation 
\  /  \  L  -  p i  A  %  C  -  A  y  ( x , , .  -  •  '  (2.3)  
The first-order conditions are given by the relation 
where P and 1 1 are vectors with j elements. 
l&X i 
If benefits are defined as 
B = Pj^ A Xj^ + ... + Pk Zi Xk (2.5) 
where x....xj^ are the changes in output and costs are defined as 
C = A +...+ Pm A Xjjj (2.6) 
where A ... are changes in inputs. 
Then we have (1 - /X y ("Xy , (2.7) 
With its respective first-order conditions 
ISJ : Mf:i 
Isl '  HKI 
The latter relations are reduced directly to 
= 1 (2.9) 
àc 
Thus, to achievc maximum national income in the absence of a budget 
constraint, subject only to the production function and the basic 
postulates of the competitive model, the benefit-cost ratio of the 
marginal project should equal one. 
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The attainment of maximum social welfare is conditioned by the 
well known postulates of the perfectly competitive model. The model 
depends upon the rational economic behaviour of consumers and producers 
operating in a market with full information of input and output prices. 
Each producer always maximizes profit independently of all other pro­
ducers. Individual utility functions are independent as well as the 
production functions, thus eliminating all externalities. Perfect 
mobility of resources and perfect information yield full employment 
for all resources. 
All of these conditions lead to the proposition that the calcula­
tion of economic benefits of the investment projects in advanced 
economies is achieved by applying market prices. The benefits of 
public investment projects are in some cases not registered by the 
market mechanism, but within the framework of the competitive model 
the price can be imputed at the prevailing market prices. Thus, for 
example, the imputed value of the water produced by an irrigation proj­
ect is the added production due to the application of the greater 
supply of water. 
2. The social marginal productivity criterion 
The Social Marginal Productivity (SMP) test as elaborated by 
Chenery (6) is an operational method of allocating public investment 
among a set of projects given a fixed investment budget. This criterion 
is the combination of two commonly employed partial criteria, the 
capital turnover rate and the balance of payments effect. 
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An increase in social welfare is defined as an increase in national 
income, so that each of the components of the criterion is measured in 
national income units. Beginning with a generalized social welfare 
function which is some function of the effect on national income, Y; 
the effect on the balance-of-payments, B; and the effect on the dis­
tribution of income, D; of a given investment K, following Chenery, we 
have =,/% (Y,B,D) (2.10) 
from which 
A - Ar A B + èl A D (2.11) 
àB ào 
since it is assumed that ^ Recognizing the difficulty of 
ÔY 
measuring the effect of a given investment on the income distribution, 
the following formulation of the SMP of a given investment is: 
SMP = /Ut =AY + r4B (2.12) 
Chenery shows the SMP in two additional computable forms; 
SMP = V - Ç + r B 
K K K (2.13) 
= / V W + r B 
V kJ\ V / K (2.14); 
where K = the given project investment 
V = social domestic value added = X + E -
X = increase in project output 
E = additional output due to external economies 
Mj:= cost of imported materials 
C = total cost of domestic inputs = L + M^j + 0 
L = labor costs 
Mj= cost of domestic materials 
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0 = all other costs including replacement 
r = percentage difference between shadow and offical 
exchange rates 
B = total net balance of payments effect = aB]^ + B2 
B]^= effect of initial fixed investment on the 
balance of payments 
52= effect of project operation on the balance of 
payments 
a = combined amortization and interest rate charged 
against investment (commonly called the capital 
recovery factor). 
The first two terms of equation 2.13 provide the net rate of 
profit per unit of investment adjusted for the divergence between 
private and social costs. Chenery gives three basic adjustments for 
the private rate of return and in addition Eckstein (8) recognizes 
two other adjustments not covered by Chenery. First, the effects of 
tariffs, taxes and subsidies must be eliminated on both outputs and 
inputs. Secondly, external economies should be accounted for to the 
extent possible, especially if the production involves basic and neces­
sary services, e.g., electricity to other producers that makes possible 
additional output. Thirdly, the social value of unused resources, 
such as unemployed labor, should be calculated. Eckstein indicates 
at least two additional adjustments required to arrive at social cost. 
The existence of underemployed resources, especially unskilled labor, 
cannot be ignored in the calculation of social cost: it is not suffici 
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to consider only unused resources. Finally, to the extent that social 
overhead services are required to achieve full production of the proj­
ect then these must be included among the projects's costs. Chenery 
applies the criterion to industrial and agricultural projects in 
Italy and Greece. From these empirical investigations he examines the 
utility of using the capital turnover rate and the balance of payments 
effect individually versus the combined SMP test. Some of the important 
generalizations are summarized below. 
In equation 2.14, SMP is given in terms of the capital turnover 
rate V, the value margin V-C plus the previously termed balance-of 
K V 
payments effect. The two terms of the product need not necessarily be 
correlated and can be off-setting. 
With the balance-or-payments effect included, there is no neces­
sary positive correlation between the rate of capital turnover and the 
SMP of the project investment. In the case of agricultural projects 
Chenery argues that there is a probable negative correlation between 
SMP and the capital turnover rate. This is due to the relative high 
value of the balance-of-paymetits effects coupled with a relative low 
value for the capital turnover rate. Among the agricultural projects 
examined a low capital turnover rate was accompanied by a high value 
margin. 
Tlio capital turnover ratio is of greatest applicability within a 
hiimogoni'DUs sector Ln which the balance of payments effect and the 
value margin do not vary greatly between projects. The variation in 
SMP among projects is principally due to the variation in the capital 
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turnover r.iLf, In wlilch cane, the coel'flclent can be applied with greater 
consistency with the SMP test. 
Chenery suggests that in comparing mutually exclusive projects 
designed to provide the same types of economic goods or services, 
e.g., road versus railroad transportation, the output-capital ratio 
could serve as the choice criterion. However, this latter contention 
should be carefully examined in each case. In underdeveloped countries 
a common comparison of methods for achieving, the same level of output 
is typified by the comparison between hydroelectric and thermal power (41). 
ïlu' choice embodies the decision between a high initial fixed investment 
in liydroolectric facilities and lower operating and replacement costs 
during the project life versus a low initial investment in thermal 
facilities and relatively high operating costs. The capital turnover 
rate would discriminate against the more capital intensive project 
while failing to account for the possible advantages of the hydroelectric 
alternative due to its lower operating costs. To the extent that all 
of the resource requirements are not included the capital turnover rate 
is a myopic investment criterion focusing only on the initial invest­
ment outlays. 
An additional difficulty in the interpretation of the SMP criterion 
is how to account I'or time discounting. Chenery indicates that dis­
counting the future project returns enters only at the level of an over­
all investment program. However, a project investment criterion must 
include some adjustment for the gestation period of investment. Con­
sider the following example: two projects with equal initial invest­
ments, annual operating costs and levels of annual production but unequal 
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gestation periods. The project which reaches full production at the 
earlier data should be the preferred project. This possibility is not 
covered explicity by the SMP criterion. 
All terms in equation 2.13 are in annual values except K and 
so it is necessary to select the representative annual value for costs 
and production. On the cost side the difficulty is not as great. Oper­
ating and maintenance costs are relatively stable from year to year and 
compost! only a small proportion of annual costs. The principal problem 
is the selection of the representative annual value of production for 
each project. Most products require a "running-in" period to reach full 
production. The use of maximum ultimate annual production on the other 
hand is a commonly employed technique but tends to overstate annual 
production. These estimation problems will be dealt with in a suc­
ceeding chapter. 
An important component in determining the value for SMP is the 
balance-of-payments effect and especially the value for r - the marginal 
rate of substitution between national income and the balance-of-pay-
monts effect. The terra r is defined by the expression 
r = •_P.2 = (2.15) 
Pe 
where Pg = shadow price of foreign exchange 
PQ = official exchange rate 
If the balance-of-payments is in long-run equilibrium, then by def­
inition r = o and SMP is composed of the socially adjusted private 
rate of return per unit of investment. If the country suffers balance 
of payments difficulties and the exchange rate is overvalued, then r^o. 
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For example, if the accounting price of foreign exchange is twice the 
official rate then the balance-of-payments effect measured in national 
income units is multiplied by unity. Hence, the balance-of-payments 
effect is interpreted as the additional contribution to national income 
over and above that contributed at the official exchange rate. This 
latter contribution is necessarily included within the first term of 
equation 2.13 measured at the official rate. Only the marginal con­
tribution to national income is calculated by the last term of the 
equation. 
3. Partial static criteria 
The least complicated and most specific of all investment criteria 
are the wide class of partial static criteria composed of ratios between 
a measure of benefits and a single limiting resource. Examples of these 
ratios are the output-capital ratio, the output-labor ratio, the labor-
capital ratio and the foreign exchange earnings-investment in foreign 
exchange ratio. Other ratios can be conveniently constructed as the 
planning requirements arise. 
As macro-economic variables these ratios are usually applied 
assuming that they are relatively stable over time or follow a fairly 
well-defined path during the development process, the aggregate pro­
duction function of many macro-economic development models is based upon 
the relative stability of the capital-output ratio. 
The output-investment ratio, as a criterion for public investments 
planning, is based upon the proposition that capital is the principal 
restricting resource. To attain the highest level of national output 
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public investment should be distributed so as to maximize the ratio of 
output to investment for the projects selected. 
A difficulty with this ratio is that a project which uses less 
capital per unit of output does not necessarily contribute more to 
national output than one which uses more capital per unit of output. 
This is due to the fact that the capital output criterion is static, 
thereby, omitting the measurement of capital durability. Thus, although 
a less capital intensive project may contribute more output per unit of 
investment, the more capital intensive project may make an annual con­
tribution to annual national output over a longer period of time with 
less annual resource requirements in replacement, maintenance and 
operation. Thus, where alternative investment schemes have different 
economic lives the capital turnover criteria, may not determine the 
optimum mix of public investments. 
Other partial static criteria that are frequently proposed for 
project evaluation are now considered. As with the capital-output 
ratio these criteria would seem to be especially applicable to project 
planning directed to the achievement of very narrow objectives. The 
output-investment ratio can be used in those cases in which capital is 
the major limiting input and the projects are similar in nature, e.g., 
within a well-defined sector or sub-sector such as irrigation projects. 
The output in foreign exchange-investment in foreign exchange ratio 
is a limited criterion that can be estimated for development projects. 
During periods of chronic balance-of-payments difficulties the planning 
authorities must distribute the limited amount of foreign exchange con­
sistent with the national planning targets. Foreign exchange should be 
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distributed among the feasible projects selecting, first, those projects 
with the largest value for the ratio of added output in foreign exchange 
per unit of investment expenditures in foreign exchange. 
The redistribution of project investment, especially in infrastruc­
ture, is not necessarily a useful tool for solving balance of payments 
difficulties. The criterion would be of importance only under serious 
balance-of-payments conditions in which normal monetary and fiscal 
measures are ineffective. This stems from the possibility that there 
is no necessary relationship between maximum output in foreign exchange 
per unit of foreign exchange investment and maximum putput per unit of 
investment in foreign exchange. Under these circumstances, the increase 
in national output resulting from the decision rule, the output in foreign 
exchange-investment in foreign exchange ratio, may yield less output 
than in applying the criterion the output-total investment ratio. 
Policy makers are then faced with the difficulty of determining 
a convenient rate of substitution between increments in output from 
project investment both in local and foreign currencies, and increments 
in output solely in foreign currency. However, the principal problem 
is one of selecting the project mix consistent with the best allocation 
of the scarce resources. It is likely that the two output-investment 
ratios will result in a different list of project priorities than the 
output in foreign exchange-foreign exchange investment ratio. The 
final selection of projects will then depend upon; 1) the seriousness 
of the balance-of-payments constraint and the resultant foreign ex­
change stringency and 2) the relative size of the direct public invest­
ment program in the development strategy. 
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In conclusion, several classes of national planning problems might 
require the use of a criterion that measures the impact on the national 
economy of expenditures in scarce foreign exchange. The ratios are 
among the partial static criteria most commonly used by the planning 
authorities: the output-foreign exchange investment ratio; the ratio 
of earnings in foreign exchange to investment in foreign exchange and 
the ratio of foreign exchange earnings to total project investment. 
When employment creation is a major planning goal then in the 
construction of the partial evaluation coefficients some measure of 
project labor use per unit of the scarce resources must be estimated. 
Specifically, planners are interested in specifying the amount of un­
skilled labor required during the construction and operating phase of 
the projects. The labor-capital ratio or the labor-output ratio are 
useful for indicating the partial effect of the project's investment 
and production upon improving employment conditions. 
4. The reinvestment criterion 
It was indicated in previous sections that the output investment-
ratio has been employed as an index of social marginal productivity of 
project investment. Under this criterion, national income is maximized 
by allocating public investment among those projects with the highest 
ratio of annual project output to project investment. 
The fundamental result of the criterion - that national income is 
maximized by maximizing the ratio of output to investment - has been 
challenged by Galenson and Leibenstein (13) and the argument further 
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developed by Eckstein (8). It is argued that the output-investment 
ratio as an index of SMP does not necessarily maximize the level of 
present or future national income due to the following factors. First, 
the criterion is static and is, therfore, inapplicable to the basic 
problem of establishing either the time path of national income or its 
maximization at some pre-established future date. The criterion does 
not account for the impact upon the future rate of investment and capital 
accumulation of a given set of investment projects. The future path 
of investment and income depends upon the level of the initial invest­
ment and the reinvestable surplus generated over the life of the project. 
It is this latter component that is not included in the output-invest-
ment ratio and which yields a higher level of future investment and 
output than shown by the output-investment ratio. The reinvestment 
criterion of Galenson and Leibenstein is an extension and modification 
of the criterion applied to estimate the SMP of public investment. 
First, it is argued by Galenson and Leibenstein that the criterion 
of maximizing the output-investment ratio is inappropriate because of 
its failure to account for important dynamic elements of development. 
Highly capital intensive investment, may have a larger value of re­
investable surplus than a project selected by the usual criterion of 
the maximization of output to investment. New skills may be developed, 
new markets opened and important bottlenecks overcome by the capital 
intensive investment. The authors argue that those projects which dis­
play a high value of output to investment are precisely those which 
require fewer technical innovations and less market adjustments through 
the application of existing skills and technologies. 
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In addition, in industries subject to increasing returns the 
standard output-investment criterion would not permit the attainment of 
an efficient size plant favoring, therefore, projects with constant 
or decreasing return to scale. 
A second corrolary to the SMP criterion subject to criticism is 
the rule that the ratio of labor employed in the project to investment 
should be maximized. Given two projects with equal investments the 
project which yields the lesser output may provide the greatest employ­
ment. This yields a contradiction between the rules of maximizing the 
the labor-investment and the output-investment ratio. Furthermore, the 
problem of the measurement of the additional employment generated is 
confounded by the presence of substantial unemployment. It is contended 
that the application of the output-investment and labor-investment 
criterion will lead to continued low labor productivity and low income 
levels. The key variable is the very high population growth potential 
present in underdeveloped countries which responds to increases in 
labor productivity generated by the investment chosen by the output-
investment and labor-investment criteria. The argument is as follows: 
investment is increased which in turn increases average labor pro­
ductivity; however, the population expansion is increased thereby re­
ducing aggregate labor productivity to the pre-investment levels. 
The appropriate criterion, according to Galenson and Leibenstein 
is to maximize the investment-labor ratio accompanied with increased 
efforts to increase labor skill, which together will combine to maximize 
output per capita. The principal determinants of development are the 
amount of investment which stem from the initial investment and the 
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size of the labor force. 
The investment decision rule, termed the marginal per capita re­
investment quotient (MR) is to equate the MR of investment in its 
alternative uses. The net amount of reinvestment per worker is taken 
as the gross output per worker less consumption and investment replace­
ment per worker. Therefore, for long-run economic development countries 
should favor investments which maintain the short-run gap between output 
and consumption thus, giving rise to a high rate of capital accumulation. 
Thus, according to Leibenstein, a critical minimum effect is necessary 
for long run development or the resultant population explosion will 
tend to push down temporarily attained increases in output per capita. 
Eckstein (8) quantifies the above arguments. Each project has a 
marginal growth contribution (MGC) which combines 1) the present value 
of the direct contribution of the project Investment to output and 
2) the output resulting from the reinvestable surplus of the project. 
The former is termed the efficiency component and the latter the re­
investment component of the initial project investment. The planning 
problem is to determine the trade off between the efficiency and the 
reinvestment component and their respective weights in determining the 
MGC. First, Eckstein demonstrates that the MGC is very sensitive to the 
interest rate. With a low rate of interest the high reinvestment project 
is chosen. At high rates of interest the efficiency objective pre­
dominates the MGC over the reinvestment component. Thus, the reinvest­
ment objective is of greatest importance with a low rate of discount. 
This conclusion is expected since a high interest rate places a greater 
weight upon short-term gains as compared with long-term returns measured 
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by the reinvestment component. 
In addition, the choice between an efficient project and a high 
reinvestment project depends upon the use of the reinvestment component. 
If the reinvestable surplus is channeled to projects with low marginal 
productivities of capital and high reinvestable components the choice 
rule would tend to favor those projects with high reinvestment components 
irrespective of the level of the interest rate. In turn, if the growth 
potential is low the initial investment would best be employed in proj­
ects with high marginal productivity of capital and little or no re­
investment component. 
It is important to turn to the efficacy of the application of some 
form of the reinvestment criterion to public investment programs in 
underdeveloped countries. The reinvestment criterion is usually suggested 
for industrial projects. Galenson and Leibenstein placed major emphasis 
on ur: an-oriented industrial projects. Solomon (35) suggests the cal­
culation of a "surplus rate of return" which incorporates the rate at 
which a project generates additional reinvestable funds, where the sur­
plus is defined as the sum of profits, depreciation, interest payments 
and taxes generated annually by the project. It is implied that over 
a long planning horizon projects should be selected on the basis of their 
reinvestment component. This approach is a simplified version of the 
more complete model developed by Eckstein, and suffers from the practical 
difficulty that the reinvestable surplus is assumed to be invested in 
projects all of which have an equal marginal productivity of capital and 
the same rate of reinvestment. Thus, the number and quality of the set 
of future investment opportunities are assumed to be unlimited relative 
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to the supply of capital and these opportunities will remain unaltered 
by the present or future pattern of public and private investment. 
Public investment in underdeveloped countries is not conducive 
to the application of a reinvestment criterion. First, many of the 
principal kinds of investment undertaken by the public sector cannot 
be undertaken by the private sector. Basic infrastructure projects such 
as roads, harbors, land reclamation and electrical generation are not 
usually considered to be surplus generating. Evidently, it is because 
these projects, while requiring large amounts of capital not available 
in the private sector, do not produce an unsubsidized surplus that they 
are not undertaken by the private sector. For example, in the case of 
large irrigation projects it is usually not expected that those benefited 
will be able to amortize the initial capital cost. 
If a reinvestable surplus is generated it is indirect and diffused 
in the form of external economies accruing to the private sector and 
national economy. It is impossible to trace the growth potential of 
such inputs using the statistical data presently available for most 
projects. 
Secondly, although capital is a dominant restriction the lack of 
well prepared investments projects limits the practicality of identifying 
second and third round investment possibilities. There is no easy way 
of establishing the growth potential of succesive round investment 
opportunities, i.e., their marginal productivities or their reinvestment 
coefficients. 
Finally, a reinvestment criterion must be based upon e assumption 
of a long-term consistent reinvestment policy of the public and the 
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private sector. The public sector must maintain a consistent long-term 
policy of investing any reinvestable surplus through increased government 
or direct project revenues rather than committing the surplus to public 
consumption. Private investors are required to sustain a high saving 
and investment rate. A policy of directing investment towards projects 
with high reinvestment components implies a very long planning horizon, 
thus requiring a relatively sophisticated planning system. 
Thus, although the reinvestment criterion involves the recognition 
of a possible important effect of investment, its appeal is diminished 
by the difficulty of its practical application and its limited aplicability 
to projects in the industrial sector. 
C. Summary 
A number of investment criteria have been examined from the view­
point of their efficacy as development planning tools. The fundamental 
theoretical problems associated with their use have been of paramount 
importance in this elaboration. 
Investment criteria, such as the benefit-cost ratio, must be 
adapted to the fundamental market distortions extant in underdeveloped 
economies. This is accomplished by adjusting the market prices of 
capital, labor and foreign exchange for under or over valuation, A 
discount rate reflecting the social evaluation of capital is necessary, 
i.e., the opportunity cost of capital modified by considerations of 
social time preference. Especially due to substantial disguised un­
employment in the agricultural sector a shadow wage rate must be adopted 
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that reflects the overvalued market rate. Likewise, under conditions 
of permanent balance-of-payments disequilibrium, the shadow price of 
foreign exchange, which reflects its undervaluation relative to the 
official exchange rate, must be employed in the calculation of a 
project's payoff. 
Among the class of applicable investment criteria the following 
have been considered: the cost-benefit ratio, the social marginal 
productivity test, the reinvestment criterion, and several partial static 
criteria including the output-investment ratio, the output in foreign 
exchange-investment in foreign exchange ratio, the investment-labor 
ratio and the output-labor ratio. It has been argued that all of these 
criteria, except the reinvestment criterion, are useful for establishing 
project priorities in developing countries. 
In the following sections, the above criteria will be applied to 
projects in the Peruvian agricultural sector. Coastal and sierra water 
development, a major class of agricultural infrastructure investment 
is treated. This type of project is a major competitor for Peruvian 
public investment funds in agriculture. In the comming years the choices 
among these projects to determine their relative weights and mix in 
the public investment program will have an important impact upon the 
agricultural development of Peru especially upon the regional dis­
tribution of public agricultural investment. A comparative analysis 
of each of the projects will be made for purpose of determining the 
most appropriate mix of projects consistent with sector and national 
development goals. 
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III. ALTERNATIVES FOR PERUVIAN PUBLIC INVESTMENT 
IN WATER RESOURCE PROJECTS 
A large proportion of recent direct public investment, aside from 
social infrastructure such as education, housing and urban services, 
has been made in the agricultural sector principally in the form of 
physical investment in coastal and sierra irrigation projects and 
jungle penetration roads. Historically investment in irrigation for 
new land expansion, improvement and drainage systems has been an important 
activity of the public sector. A recent phenomenon is the emphasis of 
the Central Government on jungle colonization. This has taken the form 
of public investment in agricultural penetration roads and the develop­
ment of programs for extensive government support in the form of agri­
cultural planning, extension, and long-term credits for development 
zones of the jungle. These activities are being supported by international 
credits. 
Agricultural planners are now confronted with the difficult task 
of setting priorities among and within the class of major agricultural 
infrastructure projects. On the one hand, the irrigation projects are 
located mainly in the coastal region which in general is characterized 
by technologically advanced and well organized farms with yields equiv­
alent to those in advanced countries. The coastal irrigation are varied 
in character. There are large projects which are located entirely on 
presently unsettled lands. These projects are very capital intensive 
and with long gestation periods but provide the opportunity to shape 
the future agricultural development of the zone in terms of the commercial 
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and tenure organization. The advantages, however, must be weighed 
against the high cost of intensive development projects. 
A second form of coastal irrigation is the improvement of existing 
irrigation systems. this is also the prevalent type of sierra irriga­
tion investment. These projects vary greatly in size and can cover 
several thousands of hectares. Currently, the majority of the proposed 
projects are small, ranging from a few hundred to two or three thousand 
hectares. An irrigation improvement normally involves relining and 
perhaps increasing the capacity of existing irrigation canals. A 
reservoir may be added to improve the water regulation to existing cul­
tivated land areas. The amount of on-farm infrastructure investment is 
not as large as on new lands irrigation projects and the project pro­
duction response would be expected to be more immediate than new land 
projects since some on-farm infrastructure already exists in the proj­
ect area. Agricultural planners can impose little control over the 
organization of production since the tenure structure is predetermined 
and difficult to alter. 
In addition, there are several minor categories of projects that 
fall within the irrigation sector. These include projects for the 
construction of drainage systems and to improve small flood control 
systems. 
A. Historical Experience In Irrigation Investment 
Table 1 shows the annual level of central government investment 
in irrigation works. A cursory examination of these data shows that 
the central government investment in irrigation has varied considerably 
Year 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1945 
1. Central government expenditure and investment including investment in irrigation, 1950-1963 
(million of soles in 1963 constant prices) 
Total ex­
penditures 
Public 
investment 
Public 
investment as 
% of total ex­
penditure 
Public 
investment in 
irrigation 
Irrigation invest­
ment as a % of 
total investment 
4,104 464 11.8 138 28.3 
4,591 502 10.9 173 34.5 
5,401 1,171 21.17 241 20.6 
5,980 306 15.1 173 56.5 
5,663 706 12.5 56 7.9 
7,048 1,581 22.4 329 20.8 
7,965 1,348 16.9 491 36.4 
7,830 1,104 14.1 286 25.9 
7,866 1,150 14.6 230 20.0 
8,112 740 9.1 130 17.6 
8,365 658 7.9 30 4.6 
10,336 1.260 12.2 82 6.5 
11,604 1,496 12.9 111 7.4 
13,195 884 6.7 164 18.6 
15,519 2,006 12.9 — — — — — — 
15,399 2,049 13.3 - - - - - -
Source: (1) 
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sinccî l'j'jO. Till!ru arc; three distinct periods in which investment in 
irrigation has increased in levels and in proportion to overall public 
investment: 1951 - 1953, 1955 - 1958, and post 1963. During the 
first period irrigation investment grew to account for more than 50 per­
cent of total investment although this appears to be the result of a sharp 
decline in other central government investment expenditures. Irrigation 
investment declined from S/. 241 to S/. 173 millions. The change in 
the relative share in all other years is due to the relative expansion 
in irrigation investment. The importance of irrigation investment is 
evident; during years of increased investment as much as one-third of 
all central government investment has been in coastal and sierra land 
expansion and improvement projects. 
The period following 1964 has been one of increased irrigation 
investment. As shown in Table 2, total irrigation investment is 
expected to double during the period 1965 to 1968. The 1968 estimate 
is based upon the assumptions that no new construction starts will 
occur and that no delays in construction on current projects will occur. 
Table 2. Investment in irrigation works 1965-1968 (million of 
current soles) 
Year 
Central government 
investment 
Independent 
public sector Total 
1965 256 143 399 
1966 216 190 406 
1967 414 206 620 
1968 557 257 814 
' tIk' author 
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This level should probably be adjusted downward given the re­
stricting effects of the devaluation and budgetary crisis on central 
government investment at the end of 1967. However, the major com­
ponents of expenditure on irrigation works, namely the Tinajones and 
San Lorenzo Projects, will likely be continued since their financing 
was completed before the initiation of the 1968 government budgetary 
difficulties. 
Throughout the 1950's the central government has accounted for 
tlie major share of public investment in irrigation. In recent years 
numerous institutions have taken on direct responsibility for initi­
ating investment in irrigation projects.1 The entities which executa 
irrigation projects form either part of the central government or the 
Independent Public Sub-sector (Sub-sector PAblico Independiente). 
In the central government, the Direction of Irrigation (Direcci&n 
de Irrigacièn) is the principal executing agency whose responsibilities 
and power include programing, direction, executing and supervision 
of irrigation projects. This office has concentrated most of its 
activities in the coastal regions. 
The only other agency of importance in the central government 
connected with irrigation activities is the Direction of Water (Direc-
ciAn de'Aguas de Regadio) whose principal function is the administrai;ion 
^Following the preparation of this section the Direction of 
Irrigation was shifted to the Ministry of Agriculture under a 
general government reorganization. 
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of surface and ground water, execution of the works complementary to 
irrigation (e.g., drainage) and the collection of hydrological 
statistics. 
Within the independent public sub.-sector there are numerous 
agencies which can execute irrigation works. The National Economic 
Development Fund (El Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Econ&mico) contracts 
feasibility studies and executes projects at the regional level through 
the Departmental Public Works Committees (Juntas Departamentales de 
Obras Publicas). Recently the National Economic Development Fund 
(FNDE) has concentrated major activities in small irrigation improve­
ment projects in the sierra. 
Each Department (Departamento) has a development corporation which 
can also execute irrigation projects. These corporations have independ­
ent revenues sources and also receive revenue transfers from the 
central government. They can directly contract the execution of proj­
ects or, of recent experience, can execute projects in cooperation 
with FNDE or the Direction of Irrigation. 
In addition, an independent coordinating committee made up of 
entities of the central government and independent public sub-sector 
exists for the purpose of executing projects with credits from the 
Interamerican Development bank. This is known as the Comision 
Coordinadora, Linea Global de Crédite. 
It is apparent that one of the major tasks of irrigation planning 
resides in coordinating the activities of the diverse set of independent 
institutions. The present institutional structure inhibits the establish­
ment of priorities and the application of a consistent set of evaluation 
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criteria. The difficulty with the present structure is the absence of 
an office with a clear responsibility to evaluate the set of available 
irrigation projects. The National Planning Institute (Instituto 
Nacional de Planificaciôn) has two offices which have carried out some 
degree of project planning: The Project Office (Direccion de Provectos) 
and the Sectoral Office of Agricultural Planning (Oficina Sectorial de 
Planificaciôn Agraria). The former office has evolved to be the admin­
istrator of a fund to finance project feasibility studies. The latter 
office has concentrated on long-term agricultural planning. The need 
for setting priorities has not been felt until recent years due to the 
relative scarcity of well conceived projects. But since 1960 increas­
ingly large amounts of public expenditure have been spent in the prepa­
ration of feasibility studies. Consequently, there are at least six 
large and twenty small irrigation projects for which feasibility studies 
are available. The investment costs of the projects greatly exceed 
the annual investment capacity of the public sector and would require 
a substantial expansion in technical and construction capacity to be 
implemented. 
Before proceeding to the comparative economic analysis of irrigation 
projects each of the projects to be considered is now described. It is 
not possible to consider all of the irrigation projects that have 
feasibility studies, but all major projects are examined as well as a 
representative group of small projects. The projects as outlined in the 
feasibility studies are taken as given data. The examination of the 
optimal project design is beyond the scope of this study; to the extent 
that alternative data sources suggest optimistic project outcomes a 
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partial adjustment of the projects is possible. For example, in some 
cases the output per hectare of major crops will be adjusted to reflect 
a more likely outcome based upon currently attained yields under similar 
technical conditions. 
B. Description Of The Projects 
Olmos The Olmos irrigation project (12), located on the 
northern Peruvian coast, is expected to add 85,751 net irrigation 
hectareas within 20 years of its initiation. 
This multi-purpose project has three principal components: irriga­
tion, electrical energy generation and investment in agricultural 
product processing plants. The total projected private and public 
investment (excluding replacement) necessary over a 23 year period is 
S/. 10,163,7 ($379.2) million in 1966 prices of which S/. 7,337.0 
($273.8) is the estimated public component as shown in Table 3. The 
private sector investment (Table 3) is estimated at S/. 2,826.7 ($105.5) 
million, of which farmers must provide S/. 2,580.3 (96.3) million and 
private investors S/. 264.4 ($9.9) million in processing facilities. 
The principal components of the fixed public investments include 
the main works for S/. 5,087.0 ^ 189.8) million of which S/. 1,081.8 
($40.4) million cover the cost of a 20 kilometer transandean tunnel and 
S/. 1,081.9 ($40.4) million for two power stations with a total capacity 
of 520,000 kilowatts. Of the headworks cost S/. 2,091 ($78.0) million 
in equivalent currency are needed. The remaining component of public 
investment involves S/. 2,250.0 ($84.0) million for the irrigation 
distribution system of the plains, of which S/. 642.4 ($24.0) million 
Table 3. Summary of irrigation project feasibility study data 
Costs 
Base Con­ On-farm Equiv­ Con­ On-farm Equiv- • 
Hectares year struc­ develop­
Total 
alent strue - develop­ aient 
Project New Improved Total prices tion ment total tion ment Total total 
Olmos 86,751 86,751 
(millions 
1966 4,276.8 
of soles) 
2,580.3 6,857.1° 
(millions (millions of 
59!9:)79.0 
(thousands 
ofgdgllars] 
Choclococha 8,500 28,000 36,500 1965 893.2 530.2 1,423.4 53.1 24.5 14.5 39,0 2.9 
Tumes 12,315 7,145 19,460 1965 673.6 50.6 724.2 27.0 34,6 2.6 37.2 1,4 
Majes 57,000 - - - - 57,000 1965 3,700.0 3,400.0 7,100.0 264,9 64.9 59.7 124.6 4,6 
Moquegua 3,080 3,670 6,750 1965 290.0 26.4 316,8 11.8 43,0 3,9 46.9 1.8 
El Cural 3,065 — — — — 3,065 1965 110.7 11.1 121.8 4.5 36.1 3.6 39.7 1.5 
La Cano 2,120 — — — - 2,120 1965 93.1 8.0 101.1 3.8 43.9 3,8 47.7 1.8 
El Huevo 2,070 — — — — 2,070 1965 79.9 6.5 86.4 3.2 38.6 3,1 41.7 1.6 
Majes, 1,780 1,530 3,310 1965 256.9 9.7 266.6 9.9 77.6 2.9 80.5 3.0 
Camana 210 1,065 1,815 1965 48.5 3.5 52.0 1.9 26,7 2.0 28.7 1.1 
Tambo 505 1,765 2,270 1965 68.2 7.3 75.5 2.8 30.1 3.2 33.3 1.2 
Iberia 880 — — — — 880 1965 20.6 3.4 24.0 0.9 23.4 3.9 27.3 1.0 
Antaura — — — — 1,175 1,175 1965 7.5 2.6 10.1 0.4 6.4 2.2 8.6 0.3 
Huanscolla — — 925 925 1965 13.8 2.4 16.2 0.6 14.9 2,6 17.5 0.7 
Chococo — — - — 1,525 1,525 1965 28.3 4.3 32.6 1.2 18.6 2.8 21.4 0,8 
Chira 7,471 28,114 35,586 1967 1,310.9 582.9 1,893.8 70.7 36.8 16.4 53.2 2.0 
Chantaco 1,272 1,272 1966 8.8 13.2 22,0 0.8 6.9 10.4 17.3 0.6 
Total 
% 
185,747 
70.8 
76,726 262,473 
29.2 100.0 
Figure 1. Peruvian irrigation projects, location and hectares. 
55 
C O L O M B I A  
E C  U  A  D  0  
TOMBES 19.460 Mom 
CHIRA 35,585 Ho« 
'rP'TURA'^ -
?-( û'sN. margin r"~ 
\ - . OLMOS 86.751 Ha». B R A S  I L  
LIBERTAD 
^AWco 
\  r -  P  A  S C O  j  
V..-V..X 
KfF^t} 
CftLLAO MADRE DE 
CHOCLOCOCHA S6.S00 Ha» 
|HUANSC0LLA«925 Mpr 
I CHOCOCO-1.525 IPA^ ANTAURA ' M7S Ko» 
MAUES- 57,000 Mo» 
I EL HUE VP 2.070 Ho» 
NEW HECTARES. /à 
NEW AND MPROVa) HECTARES ... A 
IMPROVED HECTARES * 
ILA CANO'2,120 
EL CURAL 3,065 Mo» 
jMOQUECUA 6,753 
CHILE 
56 
are needed in foreign currency. 
The; associated agricultural development costs of S/. 2,580.3 
($96.3) million are divided among three purposes, land reclamation 
S/. 9M.6 ($36.7) million; land settlement S/. 594,6 ($22.2) million; 
and agricultural development; S/. 1,000.8 ($37.3) million. 
Approximately 7,400 families will be settled over a period of 20 
years; 7,000 families on farms having an average of 10 hectares and 
400 families on farms averaging 40 hectares. 
Choclacocha The principal purpose of the Choclacocha 
irrigation project (21) is the improvement of existing land under 
cultivation in the Valley of Ica, approximately 28,000 hectares, with 
the provision for adding 8,500 vewly irrigated hectares. 
The total fixed public investment cost for this single purpose 
project is estimated at S/. 946.0 ($35.3) million. An additional 
S/. 50.6 ($1.9) million are needed for land leveling, reclamation and 
the farm irrigation distribution system. 
The construction components, their costs in local and foreign 
currency include: feeder canals for a total of S/. 171.5 ($6.4) million, 
of which S/. 101.8 ($3.8) million are in foreign currency; and dam works, 
for a total of S/. 195.6 ($7.3) million and S/. 115.2 ($4.3) million 
in foreign currency. 
The construction works of this project are designed to improve 
the existing irrigation network and headwprks. The existing Choclacocha 
eanril is to be re lined. In addition, 150 kilometers of new main and 
lateral canals will be constructed in the plains to improve the water 
supply on existing land and to increase the cultivated area. 
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Neither the number of families directly affected nor the number 
of new families or proposed size holdings have been analyzed in the 
feasibility study. The outcome of the project depends heavily upon 
the future distribution of water right - a distribution dependent upon 
a new legislative action - and an adequate system of water controls 
and charges. 
Tumbes The Tumbes irrigation project (16), located in 
the northermost part of the Peruvian coast, is a two stage multipurpose 
project covering nearly 20,000 hectares. The first stage (left bank 
improvement) is an agricultural improvement phase designed to increase 
the water supply to 7,145 hectares currently in small farm units. The 
small amount of electrical energy capacity installed in the first stage 
will bt; employed by the agricultural sector for rural electrification 
and water pumping. 
The second stage is designed to increase the irrigated hectares 
under cultivation by 12,315 hectares and provide an initial installed 
electrical power supply of 10,000 kilowatts. 
The first stage, to be constructed over 3 years, involves a total 
outlay of S/. 135.2 ($2.7) million, of which S/. 35.1 ($1.3) million 
are needed to cover the foreign currency requirements. All of these costs 
are charged to the agricultural features of the project with S/. 14.7 
($.5) million additionally to cover agricultural development costs. 
The second stage of the project, which covers a construction period 
of rive and one-half years, involves both agricultural and power genera­
tion with construction components totaling S/. 802.1 ($29.9) millions. 
An additional S/. 35.2 ($1.3) million cover the associated agricultural 
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development cost. 
Roughly 2,700 families are directly affected by the project. Under 
the two stage progrm, 600 families are relocated to the new irrigation 
area from the area improved under the first stage development. Exactly 
what administrative and legal measures are required to achieve this 
redistribution in ovnership is not discussed in the feasibility study. 
Majes The Majes irrigation project (10), located in the 
Southern Departmnet of Arequipa is projected to add 57,000 net irrigated 
hectares. A stage construction is planned in two principal steps to be 
terminated, respectively, eight and twelve years after initiation of 
construction of the first stage. The first stage development will add 
26,000 gross hectares and the second 37,000 gross hectares. 
The stage construction includes the following primary construction 
cost: the first at a cost of S/. 2,767.0 ($103.2) million and the second 
for S/. 1,2000 ($44.8) million. Charging S/. 270.0 ($10.0) million to 
possible future electrical energy generation leaves a primary construc­
tion cost for the irrigation features of S/. 3,700.0 ($138.1) million. 
No estimate is available for the direct foreign exchange costs of the 
project. The associated agricultural development costs are expected to 
reach a level of S/. 3,400.0 ($126.9) million. 
A special feature of this project is that irrigation will be 
carried out by aspersion techniques rather than the usual canal distri­
bution system. This is due to the high filtration rate of the soils in 
the project area. The failure to account for this filtration rate for 
a project in the same zone has resulted in a delay and increased costs 
arising from the need to modify the existing system. 
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It is currently planned that about 6,000 families are to be 
settled once the project is underway with an average farm size of 10 
cultivated hectares. 
Moquegua The Moquegua water development project (30), 
located on the southern coast, is designed to add 6,750 hectares 
divided into 3,670 improved hectares and 3,080 new hectares. 
This project is not exclusively an irrigation project since an esti­
mated 55 percent of the water developed by the project will be presumably 
employed by the Southern Perù Cooper Corporation for projected mining 
exploitation. Therefore the outcome and the feasibility of the project 
depend entirely upon the investment plans and future water needs of 
local mining activities. 
The total primary construction costs of the project are S/. 646.7 
($24.1) million, of which S/. 293.8 ($11.0) million are foreign currency 
costs. As shown in Table 3, S/. 290.0 ($10.8) million are charged to 
the irrigation features of the project. 
The agricultural development cost are S/. 26.4 ($9.9) million. 
In evaluating the irrigation features of the project, the project 
planners have not distributed the construction costs among the various 
project purposes - irrigation, city water supply and mining water 
supply. The costs in Table 3 show the minimum costs chargeable to the 
irrigation system. 
The study estimates that 240 families can be settled on the new 
hectares whom some of can be relocated from currently cultivated land. 
Arequipa projects The Department of Arequipa located on 
the Southern Peruvian Coast is a zone of relative land scarcity coupled 
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with a high rate of increase in population especially in the principal 
urban center of Arequipa. For these reasons there has existed con­
tinued pressure for public investment in irrigation works. The project 
La Joya is currently under construction and a number of feasibility 
studies have been completed including the previously discussed Majes 
project. 
Among those projects for which complete studies are available are 
ten small projects located in various zones of the Arequipa area (17). 
Three projects are planned for currently uninhabited areas. These 
virgin land projects include El Cural with 3, 065 hectares. La Cano 
with 2,102 hectares, and El Huevo with 2, 725 hectares to be irrigated, 
for a total of 7,892 hectares; the three projects will permit the 
addition of 1,068 farm units with an average size of 7.4 hectares. The 
respective construction costs are as follows: El Cural S/. 110,690.0 
($4.1) million; El Cano S/.93,086.0 ($3.5) million and El Huevo S/. 79,850.0 
(3.0) million. In addition roughly 10 percent of the construction 
cost will be needed for the associated on-farm development costs. These 
include such items as land leveling and the construction of the on-farm 
development components. 
Four coastal valley projects are planned for the zone. These 
projects are designed to reclaim and improve lands currently subject 
to frequent annual flooding and crop damage. A total of 4,900 hectares 
would be improved and 3,375 hectares can be added that are not currently 
under cultivation. About 225 new farm units are provided on the new 
lands. The projects and their construction cost are as follows: Majes, 
S/. 256,867.0 ($9.6) million; Camana, S/.48,500.0 ($1.8) million; 
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Tambo, S/. 68,180.0 ($2.5) million; and Iberia i/. 20,576.0 ($0.8) 
million. Additional variable amounts will be needed for the associated 
development costs. 
Finally, three projects - Ântaura, Huansocolla and Chococo - are 
planned for the sierrà area. These projects will improve 3,625 
hectares covering approximately 1800 farm units. The construction 
costs of the projects are: Antaura S/. 7,470.0 ($2.8) million, 
Huansacolla S/. 13,790.0 ($5.1) million; and Chococo S/. 28,340.0 
($10.6) million. Additional public funds would be needed for the 
associated development costs and agricultural credit. 
Chira valley The Chira valley project (20), located in 
the Northern department of Piura consists of the improvement of 28,114 
net irrigated hectares and the addition of 7,471 new hectares. The 
project involves the construction and improvement of the irrigation 
distribution system and the construction of a reservoir for the annual 
discharges of approximately 3,500 million cubic meters of which 70 per­
cent occur in the months of February, March, April and May. In 1967 
prices the total construction cost, excluding interest during construc­
tion is S/. 1,311.0 ($48.9) million of which about 44 percent are local 
currency costs. In addition to the primary distribution costs S/.582, 
873.0 ($21.7) million are needed for associated development costs. These 
costs include land leveling, the on-farm irrigation distribution system 
and the construction on a drainage system. 
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IV. THE ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF PERUVIAN IRRIGATION PROJECTS 
This chapter presents the economic evaluation of the previously 
described irrigation projects. The investment criteria examined in 
Chapter II are applied to each group of projects and a comparative 
analysis of the projects is made. Likewise, a comparative evaluation 
of the investment choice criteria is made to determine the extent to 
which the criteria vary in the selection of project priorities and 
this analysis will permit the selection of criteria that, with minimal 
information, can be applied by planning authorities for project selection. 
Each of the irrigation projects is subjected to a detailed 
economic analysis. Initially, the feasibility study of eadi project is 
reviewed and the output data are revised to account for under-or over-
valuat ion. 
The cost data are adjusted to a base year. Once the projects are 
adjusted to the base year a comparative analysis of cost and output 
data is made. This permits the identification of projects with cost 
and production data which have been obviously over-or under estimated, 
A detailed benefit-cost analysis applying alternative benefit estimates 
will allow an initial ranking of the projects. In addition, the Social 
Marginal Productivity of Investment and various partial evaluation 
criteria are applied to the projects. A sensitivity analysis of net 
project benefits through the introduction of alternative shadow prices 
for labor, capital and foreign exchange concludes this section. 
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A. Revision Of The Irrigation Feasibility Studies 
The economic analysis of the irrigation projects is based upon 
data drawn from the project fesibility studies. This is the way in 
which a central planning body would have to conduct a comparative 
project study. The planners must rely upon the capacity of the econ­
omists and engineers working at the individual project level to select 
the optimal project design for the corresponding agricultural develop­
ment program. 
However, inherent limitations present in many feasibility studies 
require a careful technical and economic revision. The quality of the 
feasibility studies is an important variable. Some studies involve 
large and highly qualified technical staffs working for many months and 
perhaps several years with a large research budget. Consequently, all 
of the technical and economic alternatives are studied and a reason­
able approximation of the optimum technical and economic design results. 
For example, the Olmos irrigation project entailed an expenditure in 
excess of $2 million and more than two years to complete. This study 
could well serve as a model for other irrigation studies due to its 
completeness-in the sense that all of the elements for a good project 
design are considered. There are other irrigation studies which are 
totally deficient in their coverage. The alternative project designs 
are not compared. The project costs and benefits are incorrectly 
estimated and a program of project implamentation is lacking. In 
addition to the omission of important aspects of a thorough design, 
the tools of economic evaluation are either rarely or improperly employed. 
64 
In most cases the project is subjected to a cost-benefit analysis. 
Frequently, the costs and benefits are defined consistently among 
projects. One study may define benefits as gross production, another 
as net farm income. There is a similar variation in defining costs; 
certain cost categories are frequently included within different classes 
of costs. For example, on-farm development costs are sometimes included 
with primary construction costs. Consequently, the first task in the 
revision of project feasibility studies is to insure that the costs 
and production are consistently defined and grouped. Likewise, omitted 
costs are to be included if possible and unnecessary costs excluded. 
The majority of ths project feasibility studies are made by 
private national or foreign engineering firms. The studies involve 
large costs and numerous man-years of engineering analysis. The central 
purpose of these studies is to provide the most favorable technical 
solution to irrigating a pre-specified zone. The engineering problem, 
therefore, tends to dominate the study with minimal research resources 
devoted to solving the economic problem, i.e., determination of the 
optimal project size consistent with some goal of income or profit 
maximization. Likewise, the calculation of a benefit-cost ratio is 
not sufficient at the feasibility study level. There is an apparent 
tendency in all feasibility studies to present a favorable benefit-
cost ratio. This is due to several reasons. First, after spending 
many thousands of dollars to study a given project an unfavorable 
benefit-cost ratio represents a failure to provide an adequate solution 
to the project problem. As suggested by Hirshman (15) "the bidding 
hand" is a phenomenon reflected by the tendency to minimize the 
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difficulties at the onset of project formulation and initiation. There 
is a tendency for each project planner to develop a vested interest in 
the project. This tendency is natural and it is precisely the role 
of the central planning office to analyze projects from an objective 
point of view. The evaluation of feasibility studies must proceed 
on the assumption that the results of the economic analysis are likely 
to be optimistic. 
There is a more objective reason that explains why the economic 
evaluation of projects at the feasibility study level is usually 
favorable- the selection of the rate of discount. The benefit-cost 
ratio is highly sensitive to the rate of interest used in calculating 
the present value of benefits and costs. The use of a low rate of 
interest, e.g., six percent or less, will nearly always yield a ben­
efit-cost ratio in excess of unity. The central planning office must 
adopt either a uniform interest rate or check the project outcomes 
using alternative interest rates. 
The adjustment of the feasibility studies is also necessary when 
the prices in valuing output and costs are from different base years. 
A uniform base year must be adopted and a price index constructed 
permitting the use of constant base year prices. 
Frequently, the output data are optimistic. An irrigation project 
should display higher than average yields due to the additional water. 
It is always evident that each project, even though expenditures for 
extension services are planned, will succeed in attaining higher 
technological levels in farming practices. Perhaps in small projects 
involving new lands a certain degree of selection of the future tenants 
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can be made. However, on Large virgin land or land improvement proj­
ects, the number of trained farmers available places a limit upon 
the rate at which technologically advanced practices can be adopted. 
Only with very costly extension and farm planning services provided 
by the government is there much possibility for achieving the pro­
jected levels of output shown by most feasibility studies. Con­
sequently, the inherent optimism evidenced by the feasibility studies 
must be reviewed and adjusted. 
A simple method of adjusting the irrigation projects is now 
presented. To a great extent a major limitation is the availability 
of consistent and complete data sources. The capacity of the planners 
to criticize each feasibility study is a function of the number of 
technicians available for the task. An ideal evaluation group would 
include representatives from the various related disciplines such as 
agronomists, civil engineers, and economists. However, this thesis 
embarks from the point that certain elements of each feasibility study 
are given i.e., the engineering works are given, the project size is 
predetermined and the projected distribution of hectares dedicated to 
crop and cattle production are given. Otherwise, each project would 
require a detail programming solution which is beyond the research 
capacity of the present study. 
The emphasis of the following adjustment process is on the production 
coefficients of the projects. Construction costs will be converted 
to the base year 1965 applying an index of prices of construction com­
ponents. Construction costs will be adjusted upwards in those few cases 
in which there is an evident under-estimation of costs. 
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The first step of the adjustment process is to select a base year. 
This is determined by the availability of agricultural production and 
cost data. A large number of the projects considered in this study 
as well as the most recent complete agricultural statistics are from 
the year 1965 which is therefore chosen as the base year. 
There are two sources for agricultural statistics. The most 
complete set of regional and national output, yield and area data is 
completed each year by CONESTGAR, a statistical compilation and re­
search organization. The Agricultural Development Bank (Banco de 
Foraento Agropccuariq), collects cost of production data by zones on a 
yearly basis for internal use. The adjustment method used in this 
study will rely upon these two sources (2,7). 
There are distinct advantages in using these two sources. The 
CONESTGAR output data tend to reflect regional averages. Since the 
data are collected for geographical zones, i.e., coast, sierra, and 
jungle, differential yields and outputs per hectare can be identified 
for reasonably small regions. To the extent that a given region is 
characterized by above average technological levels then irrigation 
projects undertaken in the zone should benefit by the existing farm 
practicos. Likewise, a project in a region with less developed farming 
technique would not be expected to achieve spectacularly high output 
levels. This point is reinforced in the case of an irrigation improve­
ment. If farmers currently produce at a subsistence level they will 
not easily be converted to advanced farming practices with high yields 
and low unit costs. This latter view (that farmers can change techniques 
quickly) is very common with irrigation project feasibility studies and 
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must be accounted for by central planners. Otherwise, the final project 
ordering will be largely a function of the optimistic projections of 
the feasibility studies. 
The cost of production data of the Agricultural Development Bank 
are currently the only complete data by crop, by regions and for the 
base year 1965. The data probably contain a bias toward more efficiently 
operated farm units since' the bank generates much of its data from the 
experience it has in making agricultural loans. The loans are primarily 
made to more efficiently operated units with good repayment records. 
It can be expected, therfore, that the unit costs are lower per unit 
of output than found on the average farm in each region. 
Therefore, there are two tendencies in the adjustment process. 
The output data tend to be representative of the average farm since 
high, medium and low technologically organized units are included in 
the sample. The production cost data tend to represent more commercial 
farming units. The adjustment process in nearly all cases yields a 
lower net production for each project. Except in a minimal number of 
cases does the adjustment process generate a higher value for output 
than is given in the feasibility study. The adjustment process out­
lined below is not to be considered definitive, nor would it be the 
process recommended given greater research resources. Rather the 
adjustment is only indicative of the type needed for the feasibility 
studies before a national planning office can proceed to a complete 
comparative analysis of the projects. 
Table 4 shows the steps involved in the adjustment of the irriga­
tion project La Cano included among the virgin land projects of Arequipa. 
Table 4. Projected and revised production and cost data, La Cano irrigation project (1965 soles 
per hectare) 
Adjusted Project 
Cultivated Direct pro- net net 
Hectares Gross production duction costs ; income Value added income 
Crop N° % Project 
Ad-
lusted Proiect 
Ad-
iusted '/?- s/  
Alfalfa 1180 46.7 16305 17600 7000 48 8448 9152 79 13904 9305 
Orchards 430 17.0 26895 28500 9000 66 18810 9690 52 14820 17895 
Vegetables 215 8.5 18884 22319 10675 46 10267 12052 70 15623 8209 
Grains 155 6.1 6194 6160 3581 55 3388 2772 64 3942 2613 
Forage 160 6.3 5844 5700 3313 48 2736 2964 79 4503 2531 
Corn(feed) 160 6.3 7438 7200 3813 65 4680 2520 67 4824 3625 
Corn(forage) 160 6.3 7469 7200 3125 65 4680 2520 67 4824 4344 
Potatoes 35 1.4 19571 24544 11000 51 12517 12027 67 16444 8571 
Garden crops 35 1.4 8143 8143 4572 44 3583 4560 70 5700 3571 
TOTAL 2530 100 15856 17061 6789 54 9224 7851 69 11783 9071 
Project 2 2120 40.1 43.2 17.2 23.3 19.9 29.8 22.9  
1 Percent of adjusted gross production. 
2 Geographical area in hectares and output and costs in railliones of soles. 
70 
The distribution of crops, including the number of cultivated hectares 
delegated to each crop, is given by the feasibility study. It is pro­
jected that a large proportion of the future production activities will 
be allocated to alfalfa, 1,180 hectares; orchards, 430 hectares; and 
vegetables 215 hectares. These three activities represent, respectively, 
forty-seven, seventeen and nine percent of the total projected cul­
tivated hectares. The feasibility study includes the projected levels 
of gross production, direct production costs and net output by crop 
and by hectare. 
In the case of alfalfa the feasibility study projects a value of 
gross production of S/. 16,305 per hectare once the project has reached 
full production. This is called the "project" gross production. This 
project gross production is now adjusted by the 1965 production data. 
According to the 1965 agricultural statistics the average value of 
output her hectare in alfalfa in the Arequipa coastal area is S/. 17,600. 
This is adopted and called the "adjusted" gross production. In this 
case, the adjustment results is an increase in the projected production 
of alfalfa. The discrepancy between the project and adjusted output 
is due to two factors. The estimates of output for the project are 
based upon yields and prices of 1964 and those of the base data, 1965; 
thus an increase in average yields and prices in the project area 
permit the use of a higher estimate of output per hectare. 
The next step is to adjust the costs of production. In the same 
table the cost of production according to the feasibility study, i.e., 
the direct project production costs per hectare, are shown for each 
crop. Thus, for example, the projected production costs are S/. 7,000 
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per hectare for alfalfa. The Agricultural Development Bank data are 
now used as the comparative standard. These data indicate that the 
best performance in the zone is a direct production cost for alfalfa of 
roughly 50 percent of output. By applying this percentage to the value 
of adjusted gross production her hectare yields an "adjusted" direct 
production cost of S/. 8,448 per hectare. The "adjusted" net income 
per hectare for alfalfa is calculated at S/. 9,152. This involves a 
slight reduction from the project net income per hectare for alfalfa 
of S/. 9,305 given by the feasibility study. 
In addition, the components are available for calculating the 
direct value added of the project. From the Bank data the ratio of 
value added to gross output has been applied to the adjusted gross 
production figures and the results entered in the next to lasc column 
of Table 4. 
Therefore, for each crop the gross output and net income have been 
adjusted and the estimate of value added computed. These per hectare 
figures, with their appropriate hectare weights, permit the calculation 
of production and cost data on a per hectare basis for the entire proj­
ect. For La Cano the project gross production per hectare is estimated 
at S/. 15,900. This estimate is adjusted upwards to an adjusted gross 
production of S/. 17,100 per hectare. This is an increase of approxi­
mately 8 percent in the projected gross output per hectare. 
The feasibility study gives a more optimistic estimate of net farm 
income than that implied by the cost of production data of the Bank. 
The feasibility study shows the cost of production of S/. 6,800 per 
hectare while the adjusted costs are S/. 9,200 per hectare. The 
resulting adjusted net income is S/. 7,900 per hectare compared with 
S/. 9,100 per hectare given by the study- a reduction in net income of 
approximately 15 percent. Value added per hectare is estimated at ap­
proximately S/. 11,800. Consequently, in the case of the irrigation 
project La Gano the adjustment process has concluded with a slight 
increase in gross production in conjuncrion with a reduction in the 
estimate for net income. 
The results of the output adjustment for twelve irrigation proj­
ects is shown in Table 5. These data measure the marginal contribution 
in output, value added and farm income per hectare for each project. 
That is, the estimated current output in the project zone not attribut­
able to the future project investment has been subtracted from the pro­
jected level of production. The adjustment process is affected by the 
special conditions for each project. First, there are projects whose out­
put is expressed in 1966 or 1967 prices. Thus, the adjustment process 
tends to reduce the projected output and income per hectare due to the 
increase in farm prices since the base year 1965. This is the case of 
the projects Olmos, Chira and Chantaco. The project gross production 
for the Olmos project is reduced by 12 percent and farm income by 20 per­
cent. The gross output and net income of the Chira project are reduced 
31 and 17 percent respectively. The gross output and net income of 
the Chantaco project are reduced by 53 percent. 
The second component of adjustment is due to the inconsistency 
among the project studies in the definition of farm income. The cost 
of production standard drawn from the Bank data is limited to direct 
costs. Payments to land and capital are excluded. This is a common 
Table 5. Project and adjusted maximum output, income and value added per hectare, Peruvian 
irrigation projects (Soles per hectare)l 
Prices Gross production Net income 
of project per hectare per hectare Value added 
Project estimates Project Adjusted Project Adiusted per hectare 
Olmos 1966 25,057 21,927 15,603 12,474 16,842 
Choclococha 1965 16,764 13,066 7,025 7,186 9,107 
Tumbes 1965 15,590 12,640 8,910 5,660 9,150 
Moquegua 1965 15,800 17,830 9,710 7,910 11,440 
Chira 1967 11,730 8,080 5,807 4,817 5,292 
El Cural 1965 24,731 24,405 13,768 10,408 16,346 
La Cano 1965 18,915 20,377 10,802 9,387 14,057 
El Huevo 1965 21,304 22,705 12,464 9,710 15,169 
Antaura 1965 6,550 6,650 1,710 4,650 4,920 
Huanscolla 1965 9,450 10,570 3,470 5,220 7,920 
Chococo 1965 6,630 7,850 2,430 4,090 5,460 
1 The project estimates of output and net income are expressed in prices shown in the column 
"prices of project estimates" and the adjusted output and net income are expressed in 1965 prices. 
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limitation found in cost of production in Peru.^ However, given this 
data restriction it is necessary to maintain consistency among projects. 
There were two projects, Choclacocha and Chira . whose costs were over­
stated (i.e., income was underestimated) relative to those indicated 
by the A}',r icu I Lural Development Bank data. As noted in Table 5, the 
projectecl jjro.ss production is diminished but the farm income is slightly 
increased for Choclacocha. Both gross production and net income are 
reduced for the Chira project. 
A third reason for adjustment is to account for apparent over- or 
under estimation of output and income due to excessively pessimistic or 
optimistic estimates of output per hectare. The tendency to adjust 
projects to an average performance of each zone is evident for the 
Aruquipa projects. With the exception of the El Cural project, the 
projected ^ross output has been increased for each project due to ap­
parently low feasibility study estimates of output per hectare. 
The net income per hectare for the three virgin lands projects -
El Cural, La Cano and El Huevo - have been reduced slightly. For 
the land improvement projects - Antaura, Huanscolla and Chococo - the 
projected net income per hectare has been increased substantially. 
In a following section the impact of the adjustment process upon 
the project ranking generated by the various investment criteria is 
carefully examined. At this point it is useful to note some of the 
adjustment process on the projected benefits of tlie projects. The 
1 An apparently complete set of cost data is currently avail­
able irom C0N1ÎSTCAR. The existence of this data was discovered too 
late to bcî used in this study. 
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adjustment procedure is consistent with the expectations regarding the 
outcome. Those projects with inconsistently defined benefits are 
adjusted in the expected direction. However, the relative impact of the 
adjustment has not altered the ordinal relation of the projects based 
upon net income per hectare although the variance in benefits per 
hectare among projects is reduced. 
The adjustment method employed is not necessarily the ideal one. 
The primary restriction has been the lack of a complete and consistent 
set of output and cost data. What is ideally required for comparative 
purposes is an extensive production function study by zones, by soil 
types, by technological levels with and without irrigation. It is, of 
course true that with the availability of complete regional cost and 
production data the feasibility studies themselves could be improved 
and linear programming models for important irrigation projects could 
be constructed on a more consistent and complete basis. 
The construction costs of the projects are now considered for 
consistency. They must first be adjusted to the base year, 1965, 
employing an appropriate price index. The only price index available 
currently in Peru is the index of construction costs published quarterly 
by the Ministry of Finance and Commerce. Table 6 gives the general 
price index for construction materials and labor. These indices are 
primarily based upon construction costs in the Lima metropolitan area. 
Although this would appear to negate their usefulness for project 
evaluation there are certain market conditions that permit the justifica­
tion of their use. Since many construction materials are imported or 
are subject to import competition it is likely that the prices of 
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Table 6. Price index of construction costs, construction materials 
and labor 1955-1967^ 
Construction Labor Unskilled 
Year Materials all groups workers 
1955 45.15 24.13 22.79 
1956 48.27 33.19 32.17 
1957 50.22 33.19 32.17 
1958 56.74 41.80 40.64 
1959 65.08 47.39 46.25 
1960 70.47 47.39 46.25 
1961 72.74 60.69 59.56 
1962 79.35 61.63 60.52 
1963 86.89 72.93 72.20 
1964 89.90 86.48 86.21 
1965 100.00 100.00 100.00 
1966 106.19 110.58 109.80 
1967 121.77 123.32 121.63 
^Source: (32). 
construction materials, such as cement and steel for a large irrigation 
project, will conform to those of the Lima area. Likewise, since the 
projects are financed by the public sector, the construction firms 
responsible for large irrigation projects requiring large amounts of 
semi-skilled labor will have to pay wages consistent with adjacent 
urban areas as well as the legally proscribed social security benefits. 
The construction price index should be applied with considerable 
caution to small sierra and coastal projects. A small project can be 
designed to use large quantities of local materials, and can employ 
large quantities of unskilled labor of local origin. This labor will 
not command a wage equal to that paid in adjacent urban areas. Con­
sequently, the degree of applicability of the price index is a function 
of the size of the project, the proportion of imported versus local 
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materials employed and the contractural conditions of the project. The 
index is more appropriate for large public coastal projects and probably 
least appropriate for small sierra projects. 
Table 7 shows the total irrigation construction costs along with 
the deflated and applied costs. The applied costs are those adopted 
for this study; these costs are employed in the following benefit-
cost analysis of the projects. The deflators are calculated from the 
Table 7. Projected, deflated and applied irrigation projects costs 
(millions of soles) 
Project study Deflated costs, Applied^ 
costs 1965 prices costs 
Project Base year Costs Deflator Costs 
Olmos 1966 6,857.1 0.94 6,459.4 6,459.3 
Choclacocha 1965 1,413.0 1.00 1,413.0 1,413.0 
Tumbes 1965 723.1 1.00 723.1 723.1 
Moquegua 1965 316.4 1.00 316.4 316.4 
Chira 1967 1,893.8 0.82 1,564.5 1,564.5 
E1 Cura1 1965 117.9 1.00 117.9 117.9 
La Cano 1965 98.1 1.00 98.1 98.1 
El Huevo 1965 88.6 1.00 88.6 88.6 
Antaura 1965 10.1 1.00 10.1 17.6 
Huanscolla 1965 15.2 1.00 15.2 15.2 
Chococo 1965 32.6 1.00 32.6 32.6 
^Applied costs are those to be employed in the following economic 
evaluation; they are equal to the deflated costs except for Gentaura 
whose costs have been increased as explained in the text. 
nhnve index of construction costs. As is evident, the process of 
deflating the project costs does not present a serious problem; the 
majority of the project studies have used 1965 prices. In those 
project studies which did not specify the base year prices it was 
assumed the prices were those nearest the publication date of the study. 
The only projects that require deflation are the Olmos project based 
upon I96(j prices and the Chira project with 1967 prices. 
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Heavy reliance is placed upon the engineering solution as presented 
by the feasibility studies. This is partly a function of limited 
capacity for re-evaluation. A complete revision of the engineering 
features and the accompanying costs would require a team of experts 
including civil engineers with experience in the formulation of ir­
rigation projects. 
An attempt has been made to adjust those projects which show evident 
underestimation of construction costs. This is the case for the 
Antaura project. The feasibility study for Antaura estimates a con­
struction cost of S/. 6,400 per hectare. This is a relatively low 
cost compared with similar sierra improvement projects. The con­
struction costs per hectare of the Huanscolla and Chococo projects are 
in excess of twice the costs of the Antaura project. Since the benefits 
of the three projects are similar the benefit-cost analysis shows an 
extremely large ratio for the Antaura project. Based upon similar 
experiences with other projects a separate analysis of the Antaura 
project is conducted using adjusted construction costs twice as large 
as those given by the feasibility study. This cost adjustment for 
Antaura is shown in the last column of Table 7. 
In this section a cursory examination of the total and per hectare 
costs and returns of the irrigation projects is made. The sample of 
projects selected for the detailed economic analysis is presented. 
Of special importance is the enumeration of the characteristic of the 
costs and returns of the projects under consideration. The basic ad­
justed cost and benefit data for twelve irrigation projects are shown 
in Table 8. 
Table 8. Project area, investment costs and adjusted benefits, at base year 1965, irrigation 
projects 
Project area 
(hectares) 
Irrigation 
project New 
Im­
proved 
Adjusted 
Investment costs annual 
Total 
per hectare 
Investment costs (thousands of 
(milliones of 1965 soles)! soles) 
Con- Con- As-
struc- Asso- struc- soci-
tion ciated Total tion ated Total 
benefits 
(milliones 
Adjusted 
annual 
benefits 
per hectare 
(thousands 
of 1965 soles) of 1965 dollars 
Gross 
Gross Net out- Net 
output income put income 
Olmos 86, 751 • • 86, 751 4,026.7 2,430.6 6,459.3 46.4 28.0 74.5 1,902, 2 1,082.1 21. 9 12. 5 
Choclococha 8, 500 28, 000 36, 500 886.7 526.2 1,412.9 24.3 14.4 38.7 476. 9 262,3 13. 1 7. 2 
Tumbes 12, 315 7, 145 19, 460 673.7 49.4 723.1 34.6 2.5 37.2 246. 0 110.1 12. 6 5. 7 
Moquegua 3, 080 3, 670 6, 750 290.0 26.4 316.4 43.0 3.9 46.9 120. 4 53.4 17. 8 7. 9 
Chira 7, 471 28, 114 35, 585 1,083.0 481.5 1,564.5 30.4 13.6 44.0 287. 5 171.4 8. 1 4. 8 
El Cural 3, 065 - 3, 065 103.0 14.9 117.9 33.6 4.9 38.5 74. 8 31.9 24. 4 10. 4 
La Cano 2, 120 2, 120 87.4 10.7 98.1 41.3 5.0 46.3 43. 2 19.9 20. 4 9. 4 
El Huevo 2, 070 2, 070 79.9 8.7 88.6 38.6 4.2 42.8 47. 0 20.1 22. 8 9. 7 
Antaura -- 1, 175 1, 175 15.0 2.6 17.6 12.8 2.2 15.0 7. 8 5.5 6. 7 4. 7 
Huanscolla -- 925 925 13.8 1.4 15.2 14.9 1.5 16.4 9. 8 4.8 10. 6 5. 2 
Chococo -- 1, 525 1, 525 28,3 4.3 32.6 18.6 2.8 21.4 12. 0 6.2 7. 9 4. 1 
Chantaco -- 1, 272 1, 272 8.8 10.8 19.6 6.9 8.5 15.4 7. 8 3.6 6. 1 2. 8 
Total or 
average. 125, 372 71, 826 197, 198 7,298.3 3,567.5 10,865.8 1 37.0 18.1 55.1 3,235 .4 1,771.3 1 16 .4 9. 0 
% , 63 . 6 36.4 100 .0 67.2 32.8 100.0 67.2 32.8 100.0 
! 26.8 soles = 1 dollar. 
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The group of projects selected for analysis represents a cross 
section of the different classes of irrigation projects. The Olmos 
project is an example of a large capital intensive new lands project. 
Small new lands projects are represented by three projects: El Cural, 
La Cano and El Huevo. The Tumbes project contains both new and improved 
lands but nearly 65 percent of the hectares are new. This group of pre­
dominately new lands projects is projected to expand the coastal area under 
irrigation by 113,466 hectares at a total cost of S/. 7,487.00 ($279.4) 
millions or approximately S/. 66,000 ($2,500) per hectare. 
There are three coastal improvement projects - Choclacocha, 
Moquegua and Chira - projected to cover 78,835 hectares. The total 
public and private investment costs are expected to be S/. 3,293.80 
($122.9) millions or approximately S/. 42,000 ($1,600) per hectare. 
Finally, four small sierra irrigation improvemnt projects have 
been included in the sample to represent this class of project. They 
are Antaura, Huanscalla, Chococo and Chantaco. These four small proj­
ects will cover 4,897 hectares when concluded at a cost of S/. 85.0 
($3.2) million or S/. 17,400 ($650) per hectare. 
As elaborated in Table 8 the investment costs are largely a func­
tion of the project type. The most costly project, Olmos, would require 
nearly S/. 75,000 ($2,800) per hectare before it is completed. This 
is due primarily to the large associated on-farm development cost 
relative to other projects. The primary construction costs of S/. 46,400 
($1,700) per hectare do not greatly exceed those projected for smaller 
virgin lands projects such as La Cano and El Huevo. But the Olmos on-
farm development costs of S/. 28,000 ($1,000) per hectare are considerably 
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in excess ol those expected for other projects. A very intensive 
program of public on-farm technical assistance is planned similar to the 
San Lorenzo irrigation now under operation on the Northern Peruvian 
coast. 
Investment costs are also a function of project size. The 
three largest projects - Olmos, Choclacocha and Chira - have the 
highest levels of on-farm development costs and, with the exception of 
Choclacocha, the highest levels of primary investment costs. The 
primary investment costs of the Choclacocha project are relatively 
lower due to the presence of completed infrastructure in the project 
zone which reduce the overall investment requirements of the project. 
The adjusted benefits of the projects are also related to the proj­
ect size and class. The four new lands projects - Olmos, El Cural, 
La Cano and El Huevo - show the highest values of gross output and 
net income per hectare. Gross output per hectare ranges from S/. 20,400 
($760) to S/. 24,400 ($910) whereas, net income has the limits of 
S/. 9,400 ($350) to S/. 12,500 ($470) per hectare. Including the com­
paratively low output per hectare of the Tumbes project, an average 
gross output and net income per hectare for the five projects is 
S/. 20,400 ($460) and S/. 11,100 ($410). 
The three coastal improvement projects - Choclacocha, Moquegua and 
Chira - have and average gross output at full production of S/. 11,200 
($420) per hectare and an average net income per hectare of S/. 6,200 
($230). Finally, the four small sierra improvement projects have a 
projected gross output per hectare at full production of S/. 7,600 
($280) and net income of S/. 4,100 ($150) per hectare. 
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It is evident that the project selection problem cannot be solved 
in a straightCorward manner from the cost and production data. The 
choice of projects will depend upon the proper inclusion of time 
through discounting the costs and benefits. Since the increase in 
the net present value of output is only one among a wide class of 
national objectives relevant to project selection, additional criteria 
that reflect these diverse objectives must be applied to the projects. 
Thus, although a given project may make the largest contribution to 
employment or to the balance of payments. The following section pro­
vides the initial step of project evaluation and selection with the 
application of the benefit - cost criterion. 
B. A Benefit - Cost Analysis Of The Projects 
The benefit - cost ratio is the most commonly applied criterion 
of project evaluation. All of the irrigation project feasibility 
studies contain this kind of analysis. The studies were, nevertheless, 
highly divergent as to their definitions of benefits and costs. Among 
the most common differences in definitions of benefits and costs in­
clude benefits with and without certain production costs, associated 
on-farm development cost included as negative benefits in some cases 
and as costs in others. A wide range of interest rates was used and 
differential rates were applied to local and foreign currency. The 
projects financed by the Agency of International Development of the 
United States (USAID) applied an interest rate of 6 percent for local 
currencies and 3% percent for foreign currency costs. The Olmos proj­
ect was evaluated at an interest rate of 8 percent. 
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The selection of benefits and costs is primarily determined by 
the type of project under consideration. For agricultural projects, 
such as irrigation and colonization, some measure of agricultural 
production or farm income is taken as benefits. Since the price of 
water of an irrigation project is not easily determined the increase in 
production and income due to the project investment is taken as the 
imputed value of the greater supply of water, i.e., the increased 
farm output and income. 
The benefits of the project may be direct, indirect and secondary. 
Direct benefits are those attributable to the primary beneficiaries 
of the project investment, i.e., the farmers within the project area. 
These direct benefits are normally taken as the increase in net farm 
income arising from the project. Indirect benefits are those arising 
from backward and forward linkages during operation. Backward link­
ages are purchases of inputs by the farmers from third parties. Tlie 
sales of third parties are included to the extent that they are due 
solely to the added demand stemming from the project. Thus, for these 
purchases to be counted as indirect benefits there must be excess 
capacity in the industries supplying the inputs. If additional invest­
ments must be made by the suppliers of inputs then the additional in­
put sales cannot be attributed to the irrigation investment. Forward 
linkages arise from the additional income received in the product 
marketing and distribution system. If firms processing and marketing 
the output of the irrigation project derive additional profits then 
they may be counted as indirect benefit so long as excess capacity 
exists in the industry. 
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The secondary benefits originate from the creation of income 
during the construction phase of the project. These are, in effect, 
the multiplier effects of the initial investment flows of the project. 
In practice the indirect and secondary benefits of irrigation 
projects in Peru are difficult to trace due to the lack of statistical 
information. Likewise, compared to other types of projects, e.g., 
hydroelectric plants, the indirect consequences of agricultural proj­
ects should be a relatively small proportion of direct benefits. In 
addition, as long as one is comparing similar types of projects the 
indirect benefits should be sufficiently similar to eliminate the need 
for their estimation. This convention is adopted for this study. 
The following definitions are adopted for the benefit-cost analysis 
elaborated in this study. The present value of benefits is defined as 
N 
Bt 1 (t=l, ..., N) (4.1) 
t=l (1+i) 
where 
Bj. = Xt - Cxt - lat " °at (4.2) 
and with each term defined as 
X(. = gross farm output, year t; 
Cxt-= direct farm production costs, year t; 
Ixt= associated on-farm development costs, year t; and 
Oat= operating, maintenance and replacement costs of the 
on-farm investment, year t; 
i = the discount rate. 
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The present value of the project costs is computed in the following 
manner; 
N 
C ^t (t=l N) (4.3) 
t=l (l+i)t 
wIlCTf 
Gj. - l(2t c^t> 
defined as 
let = primary project construction costs, year t, and 
Oct ~ operating, maintenance and replacement costs of the 
project works. 
For a project to be accepted as economically feasible the benefit-cost 
ratio must equal or exceed unity, therefore, 
B > 1. (4.5) 
C 
The definition of the benefits and costs has been chosen using the 
USAID criteria. The primary differences among alternative forms of 
the benefit-cost ratio lie in the location in the ratio of the as­
sociated on-farm development costs. For example, the Olmos project 
was evaluated placing the on-farm investment costs in the denominator 
or the ratio. The convention adopted depends upon the incidence of 
these costs. With the costs in the denominator they are viewed as an 
economic burden of the public sector; they are thought of as increasing 
the size of the public sector investment. Whereas, if these development 
cokLk are conceived as investment to be covered by the private sector 
their location in the numerator as negative benefits is accepted. The 
difference in the benefit-cost ratio of the two approaches is a function 
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of the relative size of the on-farm development costs. As shown 
previously the large coastal irrigation projects have the largest pro­
portion of on-farm investment costs out of total project investment 
costs. They may reach 30 percent of total investment for large projects 
and 10 percent of total investment for small projects. However, the 
size of the benefit-cost ratio should not be affected as greatly as 
these proportions suggest since the associated cost for large projects 
are spread over a longer time span (and thus more heavily discounted) 
than for small projects. 
In Peru the associated on-farm development costs are financed 
by public credits but are viewed as the ultimate economic burden of 
the farmers benefiting from the project. Although it is apparent that 
these obligations may be indefinitely postponed by the private sector, 
especially if the project has initial difficulties, in this study the 
associated on-farm development costs are treated as negative benefits. 
The benefits in equation (4.2) are formulated on the basis of net 
farm income, (X^ - C^t) less on-farm development and maintenance costs. 
The benefit-cost analysis may be viewed from different angles, i.e., 
private versus public gains. A national project planning office is 
not solely concerned with the future flow of net farm income. Of 
special importance is the contribution that each project and the in­
vestment program ultimately make to national income. Therefore, a 
benefit-cost ratio may be computed for each project using project value-
added instead of net farm income. This former term can be calculated 
on a gross basis if there are estimates of purchase from third parties 
by subtracting these purchases from gross output. Since value-added 
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exceeds net income the effect on the benefit-cost analysis is to in­
crease the ratio for all projects. 
The adoption of value-added as the project benefits is a re­
dundancy when considering similar types of projects. First, if the 
projects use similar production techniques such as for irrigation, the 
ratio of value-added to total production will not vary greatly. Con­
sequently, the adoption of value-added for benefits will not alter the 
relative ranking of the projects. Second, for those marginal projects 
that have a benefit-cost ratio greater than one using value-added and 
less than one using net income, it is incongruous to argue that the 
project should be initiated on the basis of its contribution to value-
added. It is evident that if the project will not earn enough benefits 
to achieve acceptable incomes for the new farm owners then the project 
will not likely be successful. Numerous farms will fail, and subsidies 
will have to be made to sustain the project. Finally, since the use 
of value-added for benefits will primarily affect the economic feasibil­
ity of the marginal projects they will not enter the final investment 
program as long as there is an abundance of projects relative to the 
overall investment constraint. 
Each of the irrigation projects is now subjected to the benefit-
cost analysis as shown in Table 9. First, the projects are ranked by 
their benefit-costs ratios using benefit, costs and market prices 
established by the feasibility study. Then, the projects are ordered 
using adjusted net income, costs and market prices. Alternative dis­
count rates are used. The projects are also ranked introducing value-
added as benefits. Finally, approximations of the shadow prices for 
Table 9. Benefit - cost ratios with alternative benefit measures, at alternative interest rates, 
irrigation projects 
6% 10% 15% 
Proiect 
Project 
net 
income 
Adjusted 
net 
income 
Value 
added 
Project 
net 
income 
Adjusted 
net 
income 
Value 
added 
Project 
net 
income 
Adjusted 
net 
income 
Value 
added 
Olmos 3.0 2.5 3.1 1.7 1.4 1.7 0.9 0.7 0.9 
Choclacocha 2.4 2.5 3.3 1.4 1.5 2.0 0.8 0,8 1.1 
Tumbes 2.3 1.3 2.3 1.5 0.8 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.9 
Moquegua 2.2 1.8 2.7 1.2 1.0 1.5 0.6 0.5 0,8 
Chira 1.6 1.2 1.4 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.2 
El Cural 2.8 2.1 3.3 1.9 1.4 2.3 1.2 0.9 1.5 
La Cano 2.7 2.3 3.5 1.6 1.4 2.1 1.0 0.8 1.3 
El Huevo 3.0 1.9 3.7 1.9 1.4 2.3 1.2 0.9 1.4 
Antaura 2.6 3.9 4.1 1.5 2.4 2.5 0.8 1.5 1.6 
Huanscolla 2.4 3.8 5.9 1.5 2.4 3.8 1.0 1.5 2.5 
Chococo 1.4 2.5 3.5 0.8 1.5 2.0 0.5 0.9 1.2 
Table 10, Project rankings by the benefit-cost ratio with alternative benefit measures at interest 
rates of 6,10, and 15 percent 
6% m m 
Project net Adjusted net Project net Adjusted net Project net Adjusted net 
income income income income income income 
Project Value Proiect Value Project Value Project Value Project Value Project Value 
Olmos 3.0 Antaura 3.9 ElCural 1.9 Antaura 2.4 El Cural 1.2 Antaura 1.5 
El Huevo 3.0 Huanscolla 3.8 El Huevo 1.9 Huanscolla 2.4 El Huevo 1.2 Huanscolla 1.5 
El Cural 2.8 Olmos 2.5 Olmos 1.7 Choclacocha 1.5 Tumbes 1.0 El Cural 0.9 
La Cano 2.7 Choclacocha 2.5 La Cano 1.6 Chococo 1.5 La Cano 1.0 El Huevo 0.9 
Antaura 2.6 Chococo 2.5 Tumbes 1.5 Olmos 1.4 Huanscolla 1.0 Chococo 0.9 
Huanscolla 2.4 La Cano 2.3 Antaura 1.5 El Cural 1.4 Olmos 0.9 Choclacocha 0.8 
Choclacocha 2.4 El Cural 2.1 Huanscolla 1.5 La Cano 1.4 ChoclacochaO.8 La Cano 0.8 
Tumbes 2.3 El Huevo 1.9 Choclacocha 1.4 El Huevo 1.4 Antaura 0.8 Olmos 0.7 
Moquegua 2.2 Moquegua 1.8 Moquegua 1.2 Moquegua 1.0 Moquegua 0.6 Moquegua 0.5 
Chira 1.6 Tumbes 1.3 Chococo 0.8 Tumbes 0.8 Chococo 0.5 Tumbes 0.5 
Chococo 1.4 Chira 1.2 Chira 0.7 Chira 0.5 Chira 0.3 Chira 0.5 
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labor, foreign exchange and capital are employed yielding, thereby, a 
new project ordering. Each of the distinct project ordering is analyzed 
and compared. 
The unadjusted and adjusted production and cost flows by project 
are shown in Appendix B. The benefits and costs for each project, con­
structed in accordance with the adjustments at full production, are 
shown in Appendix A. The period of construction and growth rate of 
output and income is postulated by each project feasibility study. 
For example, if the feasibility study gives a construction period of 
five years and a lag of eight years to reach maximum output and income 
then these hypotheses are accepted. 
At an interest rate of six percent all of the projects fall within 
the feasible set. The one large project; Olmos, is ranked high using 
unadjusted and adjusted net income for benefits. Likewise, the small 
coastal new lands projects perform well. These projects also main­
tain a relatively high ranking after adjustment. The large coastal 
improvement projects - Choclacocha, Tumbes, Moquegua and Chira - are 
ranked low before adjustment with the exception of Choclacocha which 
maintains a low ranking. The small sierra improvement projects -
Antauca, Huanscolla and Chococo - substantially improve their relative 
position after adjustment. 
By increasing the interest rate to 10 percent the change in the 
relative position of the projects before and after adjustment is not al­
tered. The large coastal improvement projects sustain a relatively low 
ranking. The small sierra improvement projects improve their ranking 
after adjustment. The main effect of increasing the interest rate is 
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to reduce the benefit - cost ratios of the projects. At 10 percent 
the Chantaco, Tumbes and Chira projects are no longer feasible for the 
adjusted ratio and the Chococo and Chira projects for the unadjusted 
ratio. The higher interest rates also penalize the large projects more 
heavily than the small ones. The Olmos projects is ranked first at an 
interest rate of six percent, third for an interest rate of 10 percent 
and sixth for an interest rate of 15 percent. A small project such as 
El Huevo is ranked eighth at 6 percent, fifth at 10 percent and third 
at 15 percent. 
As is expected the formulation of project priorities is highly 
dependent upon the the rate of discount chosen to discout the benefits 
and costs. As long as public and private resources are limited the 
interest rate must be carefully considered by the planning authority. 
Policy makers should be consulted to measure at least subjectively 
their rate of time preference. To the extent that the time horizon 
is relatively long and future production is heavily weighed relative 
to near term gains, a low interest rate may be chosen. However, it is 
not always feasible to justify a low rate of discount. First, the 
j)ublic sector is commiting itself to a long-term expenditure of re­
sources. A low interest rate - six percent or less - will likely 
result in the feasibility of all projects. There is always an unknown 
degree of uncertainty about the accuracy of the benefit-cost analysis. 
The use of a moderately high interest rate introduces an adjustment for 
uncertainty, albeit somewhat arbitrary, permitting a greater confidence 
in the selection of the projects. 
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One large unsuccessful irrigation project has negative effects 
beyond the financial costs of the project. Frequently, an unsuccess­
ful project will result in public clamor for subsidies for those farmers 
hurt by the failure. Also, if an important project develops a reputa­
tion as a failure then there will be a tendency on the part of inter­
national institutions to discourage similar investments. 
The public sector must also consider the opportunity costs of 
acquiring resources for investment in irrigation projects. It is 
necessary for the project planners to value capital in excess of the 
market rate. It is, nevertheless, difficult to determine an appro­
priate market rate of interest since there is no established capital 
market in Peru. The interest rate on government bonds is nine percent. 
A fund recently established for assisting in providing private invest­
ment funds in the agricultural sector will charge a rate of approximately 
14 percent. The Olmos irrigation project was evaluated at a rate of 
eight percent. All of these data suggest a possible range for the rate 
of interest. But in final terms the choice is to a great degree ad hoc. 
Given the apparent scarcity of capital resources in Peru a low rate 
of interest of 10 percent is chosen for discounting the future returns 
and costs of the projects. This rate strikes a balance between consid­
erations of social time preference which may require a low rate and 
the great scarcity of capital resources requiring a high discount rate. 
In a latter section of this chapter the sensitivity of the project 
ranking to alternative interest rates is carefully considered. 
As examined in previous sections the economic evaluation of agri­
cultural investment projects requires, in addition to shadow price of 
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capital, the use of shadow prices for labor and foreign exchange. 
There is no easy way to estimate statistically the values for these 
variables. Conceptually, the shadow wage for labor could be estimated 
from agricultural production functions or derived from a general linear 
programming model of the economy. Currently, Peruvian statistics are 
not sufficiently complete to permit the elaboration of these tools. 
These observations also apply to the selection of a shadow rate of 
foreign exchange. Consequently, only rough subjective estimates can be 
made of the shadow wage and exchange rate. Theory dictates the proper 
direction of the adjustment and a sensitivity analysis is employed to 
weigh the relative impact of the adjustment. For the purposes of an 
initial look at the effect of shadow prices upon the benefit-cost ratios 
a shadow wage rate of 50 percent of the market wage is assumed. The 
shadow foreign exchange rate is set at 150 percent of the market rate. 
In 1965 prices, this involves an increase from approximately twenty-
seven soles to the dollar (S/. 27 =$1) to about forty soles to a dollar 
(S/. 40 = $1). It is useful to note that in September of 1967 the sol 
was devaluated from twenty-seven to thirty-eight soles to the dollar. 
The shadow rate may be in excess of 38 soles since this is not a free 
market rate. Peru has adopted a system of exchange controls in con­
junction with increased tariffs and import restrictions. Therefore, 
the 150 percent increase in the shadow exchange rate can be viewed as 
the minimum adjustment. For the sensitivity analysis shadow exchange 
rates up to 200 percent of the 1965 market rate are applied. 
Before dealing directly with the results of the benefit-cost 
analysis the estimation procedures are fully discussed. First, the 
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labor costs of the projects are estimated. Labor is employed in varying 
degrees during the construction and operating phases of a project. The 
quality of the human resource varies; skilled and unskilled labor costs 
are separated since it is the latter for which a shadow wage is esti­
mated. During the construction phase the proportion of labor costs 
to total investment is largely a function of the project size and 
engineering techniques. Small projects can usually be constructed using 
large quantities of unskilled labor. Since the engineering works are 
very simple the construction technique is relatevely flexible. Di­
version works and main and lateral canals can be excavated using labor 
intensive methods. A project may be so small or located in difficult 
terrain that labor instead of machine intensive techniques are required. 
In small projects up to 80 or 90 percent of excavation costs involve 
labor. Nevertheless, small projects can be constructed using capital 
intensive methods. 
Large projects invariably have a small ratio of labor costs to 
total investment costs. This is attributed, first of all, to the pres­
ence of complicated engineering works. For example, construction 
techniques for a tunnel, such as the planned 20 kilometer tunnel of 
the Olmos project, are relatively fixed and do not permit substitution 
of labor for capital. This also holds for large structures such as 
dams and diversion works. Their size imply large material costs and, 
thus, low labor-investment ratios. The time required to complete such 
works using labor intensive techniques exceeds greatly that required for 
capital intensive methods. However, there are other irrigation works 
such as canals at the farm level which permit labor intensive techniques. 
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Unskilled labor is also employed on the farm once production is 
underway. The amount of labor employed and the labor costs are a 
function of 1) the level of technology achieved by farmers of each 
project, 2) the relative prices of labor and the substitutes and 3) 
the types of crop and other farm activities planned. For a given crop 
and fixed technology, higher daily wages imply higher labor costs per 
hectarci. More advanced technologies result in the substitution of 
capital for labor. The presence of certain crops which require large 
quantities of unskilled labor increase labor costs as a percent of 
production costs. 
Labor costs at the construction and operating stages are now esti­
mated. First, the labor costs for construction were not estimated in 
most of the feasibility studies. Detailed construction costs were 
estimated for each project which included the various cost components. 
For example, the amount of excavation needed for each engineering com­
ponent of the project is available. The amount of canal relining or 
the costs of concrete structures are estimated by the feasibility 
studies. Consultation with civil engineers with experience in irrigation 
projects yielded a set of labor input coefficients for a set of typical 
construction activities associated with irrigation projects.^ For exr 
ample, earth excavation costs using labor intensive methods would be 
composed of roughly 90 percent unskilled labor costs. Labor costs for 
excavation in rock would be approximately 75 to 80 percent of the con­
struction costs. These coefficients are then applied to the detailed 
^Data supplied by Ing. Mario Cuneo of the Sectoral Planning 
Office of the Ministry of Agriculture. 
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cost estimates of each project, yielding the ratios shown in the 
first column of Table 11, 
Table 11. Unskilled labor costs as a percent of construction and 
production costs, irrigation projects. 
Labor costs as a 
% of % of 
Irrigation construction production 
project costs costs 
Olraos 27 49 
Choclacocha 34 35 
Tumbes 28 40 
Moquegua 23 44 
Chira 20 41 
El Cural 32 32 
La Cano 32 32 
El Huevo 40 32 
Antaura 37 33 
Huanscolla 37 34 
Chococo 39 34 
As expected there is an evident relationship between project size 
and the labor-construction cost ratio. The small sierra projects -
Antaura, Huanscolla and Chococo - employ a larger proportion of labor 
in construction than the coastal projects. This accords with the 
hypothesis that small improvement projects simply constructed are more 
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labor intensive than large coastal projects. The large coastal proj­
ects show relatively low levels of labor use for construction. The 
range of values suggests that labor intensive projects will typically 
need 35 to 40 percent of the construction cost in labor, whereas, more 
capital intensive projects employ labor in proportion to construction 
costs of between 25 and 30 percent. These proportions hold even though 
the smaller projects considered in this study have not been designed 
specifically for labor intensive methods. It is possible that the 
proportion of labor costs could be increased to exceed 50 percent of 
construction costs by using more labor intensive methods. 
The only exception to the proposition of low labor-investment ratios 
for large projects is the Choclacocha project which has a relatively 
high proportion of 34 percent. As compared to the other coastal proj­
ects this project has the highest proportion of irrigation improvement 
to new structures and, thus, is more labor intensive. Although the 
Chira project involves the improvement of hectares under construction, 
numerous new structures in the form of damns and diversion works are 
needed. Typically, these components require large material and equip­
ment costs and, thus, the labor requirements for the project are 
reduced. 
Labor costs as a proportion of production costs are computed 
using coefficients drawn from regional farm crop costs for 1965 given 
by the Agricultural Development Bank. (Banco de Fomento Agropecuario). 
Labor costs as a percent of direct production costs for each crop are 
computed; the percentages are then applied against the total adjusted 
direct production costs for each project. The total future labor costs 
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as a proportion of the total costs are then calculated. These results 
are enumerated in Table 11. 
The results of this analysis indicate that larger coastal irriga­
tion projects incur greater labor costs as a percent of direct pro­
duction costs than small coastal and sierra projects.^ In fact, the 
largest project, Olmos, is expected to allocate 49 percent of the pro­
duction costs to labor. This outcome is mainly due to the projected 
crop composition of the projects. The large coastal projects are ex­
pected to put into production a large proportion of the land area in 
labor intensive permanent and semi-permanent crops. Such crops as 
fruits, grapes and olives are very labor intensive requiring in excess 
of 150 man-days per year. Alfalfa, typical of the sierra, requires 
less than 50 percent of the latter mentioned of the man-days to complete 
all of the production tasks. 
The foreign exchange component of project costs and benefits is a 
key consideration for underdeveloped countries in the sense that 
foreign currency is nearly always a major constraint. Countries which 
lack a broadly developed capital goods industry must rely upon their 
capacity to import to provide the required capital inputs for agricultural 
and industrial expansion. This capacity to import is a function of ex­
ports and and the degree of import substitution. Agricultural projects 
such as for irrigation if properly designed and selected have a positive 
impact on the balance-of-payments. 
^In a later section labor use per hectare is discussed in detail. 
At this point in the discussion the principal interest is in determining 
the proportion of the benefit and cost flows which are composed of 
labor costs. 
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There are both foreign exchange costs and benefits stemming from 
an irrigation project. On the cost side foreign currency is required 
for the construction and farm production phases of a project. There 
are even foreign exchange costs before the initiation of the project 
if the feasibility and definitive engineering studies are elaborated 
by foreign firms. At the construction stage foreign currency is 
employed for equipment purchases and payments to foreign technicians 
when required. Nearly all of the feasibility studies give estimates 
of the foreign exchange component of the construction costs. These 
estimates have been accepted for the purposes of this study. The 
foreign currency costs as a proportion of the project construction costs 
are shown in Table 12. There is a great variation in this proportion 
among projects. The Chira and Choclacocha projects were formulated by 
the same consulting firm which suggests a probable coincidence in 
foreign exchange cost coefficients used for both studies. These two 
projects have been designed applying the hypothesis of very capital 
intensive construction methods. Although the foreign exchange costs 
of these two projects are likely overestimated they have not been 
adjusted due to the lack of knowledge of the cost coefficients used in 
the original feasibility studies. 
The ratio between foreign currency cost and total construction 
costs are consistent with those that one would hypothesize a priori. 
The small sierra projects are expected to use very little foreign ex­
change. With the exception of the El Cural project the small projects 
will require approximately 10 percent of the initial project investment 
in foreign currency. The large coastal projects require at least the 
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Table 12. Foreign exchange cost and returns as a proportion of 
production cost, gross output and net incomes 
Foreign Net foreign 
exchange exchange 
Foreign exchange costs earnings earnings 
as a as a as a 
"L of " \ of 7o of % of 
Irrigation construction production gross adjusted 
projects costs costs production net income 
Olmos 29 12 50 85 
Choclacocha 59 14 31 45 
Turabes 21 12 40 75 
Moquegua 41 12 26 43 
Chira 56 12 25 45 
El Cural 23 15 32 56 
La Cano 11 14 42 74 
El Huevo 11 15 34 58 
Antaura 10 11 43 53 
Huanscolla 4 10 49 89 
Chococo 8 10 41 70 
double of this percentage in foreign exchange. The proportion for the 
large Olmos project is 30 percent which can be taken as a minimum 
value for large capital intensive coastal projects. (As indicated 
above, the projected ratios of the Choclacocha and Chira projects 
seem to be overestimated.) 
The effect of changes in shadow prices on the project outcome 
must account for the negative foreign exchange component of production 
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costs and the foreign exchange earning due to exportation or import 
substitution. The negative foreign exchange effect of a project is 
due to the consumption of imported inputs of the project. These inputs 
are mainly fertilizers, pesticide and other minor purchases.^ The 
production cost for each crop and each project is analyzed independ­
ently to determine an approximation to the proportion of foreign 
currency costs. The cost data of the Agricultural Development Bank 
show the fertilizer, pesticide and other costs for each crop. It has 
been assumed that of fertilizer costs 35 percent are in foreign ex­
change and that 80 percent of the value of pesticides used are im­
ported.^ Of the miscellaneous categories of production costs, e.g., 
seeds and medicines, 5 percent are assumed to be imported. 
The proportion of direct production cost valued in foreign 
currency are computed for each production activity. Then the total 
foreign exchange production cost at maximum output is obtained. 
Special assumptions are made for those land improvement projects in 
which the current production in the zone must be subtracted from the 
estimated future production to determine the marginal effect of the 
project. It is hypothesized that the current production costs con­
tain the same proportion of foreign exchange costs as the projected 
future production costs. This seems valid since it is likely that the 
^These are, of course, only the imported components of variable 
production costs. Imported capital goods, such as farm machinery, 
are accounted for in the category "associated on-farm development costs". 
2 These proportions were based upon recent national import and 
domestic input data as provided by Dr. Thyrele Robertson, fertilizer 
specialist of the Iowa Universities Mission to Peru. 
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production coefficients and production activities of the project 
should dominante the zone thus absorbing the current production 
activities. Naturally, there is a period of adjustment but not enough 
is known about the conversion rate from old to new production activities 
to estimate such details. 
Foreign exchange costs as a percent of production costs for each 
project are shown in column 1 in Table 12. The most notable charac­
teristic of this is the relative stability among the above ratios 
ranging from 10 to 15 percent of total costs. The sierra improvement 
projects have the smallest rate, whereas, the coastal projects show 
higher ratios. 
The most significant measure of the net foreign exchange effect 
at the farm level is the proportion of net farm income earned in foreign 
exchange. The estimation of the export earnings and import substitution 
components of gross project output is necessary. The estimation pro­
cedure is again based upon a crop by crop summation of the foreign 
exchange earnings. There are two effects to be estimated for each 
crop. The first is the foreign currency earned from exportation. The 
second is the value of output that can be attributed to import substitu­
tion (saving in foreign exchange). There are sufficient export data to 
identify the major agricultural exports, (7). The Agricultural Statis­
tics oT 1965 shows the following major agricultural exports: coffee, 
cotton and sugar. Of their respective total outputs the following 
percentages were exported: coffee, 70 percent; cotton, 80 percent; 
and sugar, 47 percent. 
Table 13 shows three sets of ratios. The first is the established 
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Table 13. Export earning and import substitution as a proportion 
of gross output; historical, projected and established 
rates by product 
Foreign exchange 
earnings as a 
percentage of gross 
output (including 
exports & import sub­
stitution) established 
Project for project evaluation^ 
EXPORTS 
coffee 65 70 68 
cotton 80 80 92 
sugar 45 47 48 
IMPORT 
SUBSTITUTES 
rubber 80 74 n.a.l 
oil crops 80 53 n.a. 
olives 50 18 n .a. 
rice 60 32 9 
oats 80 73 n.a. 
tobacco 60 45 33 
wheat 90 76 84 
jute 90 82 n.a. 
beet 80 15 25 
milk 80 23 36 
^n. a. not available. 
2 
Based upon rates established in (34). 
3 Based upon projections made in (39). 
Percentage of national 
demand imported or output 
exported 
historical projected 
1965 19752 
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ratio chosen for the computation of export earning or import sub­
stitution. The ratios are applied against the projected production 
of each product by project to determine the foreign exchange effect. 
For example, if a given project is expected to produce $1 million 
in cotton, then the export earnings are expected to be $800, 000, 
i.e., 80 percent of gross output. Of total rice output, 60 percent 
is attributed to import substitution. 
The composition of the demand for the project output is based 
upon the historical and projected export and import performance of 
each product. For those products destined for exportation the ratio 
of exports to output is expected to remain relatively stable until 
1975. The projections show an increase in the proportion exported. 
These proportions have been adopted for the individual project analysis. 
These projections are based upon the assumption that the composition 
of the demand for the project's output is the same as the national out­
put demand. This implies that for each project the demand function is 
relatively elastic. The only exception to this hypothesis could be 
the Olmos project which upon completion could make up a significant 
share of output. In the case of cotton, which is the major export crop 
of the Olmos project, it is estimated that in 1990 the output of the 
Olmos project will represent less than 10 percent of the national out­
put of cotton. If high quality Pima cotton is produced then the project 
should maintain a high export rate. 
Of greater importance is the estimation of the import substitution 
component of output as shown in Table 13. Only those products of 
obvious importance are included such as oil seed crops, rice, wheat. 
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meat and milk, for which Pe^u has had to recur to substantial import 
expenditures. The rate of import substitution has been roughly es­
tablished taking into account the historical import needs and the 
trends in import demand. First, a high rate of import substitution 
of 80 to 90 percent is set for the products which are almost entirely 
imported. These include rubber, oil crops, oats, wheat and jute, all 
with high import ratios. The marginal import substitution rate is set 
equal to the national average rate. A high proportion of import sub­
stitution is also established for beef and milk. As indicated for the 
projection to 1975 the growth in demand for these two products will 
require increasing proportions of imports. As long as the projects to 
be brought under production can provide the output of high quality 
substitutes for the imports the import substitution of the marginal out­
put of the project is likely to be high. Consequently, an import sub­
stitution rate of 80 percent is established for beef and milk in ac­
cord with estimates made by Shaner (34). A somewhat lower substitution 
rate of 60 percent has been set for rice. Rice has been a major import 
item for Peru but with the proper price policies self-sufficiency in rice 
production is attainable. Recent measures by the Peruvian Government, 
especially in the form of improved rice marketing and the promotion of 
rice production in the jungle, suggest that the dependency on rice im­
ports can be reduced. 
The purpose of the above discussion was to establish the foreign 
exchange cost and earning flows and annual labor costs for each project. 
The labor costs for construction and production have been identified. 
Likewise, having estimated the foreign exchange earning of gross output 
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and the foreign currency component of production costs the net foreign 
exchange contribution of adjusted net income is given. 
Given the above mentioned cost and output flows an initial analysis 
of the use of shadow prices with the benefit-cost ratio is shown 
below. As a first approximation it is assumed that the shadow wage 
rate is equal to 50 percent of the market cost given by each feasibility 
study. The shadow wage rate is not set at zero for three reasons. 
First, for an irrigation project to function at above average production 
levels as they are planned, the project authorities must select farmers 
with minimal farming skills and the capacity to adapt to commercial 
farming practices. The shadow wage for these farmers should not be as 
low as the very unskilled agricultural worker. Second, in considering 
the long time horizon of an irrigation project the productivity of labor 
should rise over time as long as the development process continues. 
With the increase in capital formation due to industrial expansion and 
a rising capital-labor ratio and migration out of agricultural, the 
real wage of labor rises over time. Rather than attempt to estimate 
the time path of real wages a shadow price for labor less than the 
market rate and greater than zero is necessary. Finally, even though 
the shadow wage were zero, costs are incurred in shifting labor from 
one activity to another as well as providing the consumer goods neces­
sary for their maintenance in the new activity. Thus, the shadow rate 
must include these positive costs. 
The foreign exchange rate is set at 150 percent of the market rate 
prevailing in 1965. The rate is increased from S/. 26.8=$1 to approxi­
mately S/. 40= $1. This shadow rate is consistent with the devaluation 
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oC 1967 during wliicli the ofCicial rate was increased to S./ 38.70 = $1. 
The comparative results of the benefit-cost ratio at market and 
shadow prices for foreign exchange and labor are shown in Table 14 and 
illustrated in Table 15. First, it is evident that the use of shadow 
prices increases the benefit-cost ratio for each project. Without 
doubt the use of a shadow wage rate improves the project performance 
since the production and construction costs are reduced. The gross 
benefits are not affected. The shadow exchange rate may have either 
a positive or a negative effect. A positive effect occurs when the in­
crease in the present discounted value of adjusted net income exceeds 
the increase in the present discounted value of construction costs. 
A reduction in the benefit-cost ratio occurs, first, if the present 
discounted value of net income declines or does not increase sufficiently 
to compensate for the increase in costs. Only after discounting the 
flows adjusted by shadow prices can the final impact-negative or posi­
tive be evaluated. As shown the over all effect of shadow prices is 
positive.^ 
Numerous projects which are rejected at market prices are accept­
able at shadow prices. At a discount rate of 15 percent two projects 
are accepted at market prices and only three projects are rejected at 
shadow prices. Utilizing shadow prices may also alter the relative 
ordering of the projects. At an interest rate of 6 percent the Olmos 
irrigation project, which at market prices is ranked third, is ranked 
sixth using shadow prices. The small coastal project. El Huevo, improves 
^A separate analysis of the shadow wage rate and shadow exchange 
rate is presented in a later section of this chapter. 
Table 14. Comparison of adjusted benefit-cost ratios at market 
exchange rates and alternative interest rates 1 
and shadow wage and foreign 
6% 10% 15% 
Proiect 
B/C 
adjusted 
net 
income 
market 
prices 
B/C 
adjusted 
net 
income 
shadow 
prices 
B/C 
adjusted 
net 
income 
market 
prices 
B/C 
adjusted 
net 
income 
shadow 
prices 
B/C 
adjusted 
net 
income 
market 
prices 
B/C 
adjusted 
net 
income 
shadow 
prices 
Olmos 2.5 3.7 1.4 2.1 0.7 1.1 
Choclacocha 2.5 5.0 1.5 3.2 0.8 1.9 
Turabes 1.3 2.3 0.8 1.5 0.5 0.9 
Moquegua 1.8 2.5 1.0 1.4 0.5 0.8 
Chira 1.2 1.4 1.5 0.6 0.2 0,2 
El Cural 2.1 3.2 1.4 2.2 0.9 1.5 
La Cano 2.3 3.7 1.4 2.2 0.8 1.3 
El Huevo 1.9 3.9 1.4 2.5 0.9 1.5 
Antauca 3.9 6.0 2.4 3.7 1.5 2.3 
Huanscolla 3.8 7.3 2.4 4.7 1.5 3.1 
Chococo 2.5 4.6 0.5 2.7 0.9 1.6 
^Shadow prices applied to the adjusted benefits and costs are 50 percent of the market wage 
rate and 150 percent of the market foreign exchange rate. 
Table 15. Benefit-costs ratios, adjusted net income at market and shadow prices and alternative 
interest rates, irrigation projects^ ^  
6% 10% 15% 
B/C B/C B/C B/C B/C B/C 
adjusted adjusted adjusted adjusted adjusted adjusted 
net net net net net net 
income income income income income income 
market shadow market shadow market shadow 
prices prices prices prices prices prices 
Antaura Huanscolla X Antaura Huanscolla X Antaura Huanscolla 
Huanscolla Antaura X Huanscolla Antaura X Huanscolla Antaura 
X Olmos Choclacocha o Choclacocha Choclacocha o El Cural Choclacocha 
X Choclacocha Chococo o Chococo Chococo o El Huevo Chococo 
X Chococo El Huevo - Olmos El Huevo o Chococo X El Cural 
La Cano x Olmos - El Cural x El Cural - Choclacocha x El Huevo 
El Cural x La Cano - La Cano x La Cano - La Cano La Cano 
El Huevo El Cural - El Huevo Olmos Olmos Olmos 
Moquegua Moquegua Moquegua Tumbes â Tumbes Tumbes 
Tumbes Tumbes Tumbes Moguegua 8 Moquegua Moquegua 
Chira Chira Chira Chira Chira Chira 
^Shadow prices equivalent to 50 percent of the market wage rate and 150 percent of the foreign 
exchange rate are applied to the adjusted benefit and costs. 
^All projects above the dashed line ( ) have benefit-cost ratios equal to or greater 
than one. 
Projects identified by the same symbol (x,o,-,0) have-equal benefit-cost ratios. 
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its relative ranking. The Olmos project is affected unfavorably by 
the foreign exchange component of investment cost extending over a 
relatively long 26-year period. Likewise, the net foreign exchange 
effect occurs over an even longer period given the long lag in the 
attainment of maximum production. 
The application of a shadow interest rate has the effect of reducing 
the variation in project ordering. As shown in Table 15 the project 
ordering at 6,10 and 15 percent interest rates are practically un­
altered. The only projects that are greatly affected are Olmos and 
El Cural, The former declines and the latter rises in the relative 
ordering. But aside from Olmos, the large coastal projects; namely, 
Choclacocha, Tumbes, Moquegua and Chira are not affected by the varia­
tion in interest rates. 
One can conclude from the above that the sensitivity of the project 
rankings to the interest rate - the most difficult variable to esti­
mate and to justify due to the varity of alternative theoretical con­
structs involved - is reduced following the application of shadow 
prices. Theoretically, the shadow prices for labor and foreign exchange 
are more readily justified even though their estimation is, under 
present limitations, somewhat subjective. 
The benefit-cost analysis leads to important generalizations 
regarding the project rankings. Using market prices and a low rate of 
interest the large projects-Olmos and Choclacocha - and the small sierra 
irrigation projects are ranked high. As the interest rate is increased 
the large projects decline in the ranking relative to all of the small 
new lands and improvement projects. The only project of size which 
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maintains a relatively high benefit-cost ratio is the Choclacocha 
project. The remaining large projects - Olmos, Tumbes, Moquegua and 
Chira - have the lowest benefit-cost ratios. Therefore, the initial 
evaluation of the irrigation suggests that the most reliable projects 
with the highest rate of economic return are the small coastal and 
sierra projects. The large projects, even at relatively low rates of 
interest, are apparently less economically advantageous than the small 
projects. General policy recommendations are discussed in a later 
section. 
C. The Internal Rate Of Return 
A frequently discussed alternative to the benefit-cost criterion 
is the internal rate of return (9). This criterion measures the annual 
percentage return to the project investment over the project's useful 
life. Thus, for a given investment K and a series of annual net receipts 
(benefits) B(-, the internal rate of return, r, is defined by the 
equation 
K . 
Î = 1 (l+r)*- t = I (1 + r)^ ~ H (A.6) 
where 
K = the initial investment; 
Bt = the annual net receipts; 
Oj. = the annual operating, maintenance and 
replacement costs; 
N = the project life. 
k known difficulty that may be encountered in the use of the internal 
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rate of return is that equation 4.6 is not necessarily single-valued. 
Multiple rates are generated when the flow of net receipts less 
operating costs is not raonotonically increasing; i.e., the flow changes 
signs several times. l-Jhen this occurs (as is not the case with the 
irrigation projects) a wide range of discount rates should be tested 
to determine if multiple solutions occur. It is recognized that in 
practice a single-valued solution is usually found (14). 
The internal rate of return is used to establish investment 
priorities selecting, first, those projects with the highest rate, then 
successively, projects with lower rates. A minimum acceptable rate 
of return equal to the opportunity cost of capital may be set to estab­
lish the cutoff point and an overall investment budget constraint may 
be imposed. 
The internal rate of return does not necessarily yield the same 
set of priorities as the benefit-cost criterion for a given group of 
projects. Assuming that the project planners have established a rate 
of interest to discount future money flows, which is then used as the 
minimum acceptable project rate of return for a project to be constructed, 
the internal rate of return and the benefit-cost criteria coincide in 
certain aspects of project choice. First, both of the criteria will 
reject the unfeasible projects: the benefit-cost ratio will be less 
than one and the internal rate of return will be less than the estab­
lished discount rate. Secondly, both criteria will accept the feasible 
projects; the benefit-cost ratio exceeds one and the internal rate of 
return exceeds the minimum acceptable discount rate. The difference be­
tween the two criteria occurs in ranking the feasible projects since a 
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project with a relatively high internal rate of return may have a 
relatively small (but greater than one) benefit-cost ratio. 
Eckstein (9) shows that the following relationship between the 
internal rate of return and the benefit-cost ratio holds 
Srn = ain (^) + ° _ 1) (4.7) 
G K C 
where 
a^^ = the capital recovery factor for N years at the internal 
rate of return r; 
^in ~ the capital recovery factor for a given sum for N years 
at a rate of discount i; 
B/G = the benefit-cost ratio; 
0 = annual operating, maintenance and replacement costs of 
the project investment; 
K = the initial project investment. 
It is assumed that i and N are known, thus, r can be found once a^^^ 
is calculated. From equation 4.7 the following propositions can be 
derived; 
(1) if li/C > 1, then r> i; 
(ii) if li/C = 1, then r=i; and 
(iii) if B/C<1, then r<. i. 
Thus, the two criteria coincide in the selection of feasible and un­
feasible projects. They do not rank the feasible projects the same 
due to the differences among projects in the ratio O/K. Hence for 
a given ratio B/C (greater than one) the higher the ratio O/K the 
higlier is the value of a^ and r. Likewise, the lower is O/K the 
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smaller is the value for r. 
This suggests an important relationship. The internal rate of 
return favors projects with large operating cost-investment ratios, 
O/K since it focuses on the return to the initial investment. The 
benefit-cost ratio favors projects with high initial investment and low 
operating costs since it is formulated on the basis of the gain per 
unit of the total public outlay including investment plus operating 
costs. 
The benefit-cost ratios and internal rates of return for eleven 
irrigation projects are compared in Table 16. Due to the relative 
homegenity of the projects, the ratio O/K, should be similar for all 
projects. Thus, as demonstrated the two criteria yield practically 
the same priorities and, in consequence, in the following sections the 
internal rate of return is not developed in further detail. 
Table 16. Internal rate of return and benefit-cost ratio, using 
adjusted net income at market prices 
Internal rate of return Benefit-cost ratios 10 % discount rate 
market prices market prices 
Project Value Project Value 
Huanscolla 20. 0 
Antaura 20. 0 
El Cural 14. 0 
El Huevo 13. 8 
Chococo 13. 7 
Choclacocha 13. 2 
La Cano 12. 8 
Olmos 12. 0 
Moquegua 9. 9 
Tumbes 8. 7 
Chira 7. 2 
Huanscolla 2 .4 
Antaura 2 .4 
Chococo 1 .5 
Choclacocha 1 .5 
El Cural 1 .4 
El Huevo 1 .4 
La Cano 1 .4 
Olmos 1 .4 
Moquegua 1 .0 
Tumbes 0 .8 
Chira 0 .5 
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D. The Social Marginal Productivity Of 
Investment In Irrigation 
The previously discussed benefit-cost ratio is a criterion which 
consists of a simple measure of the contribution of the project in­
vestment complex. The Social Marginal Productivity of Investment (SMP) 
as formulated by Chenery (6) combines the contribution of the project 
investment to two national objectives - increases in national output 
and the attainment of self-sufficiency as measured by the contribution 
to the balance-of-payments. The principal components of the SMP are 
elaborated in Chapter II. This section consists of the estimation of 
the SMP for eleven irrigation projects. 
As discussed previously the SMP is defined as follows: 
SMP V_C^rB (4.8) 
K K K 
where the first term is the output-capital ratio, the second the 
domestic costs-capital ratio and the latter the balance-of-payments 
effect per unit of project investment. The components of equation 
(4.8) are defined by Chenery as follows: 
K = the project investment; 
V = average annual domestic output due to the project = 
X + E- Mi; 
X = average annual gross output; 
E = externalties; 
M— imported materials; 
C = domestic costs = L + Mj + 0; 
L = labor costs; 
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0 = overhead costs including operating, maintenance and 
replacement costs; 
B = balance-of-payments effect; 
r = premium accounting for the overvaluation of 
the exchange rate. 
An important characteristic of any project evaluation coefficient 
is that it accounts for the differences among projects in the time 
needed to reach full output, the gestation periods, and the useful 
economic project lives. A large project, such as Olmos, may require 
an initial investment period of six or eight years before any pro­
duction occurs, whereas, the gestation period of a small project may 
be one year. Likewise, twenty years may pass before the Olmos project 
reaches full output and this same lag in attainment of full benefits 
may be only five to ten years for a small project. Differences in use­
ful project lives is not a serious question for the relatively homo­
geneous irrigation projects; it has been assumed in the feasibility 
studies that once the initial infrastructure is completed the economic 
life of each project is 50 years. 
The SMP, as formulated above, does not directly account for the 
above specified differences among projects in gestation and running-
in periods. Chenery includes the term 0, defined as the overhead costs 
of the projects, which can be calculated to include the amortization 
and interest payments of the project. The net output, (V - C), is 
then reduced more for capital intensive projects than for less capital 
intensive projects by the inclusion of heavier interest costs for the 
former projects. Nevertheless, two questions remain unsettled. First, 
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the measurement of the annual output does not include a relative 
weighting of output received at different points in time: the project 
lags to attainment of full output are not included. Chenery implies 
that the average annual output over the project's life should be em­
ployed for the calculation of X and V; but this has the effect of 
weighting equally output received each year. Thus, 100 dollars output 
received 20 years from now is assumed to be equal to 100 dollars 
received 50 years from today. The problem is evident upon examining 
the ratio of domestic output to capital, V/K. Since K is defined as 
the total project investment and V the average annual domestic output, 
K is unaffected by the length of the gestation period and V is only 
averaged on an unweighted yearly basis. 
The decision maker must view the process of project selection as 
one of present values, both of investment and output, and not of total 
values., in the case of investment, and average values, in the case of 
output. Hence, only weighting the future flows of output and investment 
by the established rate of time discount can a proper time perspective 
of output and investment be established. 
The SMP is now revised to include formal adjustments in output 
and investment by introducing the time discounting of future monetary 
flows at a pre-established interest rate. Each project has a period 
of initial investment before water reaches the farms, which depends 
upon the size and difficulty of the engineering works to be completed. 
Once production begins the project has an economic life of 50 years but 
the period required from initiation of production to the attainment of 
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maximum output varies among projects. The estimate of this running-in 
period is given by each project feasibility study and is usually longer, 
the longer the period over which infrastructure and on-farm investment 
is made. 
The total project investment K is now expressed as the present 
value in year 1 (the year of initiation of construction) of the flow 
of annual investment outlays for the basic infrastructure of the project.^ 
Hence 
P(K) ^t t = 1,... n (4.9) 
t=l (1+ 0 , 
where 
P(K) = the discounted present value of project at the 
initiation of construction; 
K(. = investment in year t; 
n = length of the investment period; and 
i = annual rate of discount assumed to be constant over 
the life of the project. 
The investment in each project can now be treated comparatively 
since each is expressed as a discounted present value of the same 
year. The differences in the length of investment periods are accounted 
for by the heavier discounting of investment made relatively further 
into the future. 
On similar grounds, the calculation of the present value of net 
domestic output V is necessary. Hence, to place output on a comparative 
This investment flow includes direct public investment in the 
project. On-farm investment is included within the term C of 
equation 4.8 
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basis among projects the following is computed; 
N 
P (V _ C) = è (V -C) t = 1,... N 
t=l (l+i)C , 
(4.10) 
where 
P(V-G) = the discounted present value of the flow of 
project net domestic income, V-C; 
(V-C)c = the net domestic income in year t; 
N = the total life span of the project including any 
period of initial investment during which no 
production occurs; and 
i = a pre-specified annual rate of discount. 
Similarly, 
N 
p ( v )  2 t _  t  =  1 , . . .  N  ( 4 . 1 1 )  
t=l (H-i)t 
where 
P(V) = the discounted present value of domestic output V; 
V(. = the domestic output in year t; and 
N C 
P(C) = ^  _zç_ . 
t=l (1+i) t = 1,...N (4.12) 
so that 
P(C) = the discounted present value of domestic costs; and 
C(. = the domestic costs in year t. 
It holds that 
P(V-C) = P(V) - P(C) (4.13) 
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Even though the output and production costs are now expressed 
in discounted present values, the SMP must be expressed in annual 
values to give the contribution of the project investment on a yearly 
basis throughout the life of the project. Thus, the discounted present 
value of output and costs must be expressed in annual values properly 
including the effect of interest rates. This is accomplished by 
using the relationship expressing the equivalence between a uniform 
series of annual values R and a present value P (32). This is given 
as follows: 
^ Pi (1+i)" 
^ (1+i)" - 1 (4.14) 
= P(c.r.f.). 
where 
R = end-of-year payment in a uniform series continuing 
n years; 
P = the discounted present value of a future money flow (the 
future flow may be uniform or irregular); 
i = a pre-specified rate of discount; 
n = the useful project life. 
The term by which P is multiplied in equation 4.14 is commonly called 
the capital recovery factor (c.r.f.) and is found in financial tables. 
Equation 4.14 can be interpreted as follows: R is the uniform annual 
project receipts that must be invested at the end of n consecutive 
years to obtain the same result as the investment at interest i of 
a lump-sum P at the beginning of the period; hence R and P are financially 
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equivalent.^ To obtain R, it is sufficient to know P, i, and n. 
For the evaluation of the irrigation projects it is assumed that 
n = 50 years and i = 0.10. Of these two variables the value for n 
is least critical given the long economic lives of irrigation projects. 
For example, with a discount rate of 10 percent the capital recovery 
factor is equal to 0.10086 for 50 years and 0.10001 for 100 years; 
increasing the period of analysis from 50 to 100 years reduces the 
equivalent annual value of the series by approximately 8/10 of 1 percent. 
The present values of output, costs and investment are converted 
to equivalent uniform annual values (hereafter refered to as equivalent 
annual values) by multiplying the present sums obtained in equations 
4.10, 4.11 and 4.12 by the approximate capital recovery factor of 
0.10 for a discount rate of 10 percent. Hence, the following equivalent 
annual values are computed 
V* = P(V) . (c.r.f.) 
C* = P(C) . (c.r.f.) (4.15) 
(V - O* = P(V-C) . (c.r.f) 
X* = P(X) . (c.r.f) 
= P(K) . (c.r.f.) 
where 
V" = equivalent annual value of domestic output; 
C* = equivalent annual value of domestic costs; 
(V -C)* = equivalent annual value of domestic income; 
^The steps involved in the derivation of equation 4.14 are 
developed in (14). 
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X* = equivalent annual value of gross output; 
K = equivalent annual investment costs; and 
c.r.f. = the capital recovery factor for a given 
discount rate and project life. 
The SMP is then redefined using the annual value of investment and the 
equivalent annual values for output and costs, so that 
SMP* = V*- C* - rB* where (4.16) 
K K 
SMP* = equivalent annual increment in national income per 
unit of the annual value of investment plus the balance-
of-payments effect. 
The SMP* is not yet adjusted for the shadow price of labor which 
affect the values of K* C* B*and the difference (V -C)*. Upon in­
cluding the shadow wage rate the SMP is denoted as follows: 
SMP«= r 1% (4.17) 
where 
SMP** = equivalent annual increment in national income 
and the balance-of-payments effect per unit of the 
annual project investment with all unused or under­
employed resources valued at their shadow prices. 
For comparative purposes four types of analysis of the social marginal 
productivity are conducted. First, the SMP of equation 4.8 is calcu­
lated without discounting the time flows of output, costs and in­
vestment by using the ultimate annual output and costs of the project 
in the denominat In this case, the annual output and cost are 
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KÎ v( n liy Lliu values sustained by the project once it roaches full pro­
duction; the project running-in period is ignored. Secondly, the project 
output, costs and investment are computed to include the discounting 
of future costs and returns; the investment is measured in annual 
costs and all values in the numerator are computed as equivalent uniform 
annual flows as shown in equation 4.16. Finally, both the discounted 
and undiscounted variables are calculated, first, at market prices and, 
secondly, at shadow prices. 
ikiforc continuing with the detailed analysis of the social marginal 
productivity of investment the balance-of-payments effect is now 
elaborated. This effect consists of three elements as given by 
li(K,X) = alii (K) + (X) + Bg' (X) (4.18) 
defined as 
B = the total bal/înce-cf-payr:ents cffcct, defined as a function 
of X and K; 
B|= the investment effects, shown as a function of K; 
a = the capital recovery factor; 
t 
B2= the direct operating effects, shown to be a function of X; 
I I 
1)2 = the indirect operating effects, also a function of X. 
Since the variables X and K are redefined in terms of X*, X**, 
K*, and K** the function B(K,X) is also adjusted for these differences. 
It follows that 
B*(K*,X*) = a Bf(K*) + Bg*^'*) + B2'* (X*), and (4.18b) 
B**(K*^%X**) = a Bi**(K^'*) + B2** (X**) + B2'**(X**) (4.18c) 
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Except for the calculation of (K**), all of the coefficients of 
the total balance-of-payments effect remain unchanged from equation 
4.18a. 
Following Chenery, each of the components is now discussed in 
detail. First, the balance-of-payments effect of the initial project 
investment is given by the equation 
Bi = -mj K - mz (1 - mj_) K, (4.19) 
which is defined by 
mj^ = proportion of the project investment requiring imports; 
m = marginal propensity-to-import 
s = marginal propensity-to-save; and 
z = 1 the investment multiplier. 
m+s 
Equation 4.19 is redefined in terms of the present value of invest­
ment K* (or valued at shadow wages, K**). It follows that 
of = - mj K* - mz (1 - m^) K* (4.20a) 
or 
B** = - - mz (1 - m^**) K** (4,20b) 
defined by 
B* = the annual value of the direct investment effects on the 
balance-of-payments valued at market wages; 
gVc* _ Che annual value of the direct investment effects on the 
balance-of-payments valued at shadow wages; and 
mi** = the proportion of project investment (valued at shadow 
wages) requiring imports. 
124 
In practice, the term B* is not computed since if the shadow exchange 
rate is used, then the shadow wage rate would normally be incorporated 
in the analysis to complete the adjustment for overvalued resources; 
equation 4.20a is included for the sake of completeness and to demon­
strate the change in the value of the coefficient mj^. Since the 
inclusion of the shadow wage rate will reduce total project investment 
by reducing labor costs, imports per unit of investment will increase. 
This occurs because the coefficient m^ is given directly by the project 
feasibility studies but in terms of investment computed at market 
prices: thus, in general, m^** will exceed m^. 
The impact upon national output of the project investment is a 
function 1) of the direct imports required for the initial capital 
costs and 2) the increase in imports arising from the increase in 
income induced by the initial investment. Both of these terms are 
necessarily negative and, therefore, will result in a reduction in 
SMP. The coefficient m^ is given directly by the project feasibility 
studies, as enumerated in Table 17. The remaining coefficients m, 
s and, z are more difficult to estimate. Optimally, they should be 
estimated by regions since the import and saving ratios will likely 
vary by zone. Thus, large coastal irrigation projects will have dif­
ferent multiplier effects than small sierra irrigation improvemnt 
projects. A priori it is more difficult to estimate the value of the 
marginal propensity-to-save although the very low income levels of the 
sierra would imply a low marginal propensity. The marginal propensity-
to-import of income groups affected by coastal projects should be 
relatively higher than for those benefiting from small sierra projects. 
Table 17. Basic data for the calculation of the social marginal productivity of investment in 
irrigation (millions of soles) 
V = X + E - M £  C  =  L  +  M j  +  0  C o e f f i c i e n t s  
Irrigation 
projects K V X E Mi C L Md 0 mi m s z e mp c 
Olmos 4,028.7 1766.3 1902.2 135.9 927.3 401.8 282.4 243.1 0.29 0.25 0.40 1.54 0.56 0.07 0.44 
Choclacocha 886.7 446.9 476.9 - 30.1 237.1 75.1 109.4 52.6 0.59 II 0.31 0.06 0.69 
Tumbes 673.7 230.3 246.1 - 15.8 129.9 56.3 68.7 4.9 0.24 It " " 0.40 0.06 0.60 
Moquegua 290.0 112.2 120.3 - 8.1 61.5 29.5 29.4 2.6 0.41 II " 0.26 0.07 0.74 
Chira 1,083.0 273.7 287.6 - 13.9 164.3 53.3 62.8 48.2 0.56 II 0.25 0.05 0.75 
El Cural 103.0 68.5 74.8 - 6.3 19.9 7.9 10.5 1.5 0.23 II " " 0.32 0.08 0.68 
La Cano 87,4 40.0 43.2 - 3.2 21.2 7.5 12.6 1.1 0.11 II " " 0.42 0.07 0.58 
El Huevo 79.9 42.9 47.0 - 4.1 23.7 8.6 14.2 0.9 0.11 II 0.34 0.09 0.66 
Antaura 14.9 7.6 7.8 - 0.2 2.4 0.8 1.3 0.3 0.10 It " " 0.43 0.03 0.57 
Huanscolla 13.8 9.3 9.8 - 0.5 4.7 1.7 2.8 0.2 0.04 II II 11 0.49 0.05 0.50 
Chococo 28.3 11.4 12.0 - 0.6 5.6 2.0 3.2 0.4 0.08 II " " 0.41 0.05 0.50 
The symbols are defined as follows: 
K = fixed investment 
V = domestic social value added 
X = gross output 
E = externalities 
Mi= imported materials 
C = total cost domestic factors 
L = labor cost 
Md= domestic materials 
0 = overhead costs 
m^ = proportion of investment requiring imports 
m = marginal propensity to import 
s = marginal propensity to save 
z = investment multiplier 
e = proportion exports or import substitution 
mp = imports per unit of project output 
c = proportion production going to Increased 
comestlc use 
Table 18. Basic data for the calculation of the social marginal productivity of investment 
expressed in present and equivalent annual values including the adjustment for 
the shadow wage rate^ 
Projects .* K K ** V X * (V - (V - C)** mj** 
Olmos 175.08 149.92 514.5 549.8 72.5 126.2 .33 
Choclacocha 71.79 59.66 305.2 325.7 38.9 76.0 .71 
Tumbes 46.17 37.44 117.4 125.5 -10.0 13.4 .25 
Moquegua .24.21 21.42 61.2 65.3 - 0.6 9.4 .46 
Chira 84.89 76.41 135.5 142.4 -44.8 -22.2 .62 
El Cural 9.36 7.87 47.2 51.5 5.7 11.5 .27 
La Cano 7.95 6.32 27.5 29.7 3.1 7.4 .14 
El Huevo 7.26 5.81 29.5 32.3 3.8 8.8 .14 
Anatura 1.28 1.04 5.1 5.3 1.9 2.5 .12 
Huanscolla 1.18 .96 6.9 7.3 1.9 2.7 .04 
Chococo 2.42 1.95 7.8 8.2 1.3 2.3 .10 
The following notation is used; 
K* = the annual value of project investment valued 
at market prices 
K** = the annual value of project investment valued 
at a shadow wage rate equal to 50 percent of 
the market price 
V* = the equivalent annual value of domestic 
production; 
X* = the equivalent annual value of gross output; 
(V-C)' 
(V-C) ** _ 
m. 
the equivalent annual value 
of domestic Income; 
the equivalent annual value of 
domestic income valued at 
shadow wages; 
imports per unit of project 
investment where investment 
is valued at shadow wages. 
127 
Those on the coast are more fully integrated into the market economy 
as reflected by larger expenditures on imported consumer goods. Little 
is presently known about regional consumption functions, therefore, 
this study incorporates global estimates of the marginal propensity-
to-import based upon work by Thorbecke and Condos (36), Vandendries 
(40) and the Iowa Mission (22). 
The global marginal savings ratio is given by the Thorbecke -
Condos model in (36). Private consumption as a function of disposable 
gross domestic income shows a marginal propensity-to-consume of 0.569 
with a standard error of 0.029 and an r2 of 0.96. Estimating the 
marginal propensity-to-consume using gross domestic income yields a 
coefficient of 0.546 and a marginal savings ratio of 0.454. This ratio 
appears to be relatively high for an underdeveloped economy. This re­
flects one of the difficulties in using an aggregate estimate; all 
income groups are included without differentiation. The high savings 
ratio is likely due to the very uneven distribution of income which 
persists in Peru. Therefore, with the inclusion of the very high in­
come groups, which are the primary beneficiaries of the gains in income 
generated by the highly export-oriented sector of the economy, the 
saving ratio will be overestimated for those low income group affected 
by the irrigation projects. To estimate the balance-of-payments effect 
of project investment a marginal savings ratio of 0.40 is applied 
consistent with the values suggested by the macro-economic models. 
The marginal propensity-to-import for the analysis of the SMP is 
set at 0.25. Thus, using the Peruvian national income data elaborated 
in (22) estimating imports as a function of gross domestic income gives 
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a marginal import coefficient of 0.2521 with an r2 of 0.92 and a 
standard error of 0.039. Thus, for the estimation of the second com­
ponent of equation 4.10) an investment multiplier of 1.54 is used 
based upon the assumption s = 0.40 and m = 0.25. 
In a previous section, the value for the proportion of the 
project requiring imports, is established as approximately 10 to 15 
percent for small coastal and sierra projects and at least 30 percent 
for large coastal projects. The values reasonably reflect the range 
for small and large projects for the coefficient mj^** and, thus, the 
following discussion also holds for the probable limits for Bi**. 
Bf = -0.10 K - 0.385 (I-O.IO)K, (4,21a) 
Bf = - 0.447 K, (4.21b) 
and for large projects 
B^ = - 0.30 K - 0.385 (1-0.30) K, (4.22^) 
Bi = - 0.569 K. (4.22b) 
The term Bi is not yet in national income units since it is not an 
annual flow but rather a proportion of the capital investment K. As 
shown in equation 4.18a, 4.18b and 4.18c, B^ is multiplied by the capital 
recovery factor a. This factor is approximately 0.10 for a discount 
rate of 10 percent. Hence, the first term aB^ as well as aB^** of 
the balance-of-payments effect, ranges between 4.5 and 5.7 percent 
of the project investment depending upon whether the project is a small 
sierra project or a large coastal project. These limits are based upon 
the above established values for the marginal propensity-to-import 
and propensity-to-save. 
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The second term in equation 4.18a,b, and c is a measure of the 
direct operating effect of the projects upon the balance-of-payments 
and is defined as follows: 
B2 = e(l -mp) X - C Sp X - g (mp' X (4.23a) 
= e (l-mpt X*- cmp X* - g(mp' - #) X* (4.23b) 
where 
e = proportion of increased output in exports or import 
substitutes; 
mp = imports per unit of project output; 
c = proportion of output going to increase domestic 
consumption; 
g = proportion of output replacing current consumption; 
^'= imports per unit of output replaced; and 
e + c + g = 1 
The last term of equations 4.23a and 4.23b is effectively zero 
for two reasons: since the output of the irrigation projects is 
specifically oriented towards export promotion and import substitution 
the value for g is likely to be small and, secondly, the difference 
between ïSp* and BÇ' is hypothesized to be very small since agricultural 
technology is not likely to change so rapidly that a large difference 
in the import ratios of the new output and the output replaced would 
be evident. It is not necessary to calculate the direct operating 
effect at shadow prices, , since labor costs do not enter into the 
function; thus = Bg**, since X* = X**. The first term of B^ 
(and B2 ) is the net foreign earnings arising from the foreign sales 
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or substitution of imports due to the project output. This term is 
always positive since Wp" is always less than one. The second term 
measures the imports needed for the component of output destined to 
increase domestic consumption. Thus, output is divided between ex­
ports or import substitution and increased domestic consumption. 
Consider the probable values for the coefficients of 4.23a and 
4.23b for the group of irrigation projects under evaluation. The 
coefficient, tnp is a small number less than 0.10 for all of the proj­
ects. Assuming that ip is equal to 0.10 the value for (and B^*) 
is a function of the term e (or c) since e + c = 1. 
The direct operating effect is equal to or greater than zero 
as long as e is equal to or exceeds 0.10. This is, e must be greater 
than mp for the term to be positive. For the group of irrigation 
projects under consideration in all cases the relation e > mp holds, 
thus, in all instances B^ ^  0. For projects with large rates of exports 
or import substitution, with at least, e = 0.50 and inp 0.10, it follows 
that 
B^ = 0.40 X, (4.24a) 
B'* =0.40 X* (4.24b) 
2 
For projects with small components of export and import substitution, 
c;,g., c = 0.25 and mp = 0.10, then 
1$^ = 0.20 X (4.25a) 
»'* = 0.20 X* (4.25b) 
The last component of the total balance-of-payments effect is 
defined by the relation 
Bg' = - m. 2 f (l-iïïp) X-mz B^ (4.26) 
131 
where 
f = proportion of output financed by inflationary means. 
The first term of 4.26 measures the negative impact on the balance-
of- payments of the expansion in imports stemming from the output 
financed by inflationary measures of the government. It is assumed 
that the central government will adopt measures to maintain long-term 
budgetary equilibrium throughout the project life; thus, 4.26 is 
composed only of the last term. Since it has been shown that for the 
projects under evaluation B^>0 and 0, it follows that, 
= - 0.385 B' (4.27a) 
Bi'*= -0.385 B^* (4,27b) 
Consider now the range of values for the function 4.8, the total 
balance-of-payments effect per unit of project investment. Applying 
the above hypotheses that g = 0 and f = 0 the following relation holds: 
B = a(-m^ - mz (l-mj^))+ (4.28a) 
K 
X (1-mz (e(l-mp) - c nç) ). 
K 
(B)** =• a( - m^ -mz (1-mj^**) ) + 
K 
(l-mz(e(l-mp) -cmp) ) (4.28b) 
The principal coefficients have the following values: 
a = 0.10; 
m = 0.25; 
z = 1.54; 
mp= 0.10. 
Alternative values that the remaining coefficients might take are 
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discussed above. The required imports as a proportion of project 
investment, (and m^ ), is 0.10 for small projects and, at least, 
0.30 for large capital intensive projects. Likewise, projects which 
obtain high levels of exports or imports substitutions are characterized 
by e = 0.50 and low levels of exports and import substitution by 
e = 0.25. Thus, the conditions for a positive balance-of-payments 
effect can be established as a function of the output-capital ratio, 
X or ,V. **. 
K <K> 
Given a realistic range of values for e and the sign of the 
balance-of-payments effect can be estimated. As seen in Table 19 
the total effect, B, is a function of the output-capital ratio of 
each project. Thus, for a small project with a low value for m^ and a 
high value for e, a minimum value for X/K of 0.183 is necessary to 
achieve a positive balance-of-payments effect. At the other extreme 
a large capital intensive project, with m^ large and with a low export 
or import substitution rate so that e is small, a larger value for 
X/K must be attained to give a positive balance-of-payments effect. 
A low import-investment ratio is characteristic of small projects and 
a large ratio characteristic of capital intensive projects. The outcome 
of Table 19 leads to important generalizations regarding the relation­
ship between the output-capital ratio and the balance-of-payments 
effect. 
To make a positive contribution to the balance-of-payments a 
large capital intensive project must have a larger ouput-investment 
ratio, X/K, than a small project for a given rate of exports or import 
substitution. This generalization in the case in which the large and 
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Table 19. Minimum values for X/K such that B/K 0 for high and low 
export substitution and high and low import-investment 
ratios, irrigation projects^ 
high export or low export or 
import substitution import substitution 
e = 0.50 e = 0.25 
Low import-
investment ratio 0.183 0.366 
mu = 0.10 
High import-
investment ratio 
m^ = 0.30 0.232 0.463 
A 
The above solutions are based upon the following equations; 
1) for e = 0.50, = 0.10; B/K = 0.045 X (0.246); 
K 
2) for e = 0.50, = 0.30; B/K= 0.057 X (0.246); 
K 
3) for e = 0.25, m^ = 0.10; B/K= 0.045 X (0.123); 
K 
4) for e = 0,25, m^ = 0.30; B/K= 0.057 X (0.123); 
K 
small projects have low rates of exports or import substitution. It 
is apparent that under the general values postulated for the coefficients 
of the effect B, small projects will have larger values for B/K than 
the large capital intensive coastal projects. Since the large proj­
ects have, on the average, a smaller output-investment ratio than the 
small coast and sierra projects, it can be concluded that the small 
projects will make a greater contribution to the balance-of-payments 
per unit of investment. 
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Consider the calculation of the SMP for eleven irrigation proj­
ects.. The basic project data are shown in Tables 17 and 18. These 
data include the coefficients necessary to compute the balance-of-
payments effect. In Table 20 the results of the calculation of the 
SMP are enumerated using market wages with output at the full project 
capacity level and investment taken as the undiscounted public in­
vestment. The same output and investment measures are used in Table 21 
with the difference that shadow wages are introduced. In these 
tables, r, the percentage difference between the shadow and market 
exchange rate expressed in soles per dollar, is alternatively set equal 
to zero, .5 and 1.0. Table 22 shows the values of the social marginal 
productivity of investment, SMP* and SMP**, and their major components, 
at a discount rate of 10 percent. Finally, Tables 23 and 24 show 
the project priorities generated from the alternative forms for the SMP. 
A major consideration is the evaluation of the effect of dis­
counting on the relative project rankings shown in Tables 23 and 24. 
It is immediately evident upon comparing the priorities that very 
little difference occurs in the project ranking; in only a few cases 
do projects (mainly the larger ones) shift more than one position 
within the rankings after output and investment are discounted. For 
example, the Olmos and El Cural shift downward in the rankings by one 
or two positions. Hence, in practice, the inclusion of discounting 
for the set of relatively homogeneous projects does not significantly 
affect the project ranking and thus for the purpose of comparison the 
use of the total undiscounted investment and the annual sustained out­
put is sufficient. Nevertheless, care should be exercised in extending 
Table 20. Social marginal productivity of investment in irrigation by component and by project, 
market wages and alternative shadow exchange rates! 
V C V-C Br S M P 
K K V K 
Irrigation 
projects r=.50 r=1.00 r=0 r=.50 r=l.00 
Olmos 0.44 0.33 0.25 0.043 0.086 0.11 0.15 0.20 
Choclacocha 0.50 0.37 0.27 0.004 0.008 0.14 0.14 0.15 
Tumbes 0.34 0.29 0.14 0.011 0.022 0.05 0.06 0.07 
Moquegua 0.39 0.31 0.19 0.047 0.094 0.08 0.12 0.17 
Chira 0.25 0.25 0.56 -0.021 -0.041 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 
El Cural 0.67 0.29 0.56 0.026 0.052 0.38 0.41 0.43 
La Cano 0.46 0.34 0.25 0.030 0.060 0.12 0.15 0.18 
El Huevo 0.54 0.40 0.26 0.022 0.043 0.14 0.16 0.18 
Antaura 0.50 0.25 0.49 0.041 0.081 0.25 0.29 0.33 
Huanscolla 0.67 0.44 0.34 0.091 0.181 0.23 0.32 0.41 
Chococo 0.40 0.30 0.26 0.023 0.046 0.10 0.12 0.15 
^Output and production costs are defined as the values attained when the project reaches full 
output, the total undiscounted project investment is equal to K. 
Table 21. Social marginal productivity of investment, shadow 
and r = .5 ^ 
wage at 50 percent of market wage 
V 
K 
C 
K 
V-C 
V 
Br 
K 
SMP SMP 
projects r = .50 r = o r = .50 
Olmos .51 .31 .59 0.050 .20 .35 
Choclacochaq .61 .37 .55 0.005 .24 .34 
Tumbes .40 .27 .56 0.013 .12 .13 
Moquegua .44 .28 .58 0.053 .16 .21 
Chira .28 .24 .50 -0.023 .04 .02 
El Cural .79 .28 .77 0.031 .51 .54 
La Cano .55 .34 .56 0.036 .21 .24 
El Huevo .67 .40 .55 0.027 .27 .30 
Antaura .62 .26 .74 0.049 .36 .41 
Huanscolla .82 .45 .57 0.111 .37 .48 
Chococo .50 .30 .60 0.029 .20 .23 
^See note of the preceding table. 
Table 22. Social marginal productivity of investment at market and shadow wages using equivalent 
annual values of output and investment^ 
Projects 
V* 
K* 4#* 
(Vrc)* 
K* 
* 
.5 B 
K* SMP* V 
/(V-C)t*. 
K 
5/B\** 
K SMP** 
Olmos 2.9 0.14 00.4 0.17 0.57 3.4 0.25 00.8 0.26 1.06 
Choclacocha 4.3 0.12 00.5 0.02 0.48 5.1 0.25 01.3 0.01 1.31 
Tumbes 2.5 -0.09 -00.2 0.02 0.18 3.1 0.11 0.04 0.08 0.48 
Moquegua 2.5 -0.01 00.0 -0.16 -0.16 2.9 0.15 0.04 -0.15 0.25 
Chira 1.6 -0.33 -00.5 -0.26 -0.76 1.8 -0.16 -00.3 -0.27 -0.57 
El Cural 5.0 0.12 00.6 0.14 0.74 6.0 0.25 01.5 0.21 1.71 
La Cano 3.5 0.11 00.4 0.17 0.57 4.4 0.27 01.2 0.27 1.47 
El Huevo 4.1 0.13 00.5 0.11 0.61 5.1 0.30 01.5 0.19 1.69 
Ântaura 4.0 0.37 01.5 0.27 1.77 4.9 0.49 02.4 0.38 2.78 
Huanscolla 5.8 0.28 01.6 0.63 2.23 7.2 0.39 02.8 0.83 3.63 
Chococo 3.2 0.17 00.5 0.16 0.66 4.0 0.29 01.2 0.23 1.43 
d 
All terms marked with a double asterisk (**) are computed using shadow wages equal 
to 50 percent of market wages. 
Table 23. Project rankings for the output-capital ratio and the social marginal productivity of 
investment (SMP) at shadow and market wage and foreign exchange rates^ 
V B B r = o 
S M 
r = .50 
P 
r = 0 r = .50 
K Shadow K K Shadow Shadow 
Market 
wage at 
50% mar­ Market Shadow Market Market 
wage at 
50% mar­
wage at 
50% mar­
wage ket wage wage. wage. wage wage ket wage ket wage 
X Huanscolla Huanscolla Huanscolla Huanscolla 
El Cural El Cural 
El Huevo El Huevo 
Choclachcha Antaura 
Antaura Choclacocha El Cural 
La Cano La Cano Chococo 
Olmos Olmos 
Chococo Chococo 
Moquegua Moquegua 
Tumbes lumbes 
Chira Chira 
Antaura Olmos 
Olmos Antaura 
La Cano La Cano x 
El Cural x 
Chococo 
El Huevo El Huevo 
Tumbes Tumbes 
Choclacocha Choclacocha 
Moquegua Moquegua 
Chira Chira 
El Cural 
Antaura 
Huanscolla 
Choclacocha 
El Huevo X 
La Cano x 
Olmos 
Chococo 
Moquegua 
Tumbes 
Chira 
El Cural 
Huanscolla 
Antaura 
El Huevo 
Olmos 
La Cano 
Choclacocha 
Chococo 
Moquegua 
Tumbes 
Chira 
El Cural 
Huanscolla 
Antaura 
El Huevo 
Choclacocha 
La Cano x 
xOlmos X 
xChococo 
Moquegua 
Tumbes 
Chira 
El Cural 
Huanscolla 
Antaura 
El Huevo 
Olmos 
Choclacocha 
La Cano 
Chococo 
Moquegua 
Tumbes 
Chira 
^All projects preceded by the same signs (x,o) have equal values for the variable under 
consideration. 
Output is valued at the ultimate annual sustained project output and investment costs 
are undiscounted. 
Table 24. Project rankings for the output-investment ratio, the balance-of-payments effect, and 
the SMP at shadow and market wage and foreign exchange rates, with output and investment 
adjustment for time discounting^ 
iir (#)* (M* SMP* r = 0 SMP* r = .5 SblP** r = o SMP** r = .5 
Huanscolla Huanscolla Huanscolla Huanscolla Huanscolla Huanscolla Huanscolla Huanscolla 
El Cural El Cural Antaura Antaura Antaura Antaura Antaura Antaura 
Choclacocha xChoclacocha xOlmos Olmos El Cural El Cural El Cural El Cural 
El Huevo xEl Huevo xLa Cano La Cano . xChoclacocha Chococo El Huevo El Huevo 
Antaura Antaura Chococo Chococo xEl Huevo El Huevo Choclacocha La Cano 
La Cano La Cano El Cural El Cural xChococo xOlmos La Cano Chococo 
Chococo Chococo El Huevo El Huevo oOlmos xLa Cano Chococo Choclacocha 
Olmos Olmos Tumbes Tumbes oLa Cano Choclacocha Olmos Olmos 
Tumbes Tumbes -Choclacocha Choclacocha Moquegua -Moquegua Moquegua Tumbes 
Moguegua Moquegua -Moquegua -Moquegua -Tumbes -Tumbes Tumbes Moquegua 
Chira Chira -Chira -Chira -Chira -Chira -Chira -Chira 
One asterisk (*) signifies that the variable is expressed as an 
equivalent annual value using.market prices. 
Two asterisks (**) indicates the variables are expressed the same as above except that 
income and investment are priced at shadow wages equal to 50 percent of market wages. 
All projects marked by the signs (x,o) have equal values for ths variables in 
question and those marked (-) have negative values for the variables. 
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this generalization to heterogeneous projects. 
The project rankings are now discussed in detail; since the 
priorities shown for the discounted and undiscounted variables are 
very similar the discussion will cover both groups of priorities. 
Using market wages and the market rate of exchange (r = 0) 
the small projects maintain a high relative ranking. The only proj­
ect of significant size to attain a relatively high ranking is 
Choclacocha. The larger more capital intensive projects are ranked 
relatively low for the SMP criterion at market prices. 
By evaluating the SMP at r = 0 and r = 0.50 and at market wages 
the variation in project rankings is identified. First, five projects, 
Olmos, El Huevo, La Cano, Chococo and Huanscolla, rise in the project 
ranking due to the application of a shadow exchange rate. Choclacocha 
falls in the ranking and the change is especially marked. These changes 
can be explained by the relative values of the project coefficients 
in Table 13. The Olmos project is affected favorably by the relatively 
large proportion of output destined to exports or import substitution -
e is large. In addition, the Huanscolla project requires a minimum of 
imports for project investment, i.e., m^ = 0.04. Thus, a positive 
weighting of the balance-of-payments effect benefits both projects pos­
itively. The Choclacocha project declines in the relative ordering 
due to the combination of a large requirement for imports at the in­
vestment stage (mi = 0.59) and a relatively low rate of export and im­
port substitution (e = 0.31). Thus, the effect of the project in­
vestment on the balance-of-payment is relatively more important 
than the positive operating effects B^ in solving for B, the total 
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balanc2-of-payments effect. As shown in Table 15 the SMP with the 
addition of the balance-of-payments component is essentially unchanged 
showing SMP = 0.24 with r = 0 and SMP = 0.25 with r = 1.0. 
The overall ranking of the projects is not significantly altered 
by the addition of a shadow wage rate at 50 percent of the market rate. 
Holding r constant the impact of the shadow rate can be evaluated. In 
Table 23 and 24 with r = 0 at market and shadow wage rates there are 
only slight changes in the project orderings. The Olmos and Chococo 
projects change ranking as well as the El Huevo and Choclacocha proj­
ects, but no major shifts occur. The same holds for the priorities 
for r = 0.5 at market and shadow wages. 
A similar change in project ranking occurs following the exchange 
rate adjustment at shadow wages. The Olmos project rises and the 
Choclacocha project declines in the ranking. The only difference 
evident is that the Choclacocha project is less affected by the ex­
change rate adjustment at shadow wages than at market wages. 
• Thus, in determining project ranking, using the SMP, the major 
variation in priorities is affected by the value of the shadow ex­
change rate adjustment r. It is apparent that the addition of a shadow 
wage rate has a small effect upon the projects priorities. 
Chenery argues that for similar types of projects it would be 
sufficient to rank the projects on the basis of the domestic value 
added-investment ratio, V/K. This hypothesis can be tested in Tables 
22 aiul 23 hy comparing tlie project priorities for the terms V/K, B/K and 
for SMP when r= 0. With r = 0 at shadow or market wages the project 
ordering for the variables V/K and SMP is almost exactly the same. 
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The projects of major Importance maintain a low ranking; namely, Olmos, 
Moquegua, Tumbes and Chira. The project ranking is altered substantially 
by the balance-of-payments effect. Consider the results for the ratio 
B/K in relation to V/K and, consequently, SMP. The Olmos project has 
a relatively large balance-of-payments effect but a low value added-
investment ratio. Hence the inclusion of a positive value for r should 
improve the relative position of the project. Another case of a di­
vergence in the ranking is the Choclacocha project. It has a relatively 
low balance-of-payments effect and a moderately high value-added-in­
vestment ratio. Therefore, when r> 0 the project declines in the proj­
ect ranking. 
The proposition that the balance-of-payments effect can be ignored 
for homogeneous projects does not hold for the eleven irrigation proj­
ects. Although the projects are grouped within a common classifica­
tion the separate effects generated large variations in the project 
rankings. Therefore, the balance-of-payments must be estimated for the 
projects to account for the full range of possible national objectives 
chosen by policy makers. 
This concludes the application of the SMP to the irrigation proj­
ects. Remaining sections cover the application of partial evaluation 
criteria to the irrigation projects, a sensitivity analysis, the com­
parison of project orderings generated by the different investment 
criteria and, finally, a comparison of investment criteria. 
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E. Partial Investment Criteria 
In addition to the comprehensive investment criteria discussed 
above, a large set of simple investment criteria are appropriate 
for the evaluation of the irrigation projects. The benefit-cost ratio 
measures the impact on production of the entire input complex and the 
SMP combines in one measure the output-investment ratio and the balance-
of-payments effect per unit of investment. The static partial criteria 
are constructed on the basis of a ratio between output or some other 
desired benefit and one limiting resource. The simplicity of the con­
struction is accentuated by the static measure of the variables; the 
investment gestation period is frequently not considered nor the lag 
in attainment of full production. 
There are essentially three classes of ratios that should be ap­
plied to the projects depending upon the national objective chosen or 
the major resource restriction under consideration. Two groups of ratios 
measure the impact of investment and expenditures and earning in foreign 
exchange and a third class of ratios measure project employment, and 
labor productivity. Each of these three classes of criteria - i.e., 
measured with respect to investment, foreign exchange and labor - are 
now applied to the irrigation projects. 
The first set of ratios now considered takes as the major limiting 
resource the total project investment and some measure of production 
is selected for the numerator. The investment criterion requires that 
the projects are selected so as to maximize the respective ratios. 
For these types of partial criteria time is not explicitly accounted 
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for. Investment is measured as the total initial capital expenditure 
independently of the length of the gestation period and output is 
measured at full output, thus, neglecting the running-in-period. 
The output-investment ratios are modified from the strictly static 
measure to include the discounting of investment flows and the calcu­
lation of the average annual value of output. The total project in­
vestment (or any component thereof) is converted into its present value 
as follows: 
K* = ^t t = l,...n (4.29) 
t=l (l+i)C, 
defined as 
K* = the discounted present value of total investment; 
Kt = investment of year t; 
i = the annual rate of discount; 
n = the investment period. 
For the purpose of comparison both K, the total undiscounted project 
investment, and K* are used to construct separate output-investment 
ratios. 
The output flow is converted into an average annual value by 
dividing its present value by the useful project life. Hence, where 
X is any measure of output, 
N 
P(X) = ^  
t=l (l+l)t, t = 1,...N (4.30) 
and 
X* = P(X) (4.31) 
N 
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where 
P(X) = the present value of output; 
X(. = the output of year t; 
i = the rate of discount; 
N = the useful project life; 
* 
X = the average annual value of the present sum P(X); 
Thus, the new output-investment ratio is given by the term X*/K*. 
This ratio will be compared with X/K, where output is the maximum sus­
tained annual output attained by the project and K is the undiscounted 
total project investment. 
The output-investment ratio can be constructed in various ways. 
Alternative forms of output can be employed including gross production, 
value added and net income. Likewise, investment can be represented 
as primary project investment of the public sector or total investment 
including private on-farm investment. Thus, the following ratios could 
be considered by a project planning office: 1) gross production - total 
investment ratio; 2) value added - total investment ratio; 3) net income 
- total investment ratio, and 4) net income - investment ratio value 
at shadow prices. 
The choice of ratio is conditioned by the formulation of the spe­
cific national economic objectives. Gross production is a very general 
measure of benefits and to the extent that excess capacity is present 
in industries supplying inputs to the projects, it represents the direct 
and indirect benefits of the project investment. As discussed in con­
nection with the choice of benefits for the benefit-cost ratio, gross 
production overestimates the contribution of the project investment by 
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the exclusion of investment induced in associated input supplying in­
dustries or throughout the market structure when no excess capacity 
exists. Thus, value added and net income are more appropriate measures 
of the direct output contribution of the project investment. Even 
though gross production appears less appropriate it frequently must be 
employed for the lack of other measures or it may be sufficient as long 
as the project priorities established by other ratios coincide. This 
possibility is examined for the group of irrigation projects. 
The denominator of the output-investment ratio is contingent upon 
the specification of the principal resource restriction. The total 
project investment is composed of two parts - public and private. The 
former is made up of the initial infrastructure costs. Unless special 
conditions dictate, planning authorities will employ total project 
investment although private investment may be treated as a negative 
benefit. This convention is used in the construction of the ratios in 
order to maintain consistency with the benefit-cost ratio and SMP. 
Table 25 shows the value and resulting priorities by applying al­
ternative measures of the output-investment ratio. Each ratio gives 
the increase in output or income per unit of investment. It is apparent 
that the project ranking for the different ratios are very similar. By 
considering the sub-groups of projects the rankings can be evaluated. 
First, the small sierra improvement projects - Antaura, Huanscolla 
and Chococo - maintain a stable position throughout the project rankings. 
The Antaura and Huanscolla projects are consistently ranked at the top 
of the list. The Chococo project is ranked relatively lower being 
ranked seventh or eighth for all of the ratios. The small coastal new 
Table 25. Alternative output-investment ratios, undiscounted and discounted, irrigation projects^ 
Gross output-investment ratios Va lue-added-investment 
X/K X/K X'/K* X'/K* 
omr 
VA/K VA'/K 
Project Value Project Value Project Value Project Value Project Value Project Value 
El Cural 0.73 El Cural 0.71 Huanscolla 0.119 Huanscolla 0.104 El Cural 0. 61 Huanscolla 0. 083 
Huanscolla 0.71 Huanscolla 0.70 El Cural 0.108 Antaura 0.071 Huanscolla 0. 49 El Cural 0. 069 
El Huevo 0.59 El Huevo 0.58 El Huevo 0.086 El Cural 0.071 Antaura 0. 42 Antaura 0. 056 
ChoclacochaO.54 Antaura 0.50 Choclacocha 0.085 El Huevo 0.071 El Huevo 0. 40 La Cano 0. 051 
Antaura 0.52 Choclacocha 0.48 Antaura 0.079 Choclacocha 0.068 Choclacocha 0. 36 El Huevo 0. 051 
La Cano 0.49 La Cano 0.48 La Cano 0.073 La Cano 0.065 Olmos 0. 34 Choclacocha 0. 047 
Olmos 0.47 Olmos 0.41 Chococo 0.065 Chococo 0.061 La Cano 0. 34 Chococo 0. 040 
Chococo 0.42 Moquegua 0.41 Moquegua 0.051 Moquegua 0.047 Moquegua 0. 30 Tumbes 0. 032 
Moquegua 0.41 Chococo 0.41 Olmos 0.050 Olmos 0.045 Chococo 0. 30 Moquegua 0. 030 
Tumbes 0.37 Tumbes 0.36 Tumbes 0.047 Tumbes 0.039 Tumbes 0. 26 Olmos 0. 029 
Chira 0.27 Chira 0.22 Chira 0.031 Chira 0.028 Chira 0. 16 Chira 0. 013 
Output and costs are valued at shadow wage and exchange rates, 50 percent and 150 percent, 
respectively, of the market wage and exchange rates. 
The symbols are defined as follows; k 
X = maximum annual sustained project output; 
X = X less on-farm investment costs; VA 
X' = average annual present value gross project , 
output less on-farm investment; ^ 
K 
omr ~ K* plus the present value of op­
erating maintenance and replacement 
costs; 
= value-added at full output less on-
farm investment; 
= average annual present value of value-
added; 
= discounted present value of investment; (X-C) = net income at full output less on-
farm investment; 
Table 25. (continued) 
Ratios Net income - investment ratios Net income-investment 
ratio shadow prices 
VAVK*omr Ot^/K '/K**omr 
Project Value Project Value Project Value Project Value Project Value 
Huanscolla 0.073 El Cural 0.48 Huanscolla 0.054 Huanscolla 0. 046 Huanscolla 0.090 
Antaura 0.050 Antaura 0.35 Antaura 0.052 Antaura 0. 046 Antaura 0.071 
El Cural 0.045 Huanscolla 0.33 El Cural 0.043 Chococo 0. 029 Choclacocha 0.059 
La Cano 0.045 El Huevo 0.24 El Huevo 0.035 El Cural 0. 027 Chococo 0.052 
El Huevo 0.041 Choclacocha 0.23 Choclacocha 0.034 La Cano 0. 027 El Huevo 0.049 
Choclacocha 0.038 La Cano 0.22 Chococo 0.031 El Huevo 0. 027 El Cural 0.043 
Chococo 0.038 Olmos 0.21 La Cano 0.029 Olmos 0. 026 La Cano 0.043 
Olmos 0.029 Chococo 0.20 Olmos 0.024 Choclacocha 0. 022 Olmos 0.035 
Tumbes 0.026 Moquegua 0.18 Moquegua 0.021 Moquegua 0. 019 Moquegua 0.026 
Moquegua 0.026 Tumbes 0.15 Tumbes 0.018 Tumbes 0. 014 Tumbes 0.025 
Chira 0.011 Chira 0.10 Chira 0.011 Chira 0. 009 Chira 0.013 
1 
(X-C)' average annual present value of net income less on-farm investment costs. 
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lands projects - El Gural, La Cano and El Huevo - also sustain a rela­
tively stable position in the ranking irregardless of the ratio selected. 
The El Cural and El Huevo projects are consistently ranked above the 
La Cano project. The large coastal improvement projects - namely, 
Choclacocha and Chira - demonstrate a varied performance. The Chira 
project is ranked last for all of the output-investment ratios. The 
Choclacocha project is ranked lower when the average annual value is 
employed. 
The Olmos and Choclacocha projects are ranked lower by the in­
clusion of on-farm investment, i.e., X' compared with X. This per­
formance can be explained by their relatively high ratio of on-farm in­
vestment to total investment. The small coastal and sierra projects 
have an average ratio of on-farm to total investment of 0.13, whereas 
the Olmos and Choclacocha projects show a value for the ratio of ap­
proximately 0.38. This suggests one of the weaknesses in applying a 
ratio which does not include on-farm investment; unless investment is 
defined precisely and distributed carefully between primary and asso­
ciated on-farm investment the lack of consistency in the definition of 
investment may introduce biases in the results. Likewise, both pri­
mary and on-farm investment are scarce resources, thus, the use of total 
investment reflects the contribution of total scarce resources. 
The simple static ratios, X/K, VA/K and (X-C)y^ are modified to in­
clude discounting and the addition of operating, maintenance and replace­
ment costs of the initial project investment. The inclusion of dis­
counting has only minimal effects on the project rankings. The more 
capital intensive projects decline in the rankings but the change does 
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not involve more than one or two positions. The small projects, such 
as Chococo, are positively affected in the relative ranking although 
the absolute values for all ratios are reduced by discounting. The 
addition of operating, maintenance and replacement costs to the capital 
costs also discriminates against capital intensive costs - this arises 
from the heavier operating and maintenance costs associated with large 
engineering works such as damns and diversion works. Nonetheless, the 
variation in the project rankings is minimal with the introduction of 
the variable K^mr* 
The use of shadow prices does not alter the relative ranking of 
most of the projects, with the exception of Olmos and Choclacocha. The 
former project declines in the ranking and the latter rises. In absolute 
terms the value of the ratio for all projects increases but proportion­
ally more for the small less capital intensive projects. 
Therefore, it is evident that the choice of output-investment ratio 
does not greatly affect the rankings of the projects. If project data 
is lacking the gross output-investment ratio, properly discounted, will 
likely yield approximately the same set of priorities as the more re­
fined criteria using value-added or net income. 
A second set of important ratios for project selection are those 
refering to labor use and productivity. To the extent that employment 
generation is included in the welfare function, labor use per unit of 
scarce resource should be measured. Likewise, for the labor employed 
in the distinct projects a measure of its most advantageous use is a 
ratio of output to labor. 
The labor employed in each project can be measured in either physical 
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or monetary units for the construction and operating phases. In ad­
dition, shadow wages may be introduced; but since the same reduction 
in market wages are made for each project this refinement does not 
greatly alter the ordinal ranking of the projects. 
Kacli project employs labor during the construction and operating 
pliases. Tlie construction Employment is important to measure when pos­
sible but the effecta are temporary. In this study this employment has 
not been estimated due mainly to the assumption that the planning author­
ities, when refering to employment generation, implicitly are considering 
the permanent on-farm employment effects. Consequently, all of the 
labor coefficients omit temporary employment during project construction. 
This is not to argue that construction employment should be ignored. 
Viewed from the total investment program a large project or a series of 
small projects can provide substantial regional employment and income 
generation. For example, the Olmos project is expected to provide 
annual employment of 4,000 man-days during the construction phase. 
The annual man-days of labor employment during operation are esti­
mated for each project by applying data drawn from the Agricultural 
Development Bank. Estimates are available of the number of man-days 
annually required by crop, and by zone per cultivated hectare. These 
labor coefficients by crop are then applied to the projected output data 
of Appendix A giving the total project labor demand in annual man-days. 
The Bank data is also utilized in calculating labor costs since these 
are also available by crop and by zone for cultivated hectares. Only 
one project - Olmos - gives an estimate of the expected future labor 
requirements. 
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The labor use per hectare is relatively uniform for the projects. 
Table 26 shows the projected number of annual man-days per cultivated 
hectare for each irrigation project. 
Table 26. Annual man-days required per cultivated hectare at full 
output, irrigation projects 
Irrigation 
project 
Annual 
man-day per 
cultivated 
hectare 
Olmos 103 
Choclacocha 103 
Moquegua 88 
Chira 101 
El Cural 109 
La Cano 103 
El Huevo 105 
Antaura 96 
Huanscolla 95 
Chococo 96 
The new lands projects such as Olmos, El Cural, La Cano and El 
Huevo have higher labor requirements per hectare than the small im-
provement projects This is mainly determined by the projected dis-
tribution of crops. Projects with extensive areas in fruits, olives 
and grapes and other high labor use crops will, on the average, have a 
higher labor demand. The improvement projects, frequently located in 
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zones not apt for such crops, would then be expected to employ less 
labor per hectare. 
Nevertheless, the main planning question is one of evaluating 
projects from the viewpoint of labor use per unit of the scarce re­
source, investment. Table 27 shows the ratios pertinent to the evalua­
tion of labor use and productivity. The first two ratios measure the 
labor costs per unit of investment for discounted variables. The 
remaining ratios measure the gross output per unit of annual man-days 
employment and annual labor costs during operation. 
The ratios of labor payments to total investment demonstrate a 
now familiar result - the small less capital intensive projects are 
ranked over the large more capital intensive projects. The small coastal 
new lands projects - El Cural, La Cano and El Huevo - perform especially 
well. The Chira project is ranked last. These results are not unex­
pected. The large projects are planned to include extensive farm mech­
anization and other on-farm capital costs. The small projects are or­
ganized assuming that present farming practices will be continued, i.e., 
the amount of on-farm technical assistance is less intensive than for 
the large projects, and thus, on-farm development costs will be minimal. 
Since labor costs are affected by regional variations in wage 
rates the ranking is not the same as when the number of annual man-days 
is utilized. Wage rates on the coast are in general higher than those 
in the sierra. For the projects under analysis the average daily wage 
for unskilled farm laborers is S/.30 for the coastal area and approxi­
mately S/.20 for the sierra. Nevertheless, the variation in the project 
Table 27. Labor evaluation coefficients, use and productivity, irrigation projects 
L/K L'/K * X/L X' /L' X/MD 
Project Value Project Value Project Value Project Va lue Project Value 
Huanscolla 0.11 Huanscolla .021 Antaura 6.5 Antaura 6.6 Olmos 195 
El Cural 0.10 El Cural .020 Choclacocha 6.0 Choclacocha 6.3 Moquegua 194 
La Cano 0.10 El Huevo .016 Chira 5.8 Chococo 6.3 El Cural 191 
El Huevo 0.10 La Cano .014 Chococo 5.7 Chira 6.0 El Huevo 183 
Tumbes 0.08 Moquegua .011 Huanscolla 5.5 La Cano 5.7 La Cano 165 
Olmos 0.06 Olmos .010 La Cano 5.3 Huanscolla 5.6 Tumbes 137 
Moquegua 0.06 Tumbes .010 El Cural 5.0 El Cural 5.5 Choclacocha 120 
Chococo 0.06 Chococo .010 El Huevo 5.0 El Huevo 5.5 Chira 114 
Choclacocha 0.05 Choclacocha .008 Olmos 4.7 Olmos 5.0 Antaura 111 
Antaura 0.05 Antaura .008 Tumbes 4.2 Tumbes 4.4 Chococo 106 
Chira 0.03 Chira .006 Moquegua 3.9 Moquegua 4.4 Huanscolla 103 
The symbols are defined as. follows: 
L = annual labor costs at full project output; 
L' = average annual present value of labor costs; 
X = gross output at full output; 
X' = average annual present value of gross output; 
K = total project investment; 
K* = present value of total investment; 
MD = annual man-days employment at full 
output. 
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ranking is not greatly altered by the use of the differential wage rates. 
Although the large projects should benefit in the ranking from the higher 
wage rates paid, the lower ratio of man-days to total investment does 
not permit an improvement in the project ranking. 
Without implying that farm labor should be considered a scarce in­
put a rough measure of the average productivity of labor is now pre­
sented. The ratio of gross output to total annual man-days employed 
is given. The average productivity of labor is higher for the capital 
intensive coastal projects. This stems from the fact that the gross 
output per hectare for these projects is significantly larger than found 
for the improvement projects. Since the number of man-days employed 
per hectare for the projects varies little, the gross output per hectare 
is the main determinant of the ranking. Thus, the labor productivity 
is a function of the same factors which influence output per hectare, 
i.e., the amount of capital employed, the crops selected and the cropping 
pattern, the level of farm technology, yields per hectare, farm size, 
etc. 
Conventional economic theory specifies that the wage rate is a 
function of the productivity of labor. This is verified by the ratio 
of output to man-days employed. The coastal area with higher wage 
rates is characterized by a high average productivity of labor as shown 
for the irrigation projects. Inversely, the sierra projects are typi­
fied by a low average labor productivity. Hence, the labor requirements 
per unit of investment are lower for the coastal projects but the labor 
employed will have a higher productivity than the same labor employed 
in the sierra. 
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Finally, foreign exchange can be an important limiting resource 
in planning for investment in irrigation. This is an especially acute 
problem for the large capital intensive projects which can require up 
to 50 percent of the initial investment in foreign exchange. Likewise, 
the restriction is pronounced during periods of balance-of-payment 
difficulties occasioned by declining exchange reserves and limited debt 
capacity. The foreign exchange restraint is less crucial for the small 
improvement projects since 15 percent or less of total investment in 
foreign exchange is needed. For this reason local budgetary restric­
tions weigh more heavily in the selection of the investment program for 
small projects. These budgetary limitations are clearly evident in the 
economic situation in Peru during the year 1968 and are expected to 
continue at least through 1970. The foreign exchange shortage is acute 
following the devaluation of 1967. 
Two simple evaluation coefficients reflecting the foreign exchange 
earnings per unit of total investment and total investment in foreign 
exchange are shown in Table 28. The first ratio is calculated using 
the annual gross foreign exchange earning at full project output. Thus, 
for the Huanscolla project each unit of investment yields, at full proj­
ect output 28 cents in net foreign exchange earnings. The small proj­
ects, be they for new lands or improvement are ranked highest. This 
is explained by the relatively high ratio of foreign earning to total 
production. For example, the following ratios are given for a group 
of representative projects; Huanscolla, 0.49; El Cural, 0.32; Antaura, 
0.43; Choclacocha, 0.31; and Chira, 0.25. Among the large projects the 
Table 28. Foreign exchange ratios, irrigation projects" 
Proiect Value Proiect Value Proiect Value Proiect Value 
Huanscolla 0.28 Huanscolla .052 Huanscolla 8.60 Huanscolla 1.54 
Antaura 0.17 Antaura .033 Antaura 2.13 Antaura 0.32 
El Cural 0.15 Olmos .026 Chococo 2.00 Chococo 0.30 
]La Cano 0.15 El Cural .025 La Cano 1.54 La Cano 0.23 
Olmos 0.14 La Cano .025 El Huevo 1.29 El Huevo 0.19 
Chococo 0.13 Chococo .025 Olmos 0.79 El Cural 0.11 
El Huevo 0.13 Choclacocha .021 El Cural 0.75 Olmos 0.09 
Tumbes 0.12 El Huevo .021 Tumbes 0.59 Tumbes 0.06 
Choclacocha 0.08 Tumbes .014 Choclacocha 0.23 Choclacocha 0.04 
Moquegua 0.07 Moquegua .009 Moquegua 0.19 Moquegua 0.02 
Chira 0.04 Chira ,007 Chira 0.13 Chira 0.01 
The symbols are defined as follows: 
(X-C)p = net foreign exchange earning at full output; 
(X-C)p = average annual present value of foreign exchange earning at full output; 
K = total project investment; 
K* = present value of total investment; 
Kp = foreign exchange component of total investment; 
K*p = present value of the foreign exchange component of project investment. 
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Olmos project is ranked highest due to the high proportion of net in­
come in foreign exchange. Even though the project is relatively capital 
intensive it performs well in the overall ranking. 
The second ratio of Table 28 measures the net foreign exchange 
earnings (net of the foreign exchange component of production costs) 
per unit of total investment in foreign exchange. If the data are 
available this is a much more realistic measure of foreign exchange 
earnings per unit of foreign exchange costs; but the general pattern 
of the project ordering is not significantly altered from the previous 
ratios. 
F. A Sensitivity Analysis 
Frequently, the project planner is unable to provide a consistent 
and complete methodology for the estimation of the shadow prices of 
capital, labor and foreign exchange. Reliable data are usually not 
available to construct a general equilibrium model. Economic theory 
provides the basis for specifying the directional change in the market 
prices to arrive at shadow prices but the specification of the exact 
rate is very difficult if not impossible. It is generally accepted 
that 1) the shadow wage is less than the market wage, 2) the shadow 
interest rate is higher than the market rate and 3) the shadow exchange 
rate is higher than the market exchange rate. Thus, the shadow prices 
are specified following these three guidelines. 
It is important that the economic analysis of the projects does 
not hinge solely upon intuitive judgements in the selection of shadow 
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prices but rather methods should be employed to test the relative impact 
of the established prices. Consequently, a sensitivity analysis is a 
useful complement to the complete evaluation of the irrigation projects. 
This analysis consists of the systematic variation of the project co­
efficients i.e., wage rates, exchange rate and interest rate, to mea­
sure the change in the net present value of benefits and costs and the 
resulting project priorities. For if the latter ranking is not sub­
stantially affected by the variation of (say) the shadow wage then its 
estimation can be ignored by the project planner. 
A sensitivity analysis of the irrigation project benefit-cost 
ratios to changes in the interest rate, the exchange rate and the wage 
rate is now presented. The benefits and costs of each project are 
divided into labor costs and foreign exchange earnings and costs. 
Algebraically, the analysis consists of the extension of the equations 
(4.1), (4.2), (4.3) and (4.4) previously discussed. 
First, the systematic variation in benefits is conducted by in­
cluding adjustment coefficients f and b for foreign exchange and wages. 
The benefits are defined as the difference between gross output and 
production costs, on-farm investment costs and on-farm operating main­
tenance and replacement costs, i.e., 
Bt = Xj. - Pxt " lat " ®at ' where t = 1,—N, (4.30) 
for year t. Dividing output into domestic and foreign exchange earnings 
and costs and investment into labor costs, foreign exchange costs and 
domestic non-labor costs we have 
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Xt = Xt + Xt , (4.31a) 
Cxt = + fC^t + and (4.31b) 
lat = + fift + blat, (4.31c) 
defined as follows for the year t 
Xj. = gross output; 
= gross output in domestic currency; 
X^ = gross output in foreign currency earned or substituted; 
Cxt - production costs; 
x^t''" domestic non-labor production costs; 
= foreign currency production costs; 
C^ (. = labor production costs; 
Igj. = associated on-farm investment costs; 
dnb 
Igj. = domestic non-labor on-farm investment costs; 
= foreign currency on-farm investment costs; 
Igj. = labor on-farm investment costs, and 
Ogt = operating, maintenance and replacement costs. 
Likewise, the project costs of year t are shown as 
= let + Oct and (4.32) 
let = Ict^ + "ft + (4.33) 
where 
Gt = project costs; 
= construction costs; 
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= domestic non-labor construction costs; 
f 
= foreign currency construction costs; 
= labor component of construction costs, and 
Oct ~ operating, maintenance and replacement costs. 
FinaJLy, as shown previously, the benefit-cost ratio is 
N 
li/C = ^  
t=l (l+i)t t=l (1+i)^, t=l J • • • > N (4.34) 
The sensitivity of the benefit-cost ratio to variations in the 
labor costs through the selection of different values for the shadow 
wage rate is achieved by introducing alternative values for the coef­
ficient b. Since the shadow wage is less than the market wage the con­
dition ) O^b—1 must be maintained. The effect of different shadow 
exchange rates on the benefit-cost ratio by varying the value for the 
coefficient f is based upon the relation 0 —f —k when k is a pre-speci-
fied upper bound. Finally, the interest rate r can be varied through 
some range of values giving rise to a functional relationship between 
itself and the benefit-cost ratio. For this study it is assumed that 
0.06^i^0.15. 
The number of possible combinations in the construction of a sensi­
tivity analysis is extremely large. Even with high speed computational 
Tacilities the number of possibilities is far greater than the analyst 
can clearly handle. For example, by systematically altering three 
variables such as tlie exchange rate, the wage rate and the interest 
rate by computing five different values for each, there are 125.possible 
combinations to be analyzed. Therefore, it is first necessary to 
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selectively limit the range of values including only those most rele­
vant. For the three project parameters - foreign exchange rate, wage 
rate and interest rate - the following limits are placed: 
1.0-f-.2.0, (4.35a) 
0'. b'. 1.0, (4.35b) 
0.06 i'-0.15 (4.35c) 
Thus, four functional relationships are computed relating the benefit-
cost ratio of each project to the alternative values of each parameter 
subject to the above constraints. Hence 
B/C = Si (f) (4.36) 
B/C = g2 (b) (4.37) 
B/C = 83 (i) (4.38) 
B/C = (f,b,i) (4.39) 
subject to (§4.35). Since the discount rate is a key variable the 
functions g^, ^2 and g^ are calculated at different rates. 
1. Discount rate 
One of the most strategic parameters for project analysis is the 
interest rate. The capital Intensity of the project program is heavily 
dependent upon its value. A high rate of interest discriminates against 
large capital intensive projects and a low rate will improve the relative 
ranking of large projects. The sensitivity of the benefit-cost, un­
adjusted and adjusted, is shown in the Figures 2 and 3. 
The benefit-cost ratio of each project is highly dependent upon 
Figure 2. Benefit-cost ratios using unadjusted project net income 
at alternative interest rates, irrigation projects. 
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Figure 3. Benefit-cost ratios using adjusted net income at alternative 
interest rates, irrigation projects. 
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the rate of interest. For a low rate of interest all of the projects 
have a positive net present value of benefits, i.e., the benefit-cost 
ratio exceeds one. At a high rate of interest (say, 15 percent) most 
projects are no longer economically feasible applying either adjusted 
or unadjusted net income. A.11 the projects are feasible at a low in­
terest rate and nearly all are rejected at high interest rates using 
both unadjusted and adjusted net income. Likewise, the common practice 
of employing a low rate of interest for feasibility studies tends nearly 
always to yield feasible projects. A planning office should require 
the use of multiple interest rates or set in advance a uniform rate to 
be employed in all feasibility studies. 
This still leaves unsolved the most difficult problem - the effect 
of the interest rate upon the composition of the project ranking. The 
Olmos project is an example of the relative impact of alternative in­
terest rates upon a capital intensive project. In both Figures, 2 and 
3, Olmos declines in the ranking as the interest rate is increased from 
6 to 15 percent. Thus, the current practice of using a low rate of 
interest automatically favors large scale projects implying a very 
long-term commitment of public resources. Thus, the selection of the 
interest rate will have a profound effect upon the feasibility of the 
individual projects and the composition of the project ranking as long 
as market wage and exchange rates are used. Greater consistency can be 
obtained by adopting uniform practices in the application of interest 
rates but the selection of a single rate to determine the final project 
ranking remains largely unresolved. The subjective preferences of 
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policy makers, in the final analysis, determine the appropriate rate 
of interest consistent with the rate of social time preference. 
2. Foreign exchange 
The benefit-cost ratios of the eleven irrigation projects are now 
subjected to a sensitivity analysis to variations in the foreign ex­
change rate. The foreign exchange adjustment coefficient f of equations 
(4.31) and (4.33) is varied systematically between the limits 1.0 and 
2.0. Three separate tests are made at interest rates of 6, 10, and 15 
percent. These results are shown in Figures 4, 5, and 6. 
First, irrespective of the rate of interest the economic feasi­
bility of each project is positively related to the exchange rate, i.e., 
a higher rate yields a higher benefit-cost ratio because of the positive 
net foreign exchange earnings of the projects. Nonetheless, the relative 
sensitivity of each project is quite different. Consider the results 
of Figure 4. Among the projects that are the most sensitive to the ex­
change rate are included: Antaura, Huanscolla, Chococo, and to a lesser 
extent. El Gural, La Cano, El Huevo and Olmos. Projects which are not 
affected by the value of the exchange rate are Choclacocha, Moquegua, 
Tumbes and Chira. 
The use of a shadow exchange rate in excess of the market rate 
yields feasible projects which were previously considered unfeasible 
for a given interest rate (Figure 3). This is especially the case at 
an interest rate of 15 percent. Thus Olmos, La Cano, El Huevo, El Cural, 
Chococo are all feasible for a shadow exchange rate twice the market 
Figure 4. Benefit-cost ratios using adjusted net income at 
alternative foreign exchange rates and an interest 
rate of 6 percent, irrigation projects. 
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rate i.e., f = 2.0. With the exception of Olmos a minimum value of 
approximately f = 1.2 is necessary to achieve B/C = 1 and for Olmos 
the minimum shadow rate is f = 1.8 at an interest rate of 15 percent. 
At lower rates of interest the feasibility of the projects is not 
affected by the variable exchange rate. 
The size of the foreign exchange adjustment alters the project 
ranking because of the differential sensitivity of the projects to the 
shadow rates. In Figures 4, 5 and 6 the changes in priorities are 
presented by the interscetion of the individual project functions. At 
a 6 percent interest rate (Figure 4) the project rankings are not altered 
beyond a shadow rate of 1.6 times the market rate. At 10 percent the 
last intersection occurs at 1.4 times the market rate. At 15 percent 
the minimum necessary adjustment in the market rate beyond which the 
ranking is not altered is 1.3. The intersection of the functions for 
the Olmos and Choclacocha projects can be ignored since Choclacocha is 
unfeasible throughout all values of the exchange rate. Thus, at a high 
rate of interest a moderate shadow exchange rate - one that can easily 
/ 
be justified during times of balance-of-payments difficulties - will 
lead to stable project ranking. At a low interest rate a much higher 
shadow rate is reached before an invariant project ranking is attained. 
These results imply that when the planning authorities decide upon a 
low discount rate then much greater care must be taken in choosing the 
shadow exchange rate. When using a shadow exchange rate the project 
ranking is more unstable at lower than at higher interest rates. 
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3. Labor 
Holding other variables constant alternative shadow wage rates are 
introduced in calculating the benefit-cost ratios. The relevant para­
meter is subject to the limits 0^ b s 1. The resulting functions are 
shown in Figure 7, 8, and 9 for interest rates of 6, 10 and 15 percent, 
respectively. 
The benefit-cost ratios of the projects are all inversely related 
to the shadow wage - a lower wage rate yields a higher benefit-cost 
ratio. All of the projects are affected roughly the same. The Oimos 
and Chociacocna projects, which are more capital intensive, are rela­
tively less sensitive than the small projects such as Chococo, La Cano 
and El Huevo. This holds at three interest rates. 
The sensitivity analysis is useful in defining the relevant range 
of the shadow wage. By identifying the points of intersection of the 
functions a wide span of values for the shadow wage has no effect upon 
the project ranking. For an interest rate of 6 percent the ordering is 
unaltered for a shadow wage less than 60 percent of the market wage. 
For rates of 10 and 15 percent (Figures 7 and 8) wages less than 50 per­
cent of market wage are sufficient to leave unchanged the project ranking. 
For these projects a wide range of probable values for the shadow wage 
are eliminated as irrelevant for the final process of project ranking. 
The critical range is a shadow rate between 60 and 100 percent of the 
market wage. 
The application of a shadow wage tends to ameliorate the negative 
effect of a high interest rate upon the feasibility of the projects. 
Figure 7. Benefit-cost ratios using adjusted net income at 
alternative wage rates and an interest rate of 
6 percent, irrigation projects. 
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Projects that are unfeasible at market rate (Figure 3) are now feasible 
at relatively moderate shadow rates (Figure 9). However, the interest 
rate remains important in determining the capital intensity of the 
project ranking. 
4. Combined rates 
The three key variables - the discount rate, the wage rate and 
the foreign exchange - are now varied simultaneously to examine the 
overall sensitivity of the benefit-cost ratio. The results of the 
analysis are shown in Figures 10, 11, and 12 for interest rates of 
6, 10 and 15 percent. In Figures 10 and 12 a shadow wage equal to 50 
percent of the market wage is applied. In Figure 11 two functions are 
shown for each project - one at market wages and the second at a shadow 
wage. 
The application of both shadow wage and exchange rate increases the 
benefit-cost ratio of each project over and above the increase deriving 
from the use of either one of these rates alone. It has been shown 
previously that the projects are positively affected by rate adjustments. 
Except for the Moquegua and Chira projects, which are relatively in­
sensitive to the shadow rate variations, all of the projects benefit by 
the adjustment in absolute terms. As the interest rate is increased 
the functions shift downward reflecting a heavier discounting of long-
term benefits. However, with the inclusion of the shadow rates only 
the worst projects - those which have consistently been rated low - are 
unfeasible. At an interest rate of 15 percent at market wage and exchange 
Figure 10. Benefit-cost ratios using adjusted net income at 
alternate exchange rates, with wage rates equal to 
50 percent of market wages and at an interest rate 
of 6 percent, irrigation projects. 
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rates the Huanscolla and Antaura projects are the only ones feasible 
(Figure 2)^ whereas, with shadow rates only Moquegua, Tumbes and Chira 
are unfeasible. As can be expected, the project ranking varies ac­
cording to the degree of shadow rate adjustment. Fix the interest 
rate at 10 percent as shown in Figure 11. There are two sets of func­
tions represented. The dashed lines are computed using the market wage 
rate and the alternative exchange rates are the solid lines using a 
shadow wage equal to 50 percent of the market rate and at different 
exchange rates. As the wage rate is increased the dispersion between 
the project functions increases - the differential use of labor and 
foreign exchange are intensified. The ordering is much more stable as 
a result of the accentuation of differences in project ratios. 
The project ranking is also relatively stable as between interest 
rates. Compare the results of Figures 10 and 12. Previously, the 
ranking has been sensitive to the interest rate; but now the project 
ranking is practically the same at 6 and 15 percent interest rates. 
This leads to an extremely significant proposition for the project plan-
% 
ner. Three shadow rates must be fixed, respectively, for foreign ex­
change, labor and capital. Of these three, the most difficult to estab­
lish from an objective viewpoint is the interest rate since it depends 
upon such unmeasurable variables as the time preference of policy 
makers. On the other hand, the shadow wage and exchange rates depend 
upon more objective phenomenon e.g., market competiveness and produc­
tivity. The market rates can be taken as the initial point of departure 
and at least the direction of the adjustment can be agreed upon in ad­
vance. Thus, the choice of the interest rate is far less critical when 
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shadow prices are included as an accepted component of project 
evaluation. 
G. Summary 
The evaluation of the principal Peruvian irrigation projects 
applying alternative investment criteria considered include the be­
nefit-cost ratio, the social marginal productivity of investment and 
various static partial ratios. A sensitivity analysis of the benefit-
cost ratio using the most important project coefficients; namely, the 
exchange rate, the interest rate and the wage rate, has yielded con­
clusions regarding the significant range of values for these variables. 
A series of project rankings for each investment criteria has 
resulted. For the benefit-cost ratio a different project ordering is 
given depending upon the definition of benefits - be they adjusted or 
unadjusted net farm income - and the choice of shadow prices. First, 
the projects are adjusted for the optimistic (or pesimistic) benefit 
forecasts of the individual feasibility studies. The average production 
conditions of each zone are considered for this purpose. Likewise, 
value added is estimated for each project permitting an alternative to 
the net income measure of benefits. Annual costs and production flows 
which depend upon the gestation period, lag in attainment of full pro­
duction and the projected net income are shown for each project. A 
shadow price of foreign exchange equal to 150 percent of the market rate 
and a shadow wage of 50 percent of the market wage provide alternative 
project ranking when applied with alternative interest rates. 
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The social marginal productivity of investment is shown as a 
useful tool of project evaluation especially since the balanca-of-
payments effect of investment is explicitly introduced. This latter 
element has given rise to distinct project rankings which are to be 
considered when the balance-of-payments problems are acute. 
A wide range of partial evaluation coefficients covering the con­
tribution of investment, foreign exchange and labor both as project 
benefits and scarce resources have been applied. These represent some 
of the alternative criteria that might be selected by project planners 
depending upon the national objectives under consideration. As with the 
previous criteria a distinct project ranking is derived for each 
variable. 
Finally, a sensitivity analysis of the benefit-cost ratio of each 
project has been formulated. Of special importance is the conclusion 
that the sensitivity of the project rankings to the discount rate is 
significantly reduced by the inclusion of moderate shadow wage and ex­
change rates. 
This concludes, thereby, the independent application of a group 
of standard project evaluation coefficients. Although replete with 
statistical difficulties this marks only a part of the planning process. 
These criteria must be related in a manner consistent with the overall 
national planning objectives. An overall project investment program in 
irrigation must be specified which is conditioned upon the overall sector 
budget allocation and the proper selection and timing of project invest­
ment in order to maximize a specific welfare function of the sector. 
To the extent possible investment criteria are combined that produce 
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very similar project ranking. Thus, a complete comparison of criteria 
and their respective project ordering is an integral part of the next 
step of the project planning process. 
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V. NATIONAL AND SECTORAL PROJECT INVESTMENT PLANNING 
The evaluation of irrigation projects has centered upon the presen­
tation of independent project rankings without regard for the relative 
importance of the underlying national and sectoral planning objectives. 
The existence of an overall budgetary restraint on project investment 
has been ignored for the sake of simplicity. These above elements are, 
nonetheless, essential to project planning and the selection of an 
investment program. This chapter deals with the main components of 
project investment programming and its relation to project evaluation 
as embodied in the benefit-cost ratio, the SMP and the various partial 
investment criteria. The project rankings as generated by each criterion 
are compared permitting, thereby, the elimination of the criteria that 
produce similar orderings. Peruvian national planning objectives are 
specified and related to the previously developed investment criteria. 
Finally, a tentative medium-term investment program is developed con­
sistent with the relative weights attached to the national and sectoral 
objectives. 
A. The Comparison Of Project Evaluation Criteria 
A variety of evaluation coefficients have been used to construct 
project priorities. The criteria should be examined to check for pos­
sible similarities which then permits a reduction in the number of 
choice criteria that the project planner might apply. The main concern 
in selecting the criteria of Chapter IV is that they can be applied 
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using the presently scarce production and cost data. It is possible 
that other coefficients could be used, e.g., the marginal reinvestment 
criterion, but the criteria most easily applied include the following; 
1) the benefit-cost ratio, 2) the social marginal productivity of in­
vestment, 3) the output-investment ratio, 4) the labor-investment rate, 
5) the foreign exchange-investment ratio and 6) the internal rate of 
return of the project investment. When necessary, alternative values 
for the foreign exchange rate, the wage rate and the interest rate are 
introduced to represent probable values of the respective shadow rates. 
Assuming an unlimited investment budget the benefit-cost criterion 
requires that the ratio of benefits, defined as the flow of net income 
to costs exceed unity. The choice rule of the SMP requries that proj­
ects are selected for the highest value of the coefficient. This 
maximizing rule also holds for the output-capital ratio, the labor-
investment ratio, the balance-of-payments effect and the internal rate 
of return. In all of these criteria project investment is the limiting 
resource. 
Table 29 summarizes the project rankings according to the six 
alternative investment criteria for the eleven irrigation projects. 
Consider now the similarities and differences in the project priorities 
as shown. Special attention is given to the performance of the project 
sub-groups including: 1) the small sierra improvement projects, Antaura, 
Huanscolla and Chococo; 2) the small coastal new lands projects. El Cural, 
La Cano and El Huevo; 3) medium and large coastal improvement projects, 
Choclacocha, Moquegua and Chira and 4) medium and large coastal new 
lands projects, Tumbes and Olmos. This latter project is an excellent 
Table 29. Project rankings for values of the alternative investment choice criteria, irrigation 
proj ects 
Benefit-cost ratio (adjusted income) Social marginal productivity of investment Output-investment 
10% discount 10% discount SMP** SMP'^ * 
rate, market rate, shadow B ** 
prices prices r = 0 r = .5 K*omr 
Project Value Project Value Project Value Project Value Project Value Project Value 
Antaura 2.4 Huanscolla 4.7 Huanscolla 2.8 Huanscolla 3.63 Huanscolla 0.083 Huanscolla 0.104 
Huanscolla 2.4 Antaura 3.7 Antaura 2.4 Antaura 2.78 Antaura 0.038 Antaura 0.071 
Choclacocha 1.5 Choclacocha 3.2 El Cural 1.5 El Cural 1.71 La Cano 0.027 El Cural 0.071 
Chococo 1.5 Chococo 2.7 El Huevo 1.5 El Huevo 1.69 Olmos 0.026 El Huevo 0.071 
Olmos 1.4 El Huevo 2.5 Choclacocha 1.3 La Cano 1.47 Chococo 0.023 ChoclacochaO.068 
El Cural 1.4 El Cural 2.2 La Cano 1.2 Chococo 1.43 El Cural 0.021 La Cano 0.065 
La Cano 1.4 La Cano 2.2 Chococo 1.2 Choclacocha 1.31 El Huevo 0.019 Chococo 0.061 
El Huevo 1.4 Olmos 2.1 Olmos 0.8 Olmos 1.06 Tumbes 0.008 Moquegua 0.047 
Moquegua 1.0 Tumbes 1.5 Tumbes 0.4 Tumbes 0.48 Choclacocha 0.001 Olmos 0.045 
Tumbes 0.8 Moquegua 1.4 Moquegua 0.4 Moquegua 0.25 Moquegua -0.015 Tumbes 0.03 
Chira 0.5 Chira 0.6 Chira 0.3 Chira -0.57 Chira -0.027 Chira 0.028 
Table 29. (continued) 
ent ratios 
% 
Project 
«-«'"'/KSSr 
shadow prices 
Value Project Value 
Labor 
L*/K* 
Foreign exchange 
(X-C) * 
F/K' 
Project Value Project 
^ internai rate of 
return (%) 
Value Project Value 
Huanscolla 0.046 Huanscolla 0.090 Huanscolla 0.021 Huanscolla 0.052 Huanscolla 20.0 
Antaura 0.046 Antaura 0.071 El Curai 0.020 Antaura 0.033 Antaura 20.0 
Chococo 0.029 Choclacocha 0.059 El Huevo 0.016 Olmos 0.026 El Curai 14.0 
El Curai 0.027 Chococo 0.052 La Cano 0.014 El Curai 0.025 El Huevo 13.8 
La Cano 0.027 El Huevo 0.049 Moquegua 0.011 La Cano 0.025 Chococo 13.7 
El Huevo 0.027 El Curai 0.043 Olmos 0.010 Chococo 0.025 Choclacocha 13.2 
Choclacocha 0.026 La Cano 0.043 Tumbes 0.010 Choclacocha 0.021 La Cano 12,8 
Olmos 0.022 Olmos 0.035 Chococo 0.010 El Huevo 0.021 Olmos 12,0 
Moquegua 0.019 Moquegua 0.026 Choclacocha 0.008 Tumbes 0.014 Moquegua 9.9 
Tumbes 0.014 Tumbes 0.025 Antaura 0.008 Moquegua 0.009 Tumbes 8.7 
Chira 0.009 Chira 0.013 Chira 0.006 Chira 0.007 Chira 7.2 
v£), 
•>i 
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example of a large capital intensive coastal project. The Tumbes 
project is a multi-purpose project containing both new and improved 
lands. 
The relative rankings of the four classes of projects are now 
compared among the six types of investment criteria. The small sierra 
improvenent projects as a group perform very well throughout the alter­
native project priorities. The Huanscolla project is ranked either 
first or second for all of the investment coefficients. The Antaura 
project is ranked exceptionally high in most of the orderings including 
the benefit-cost ratio and the SMP. Using the labor evaluation co­
efficients the Antaura project is judged to contribute relatively little 
to employment and wage generation. Finally, the Chococo project is 
the less desirable of the small sierra improvements. The project is 
ranked relatively high (in third or fourth position) for the benefit-
cost ratio, the labor-investment ratio and the internal rate of return 
but for the remaining coefficients it is ranked in the sixth or seventh 
position. This is one project that would be affected by the choice of 
investment criteria and, consequently, its ranking depends upon the 
weighting of alternative national objectives. But as a group it can 
be concluded that the small sierra improvement projects are ranked above 
all other classes of projects and, therefore, these projects, as well 
as similar projects, should be seriously considered by the policy makers 
and planning technicians in formulating an investment program. 
The second category is the small coastal new lands projects in­
cluding El Cural, La Cano and El Huevo. Whereas, the previous projects 
consist of investment in currently cultivated hectares, these three 
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projects cover presently unsettled areas in the dry coastal zone. Of 
the three projects the one consistently ranked the highest is El Cural. 
It is ranked fifth and sixth for the benefit-cost criterion, third for 
the SMP and not below fifth for the remaining lists. The La Cano and 
El Huevo projects are also ranked fifth and sixth for the benefit-cost 
ratio but both are ranked slightly lower when the labor and balance-
of-payment coefficients are employed. The El Huevo project has a 
relatively high output-investment ratio and employment-investment ratio 
but it is ranked low for the balance-of-payments effect of the SMP. 
But with these variations El Huevo maintains an approximate ranking of 
fifth irrespective of the investment criterion employed. The project 
La Cano maintains a relatively stable position being ranked between 
fourth and sixth. Therefore, the small coastal new lands projects do 
less well than the small sierra projects but on the average are ranked 
between the fourth and sixth positions. Of the three. El Cural is 
ranked first followed by El Huevo and La Cano. 
The third class of projects encompass those located on the coast 
consisting mainly of improved hectares but admitting a small proportion 
of new hectares. The projects are Choclacocha, Moquegua and Chira. The 
Chira project can be eliminated quickly; no matter which ranking is 
chosen the project is placed last. The Moquegua project does not per­
form much better being ranked tenth for the majority of the ordering. 
Thus, of those projects primarily designed for in^roving existing land 
under cultivation only the Choclacocha project performs well. It is 
ranked approximately in seventh position in all of the ranking, but is 
ranked third under the benefit-cost criterion and fourth for the capital-
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output ratio. For the labor coefficient and the foreign exchange effect 
the project loses ground relative to other projects. 
The Tumbes project, whose second stage is expected to be new land 
expansion, also is a case of a poor performance. The ranking of the 
project is approximately eighth for the group of coefficients of Table 
29. Finally, the ranking of the Olmos project is of importance be­
cause this is an example of a large coastal capital intensive new lands 
project. Although the project is judged feasible by the benefit-cost 
criterion the across-the-board performance of the project is not ex­
ceptional. On the basis of most criteria the project does not rise above 
sixth position. Only for the balance-of-payments effect does the proj­
ect display a high ranking - it is ranked third. 
Thus, a comparison of the project orderings provided by the six 
classes of evaluation coefficients does permit important generalizations 
regarding the most favorable types of projects. Without doubt, the 
small sierra improvement projects are ranked highest for all categories 
of criteria. These, in turn, are followed by the small coastal virgin 
land projects. Among the remaining projects Olmos is ranked above both 
strictly improvement and combined new land and improvement projects. 
The large coastal improvement projects as a group - including Chira, 
Moquegua and Choclacocha - are the least desirable choices since they 
are consistently ranked lowest independently of the investment criterion 
under consideration. 
The project rankings of the alternative investment criteria can now 
be compared. To the extent that the project priorities of two or more 
investment criteria coincidence the total number of rankings to be 
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compared can be reduced. First, there are two benefit-cost ratios 
shown in Table 29, one with market prices and the second with shadow 
prices both at an interest rate of 10 percent. The two rankings are 
almost the same with the exception of the performance of the Olmos 
project. This project declines from sixth to eighth position upon 
applying shadow prices. The theoretical and practical need for applying 
shadow prices to development projects has been discussed fully in pre­
vious sections; the benefit-cost ratio with shadow prices is chosen as 
a representative ratio reflecting the income generation of the project 
investment. 
The second class of investment criteria is the SMP. This cri­
terion is elaborated in two forms: first for r=0, so that the balance-
of-payments effect is assumed to be zero and the second with r=.50, 
such that the shadow price of foreign exchange is assumed equal to 150 
percent of the market rate. To maintain a consistent approach the 
ranking SMP** (with shadow prices) is accepted as the representative 
measure of the SMP. The balance-of-payments effect, B**/K**, of the 
SMP is also separated in the table; it will be compared later with the 
other coefficients to measure the foreign exchange contribution of each 
project. 
The third class of ratios, the output-capital ratio, is measured 
at gross output and net income both properly discounted. These two 
ratios give approximately the same project priorities. It has been 
argued that net income is the most complete measure of the direct con­
tribution of project investment, since gross output includes off-farm 
input purchases normally not attributable to project investment. The 
202 
ratio (X-C)**/KSSr is selected as the most appropriate output-invest­
ment ratio. 
The contribution . of the project investment to employment is 
shown by the ratio. The future cost flows have been discounted and 
the labor costs are in average annual values. 
There are two variables available for measuring the balance-of-
payment effect. The first is used in determining the last component 
of the SMP. The second, measured at full project output, is the ratio 
of the foreign exchange component of net income to total investment. 
For the majority of the projects the ratio gives like priorities. The 
balance-of-payment effect of the SMP is much more complete since the 
indirect effects of the foreign exchange creation are fully covered. 
Apparently, either ranking will serve but, for present purposes, the 
term is used. 
Finally, the internal rate of return is shown in Table 29. In 
Keynesian terras it is the marginal efficiency of investment. Assuming 
that the internal rate of return is single valued, it is equal to the 
rate of discount at which the benefit-cost ratio is unity. If the bene-
fit-cost ratio exceeds one, then the internal rate of return exceeds 
the discount rate and it is less than the discount rate when the bene­
fit-cost ratio is less than one. Noting that the approximate values 
of the internal rate of return vary little for the high ranking projects 
the benefit-cost and the internal rate of return criteria give the same 
project priorities. Therefore, the ranking shown for the internal rate 
of return is unnecessary and is dropped for the benefit-cost ratio. 
Thus, five distinct indicators of project performance have been 
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chosen from the group of eleven of Table 29: 1) the benefit-cost ratio 
at shadow prices; 2) the SNP** with r=0.5 at shadow wages; 3) the net 
income-investment ratio; 4) the labor cost - total investment ratio; 
and 5) the balance-or-payments effect 
The similarity of the project ranking is evident by noting the 
performance of the two major groups of projects - 1) the large coastal 
improvement and new lands projects and 2) the small coastal and sierra 
new lands and improvement projects. For the five criteria identified 
above the large projects are consistently ranked in the lower half of 
the project priorities. There are only two minor exceptions to this 
generalization; the Choclacocha project is ranked third for the benefit-
cost ratio and the Olmos project is ranked fourth for the balance-of-
payments effect. Concurrently, the small coastal and sierra projects 
are consistently found in the upper half of the project rankings. The 
only exception to this rule is the relatively low ranking of thfe Antaura 
project for the labor-investment ratio, the El Huevo project for the 
balance-of-payments effect and the Chococo project for the SMP**. In 
the final analysis the selection of projects for an investment program 
hinges upon the choice of investment criteria; this step depends initially 
upon the explicit enumeration of the national and sectoral objectives 
or targets. In the following section an indication of the probable 
weights attached to each economic objective under the current political 
regime is discussed. 
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B. The Specification of Peruvian National And 
Sectoral Economic Objectives 
Considerable effort has been directed to the specification of 
evaluation criteria without reference to their relative importance. 
The limitation of adequate data and the need for relatively simple 
methods has determined the character of the final choice of criteria. 
But, the planning process must logically be initiated with the specifi­
cation of the national planning objectives. Then the investment criteria 
are designed to measure the contribution of each project to the set of 
each objectives. To the extent possible the criteria should permit 
additivity and comparability of project performance so that weights can 
be attached to the contribution of each the projects to the objectives. 
The selection of national economic objectives, as well as non-
economic objectives, is essentially a political process. It is not a 
choice for the economist; the technician must take the objectives as 
pre-determined variables. In the language of policy planning these are 
fixed or variable targets. Fixed targets or objectives are specified 
beforehand e.g., unemployment is to be reduced X percent, national in­
come must grow annually at X percent. Flexible targets, as their name 
imply, involve an optimization or maximization of given target variables 
without specifying their terminal values. In any case, the economist 
is not competent to judge the merits of a given set of policy objectives. 
Nonetheless, an effort must be made to define in precise economic terms 
the explicit or implicit objectives as manifested through the political 
process. Frequently, the objectives are a result of the interaction 
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of many interest groups so that considerable disagreement may exist 
as to the form of the objectives and their relative importance. It 
is evident that for each society a single group cannot be expected to 
specify the wide range of possible objectives. Therefore, the project 
planner may act a a catalyst by including several objectives and by 
trying alternative insights in the welfare function. The policy maker 
can then be confronted with numerous alternatives so that the range of 
planning alternatives can be reduced. At least the economist must inform 
the policy maker of the economic consequences of a number of alternative 
investment decisions. 
The National Planning Institute, (Instituto Nacional de Plani-
ficaci6n) is the planning body which has the function of setting the 
general guideline in terms of objectives and policies for achieving 
economic development in Peru.^ Through consultation with members of 
the private and public sector the Institute has specified a set of national 
planning objectives (18). These objectives are essentially the same as 
those frequently specified throughout economic development literature: 
1) the increase in per capital income, 2) the reduction of unemployment 
and underemployment, 3) the achievement of balance-of-payments equili­
brium and 4) the redistribution of income. 
Thus, from the project planner's viewpoint, investment criteria are 
to be formulated permitting the measurement of the contribution of a 
project to each of these objectives. A lucid discussion of this task 
is provided by Professor Marglin (27). 
^At the time of this writing, the structure of the Peruvian Govern­
ment, including the principal ministries and planning offices, is under 
reorganization following the military coup of October 1968. 
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Besides the national planning level, the sectoral planning of­
fices of each ministry (e.g., agriculture) are called upon to specify 
sectoral objectives and policies. The agricultural sector competes 
with other sectors for its share of the national investment outlay. 
Once the annual sectoral budget constraint is fixed the detailed sectoral 
activities are outlined. The sectoral plan contains measures for dis­
tributing expenditures between promotional activities and investment in 
land expansion. The means for achieving desired production levels for 
particular crops is an important detailed component. At the sectoral 
level the statement of objectives are framed in terms of, e.g., in­
creasing the production of a certain crop by X percent annually by the 
combination of expenditures, Y, in extension services and investment,Z, 
in project investment. Likewise, means of stimulating private invest­
ment is an important element of completing the plan. 
The project planner, be he concerned with irrigation or other 
projects, must envisage the evaluation of projects as only a step in the 
completion of the sectoral and national plans. There are other measures 
beyond investment in infrastructure that can be employed to achieve 
the national and sectoral targets. 
Consider now the enumeration of the national and sectoral objectives 
and their respective evaluation coefficients. The first national ob­
jective frequently discussed or implied by policy makers is to increase 
per capita or aggregate consumption or income. Since population is a 
pre-determined variable outside of the control of the public sector, at 
the project level, the use of aggregate income and consumption is indi­
cated. 
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The per capita income and consumption at the individual project 
level possibly can be controlled under special circumstances, especially 
for a virgin lands project for which the farm size enters as a policy 
variable. Thus, in selecting the desired farm size an objective func­
tion can be used which maximizes the direct per capita income at the 
farm level as a function of the farm size, and other technological and 
economic constraints. However, for the eleven irrigation projects no 
effort was made by the consulting firms to provide a consistent program­
ming solution to the objective of maximizing per capita income or con­
sumption. Rather an approximation of the farm size that would achieve 
a pre-specified minimum farm income for a given family size is more often 
employed. This latter analysis does not always guarantee a maximum per 
capita income or consumption. 
A choice is to be made between consumption and income as a meas­
ure of efficiency goals of project Investment. Income is most ap­
propriate when the impact of the re-investment of project benefits is 
under consideration because consumption, measured net of savings, ab­
stracts from the second round investment effects of each project. Major 
limitations, are that first, income is reasonably difficult to measure 
and secondly, consumption is even more allusive at the project level. 
Thus, the first national objective, now specified is to increase ag­
gregate income. 
The investment criterion reflecting the contribution of project 
investment to aggregate income is the benefit-cost ratio in which bene­
fits are defined as net farm income less associated investment costs in­
curred by the private sector, and costs are defined as the costs attributed 
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to the public sector. There are two other possible criteria that could 
be used including the SMP with r=0 and the output-investment ratio. The 
actual priorities generated by the three criteria do not show signifi­
cant variations for most of the projects. The Choclacocha project 
substantially increases its ranking with the benefit-cost ratio but the 
remaining projects are not affected greatly by the choice of criteria. 
A simple method of measuring the priorities as generated by the 
three criteria is provided by attaching weights to the projects ranked 
by each coefficient. Thus, the highest ranked project receives a value 
of one (1), the next project a value of two (2) until the last project 
which receives a value of eleven (11). In the case in which two or 
more projects have the same value for an evaluation coefficient an aver­
age weight is computed. Thus, for the benefit-cost ratio of the following 
table, the El Cural and La Cano projects are both ranked 6.5 (averaging 
the sixth and seventh positions). The following project, Olmos, is 
ranked eighth since, e.g., if the La Cano project is selected, then the 
El Cural project by elimination is placed seventh. 
A mean ranking is shown for each project assuming that the average 
value is constructed weighting each criterion equally. Hence, the Olmos 
project is ranked eighth for the benefit-cost ratio, eighth for the SMP 
and eighth for the income-investment ratio. The mean ranking is equal 
to 8.0 being placed eighth for the eleven irrigation projects. The 
Chococo project has a mean ranking of 4.8 and is ranked fifth overall 
since the El Cural project is placed slightly lower with a value of 5.5. 
The last ranking of Table 30 takes into account the varied per­
formance of the projects for the three different measures of aggregate 
209 
Table 30. Numerical and mean ranking by investment criteria, 
irrigation projects 1 
Benefit- Net income 
cost investment 
Irrigation 
projects 
ratio 
shadow 
orices 
SMP** 
r=0 
ratio 
(X-C)** 
K**omr 
Mean 
ranking Rapkins 
Olmos 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 
Choclacocha 3.0 5.0 3.0 3.7 3.0 
Tumbes 9.0 9.5 10.0 9.5 9.5 
Moquegua 10.0 9.5 9.0 9.5 9.5 
Chira 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 
El Cural 6.5 3.5 6.5 5.5 6.0 
La Cano 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.6 7.0 
El Huevo 5.0 3.5 5.0 4.5 4.0 
Antaura 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Huanscolla 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Chococo 4.0 6.5 4.0 4.8 5.0 
^Source: Table 29. 
income contribution of project investment. Thus, for the purpose of 
ranking, or more generally the mean ranking, which averages out the ir­
regular performance of specific projects like Chococo and Choclacocha. 
The second national and sectoral objectives are those relating to 
the attainment of balance-of-payment equilibrium. The objective is 
normally formulated on the basis of achieving equilibrium between im­
port and exports including autonomous capital movements. The publica­
tions of the National Planning Institute refer to the objective of 
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maintaining sufficient diversification of exports so as to reduce the 
effect of autonomous fluctations in the demand for exports upon the 
domestic economy (18). At the sectoral level serious concern must be 
given the balance-of-payments effects of agriculture investment. On the 
export side, efforts are required to increase the current earnings, 
however, since the elasticity of demand of the large proportion of these 
products e.g., cotton and sugar, is extremely low, the rate of annual 
expansion is effectively limited. The main effort in agriucltural pro­
duction is, therefore, more often directed to import substitution. 
Consequently, a legitimate objective of national planning is to 
direct investment to those projects which have the greatest positive 
impact on the balance-of-payments. This objective is especially crucial 
for Peru. Since 1967 the balance-of-payment position reserves have fall­
en dramatically following the devaluation of September 1967, import 
and exchange controls have been imposed and debt repayments have been 
postponed. 
Two measures of the balance-of-payments effect of project invest­
ment are available from the ratio of the SMP** and the ratio of 
foreign exchange to investment properly discounted. Of these two the 
former is prefered due to its more complete treatment of direct and in­
direct costs and earnings. 
The ranking of the projects according to the two investment criteria 
are shown next. There is no great variation in the placement of the 
projects except for the Olmcs and El Cural projects. The mean ranking 
of the projects is computed assuming that the performance of the two 
projects is weighted equally for the two criteria. Thus, the average 
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Table 31. Numerical and mean ranking by balance-of-payments 
criteria, irrigation projects 
Foreign 
exchange-
investment 
Irrigation ratio Mean 
projects K** (X-C)** F/K**omr ranking Ranking 
Olmos 4.0 3.0 3.5 3.0 
Choclacocha 9.0 7.5 8.3 8.0 
Tumbes 8.0 9.0 8.5 9.0 
Moquegua 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 
Chira 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 
El Cural 6.0 5.0 5.5 6.0 
La Cano 3.0 5.0 4.0 4.0 
El Huevo 7.0 7.5 7.3 7.0 
Antaura 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Huanscolla 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Chococo 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
ranking of the Olmos project is third and the El Cural ranking is sixth. 
The last column of Table 31 is, in effect, a compromise solution for 
the planner. 
A third frequently discussed objective of the public sector is to 
increase employment for those unemployed or underemployed. Closely 
related to this objective is the goal of redistributing income. In 
many respects the two objectives can be viewed together in that redis­
tribution of income is the principal goal and increasing employment is 
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an instrument rather than objective. By increasing the employment and 
productivity of a selected group, e.g., subsistence sierra farmers, the 
end result is an improvement in the relative income receiving position 
of this group to other zones. This is an especially useful point of 
view since it is a very difficult task to measure directly the income 
redistributional effect of project investment. Hence by measuring the 
employment effect a roundabout measure of the income gains of various 
groups can be accounted for. 
It has been argured earlier that a viable measure of employment 
generation is given by the ratio of annual labor costs required per 
unit of the total project investment. This ratio is given in Table 29. 
For this ratio the small coastal and sierra projects are ranked above 
the larger coastal projects. Thus, it is apparent that the small proj­
ects make the largest contribution to employment and consequently to 
income distribution. This result is especially important since clearly 
the small sierra and coastal projects are located in zones characterized 
by a high population expansion, subsistence agriculture accompanied by 
low incomes and nutritional levels. Thus, relative to other zones, ir­
rigation investment in these areas will have a high payoff in terms of 
employment generation and income redistributional effects. 
A final objective of national planning is related to what is fre­
quently termed the fulfillment of social needs or as discussed by 
Marglin (27) "merit wants." These are government determined objectives 
based upon political preferences and less upon market determined tastes. 
For example, an irrigation project may be initiated for the purpose of 
satisfying the political interests of a given zone or to make available 
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lands to a previously landless peasant class even though the project is 
shown to be economically unfeasible. Thus, the project takes the form 
of a subsidy to a given group. Aside from the view sometimes expressed 
by advocates of irrigation projects that the economic effects of a given 
investment should be ignored, taking precedence, thereby, important 
social objectives, the merit want argument is often used to justify an 
economically undesirable project. The agreement usually takes the fol­
lowing form: project X is shown to have a very low benefit-cost ratio 
even at low interest rates; nevertheless, to provide social justice the 
project must be constructed to provide land to the poor farmers of the 
region. The argument should not be negated simply because it does not 
account for the poor performance of the project. Rather there are 
several related alternatives that can be considered that are ignored in 
this argument. First, policy makers should consider not only the apparent 
social benefits of the decision to implement the project but also the 
social costs. If the farmers are encouraged to participate in an unsuc­
cessful irrigation scheme then in the final analysis they may be worse 
off. Greater dissatisfaction may be created by an uneconomical project 
which fails to provide promised higher standards of living than not con­
structing the project at all. It very well may occur that the social 
benefits exceed the costs but the relationship is frequently ignored by 
those defending a project. Secondly, in defending a particular irriga­
tion project (or any single solution to an area's difficulties) to fail 
to include all of the possible public policies, limits the effectiveness 
of the argument. Hence, suppose the public sector were to spend in ex­
tension services, fertilizers, and new seed promotion the same amount to 
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be spent on an irrigation project - would the net social benefits of 
this new alternative differ from those stemming from the irrigation proj­
ect. This question delimits the basic weakness in defending a project 
on "social" grounds - the social costs are often ignored and the payoff 
of other alternatives is not considered. Thus, due to the obvious dif­
ficulty of interpreting social values and goals, the national objective 
of fulfilling merit wants is not systematically examined in this study. 
In summary, four major national objectives are under consideration -
increasing income, balance-of-payments equilibrium, increasing employ­
ment and the fulfillment of merit wants. An investment criterion has 
been assigned to each of the first three objectives which measure the 
contribution of the project investment for each objective. The benefit-
cost ratio corresponds to the income objective, the ratio to the 
balance-of-payments objective and the labor cost - investment ratio to 
the employment goal. A separate project ranking, independent of a budget 
constraint, has been constructed for each criterion. Thus, for example, 
if the policy maker favors a goal of increasing employment a specific 
project ranking corresponds to the attainment of this objective. 
The preference function of the policy maker is not likely to be as 
simple as the maximization of a single national objective - rather all 
three objectives are considered to be of importance, but weighted dif­
ferently. A simple method of testing alternative weights in the ob­
jective function is achieved by weighting the individual project pri­
orities given by the three investment criteria. 
For each investment criterion a project ranking is given in which 
each project is assigned a value reflecting its relative position; the 
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highest ranked project is assigned a value of one, successively until 
the last project is ranked eleventh. Let yP be the ranked position of 
project p for the income objective, the ranking for the foreign 
exchange effect and E? the ranking for the employment effect. Then 
assuming that the three objectives are weighted in the policy maker's 
preference function, a weighted mean ranking is defined as follows: 
RP = y"<P +<f PP H-vCg eP, where 
(YP = 1,...,11) 
(PP = 1,...,11) 
(EP = 1,...,11) 
(p = 1,...,11) 
for the eleven projects. This is no more than a weighted average of 
the ranking for the three objectives for project p. Thus, the condition 
+^f +-^6 = 1 (5.2) 
must hold. In the case in which all of the rankings are weighted 
equally the condition 
^y='<f =^e (5.3) 
must also be specified. 
Consider now different sets of weights which represent some pos­
sible points of view held by policy makers. Four cases are considered 
in Table 32. 
The first weighted mean ranking for project p places equal impor­
tance on the three objectives. The second, third and fourth mean rankings 
R3 - weight the objectives such that one objective is weighted 
twice as heavily as either of the remaining rankings. Hence, for , 
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Table 32. Alternative weights of project rankings for three 
national objectives 
cC y ^ f •K e ^y f +XL e 
% .33 .33 .33 1.00 
R2 .50 .25 .25 1.00 
R3 .25 .50 .25 .1.00 
R4 .25 .25 .50 1.00 
the foreign exchange goal is placed in pre-eminence over the income and 
employment objectives although the latter two are not excluded. This 
would represent the case in which the balance-of-payments situation is 
so serious that the policy maker, although not excluding the other goals, 
must try to minimize the impact of investment on the foreign exchange 
position of the economy. 
In Table 33 the project rankings are specified according to the 
weighted mean rankings constructed by project with the weights of 
Table 32. The general pattern of the ranking is evident; the small 
coastal and sierra projects are ranked highest over a wide range of 
alternative preferences for the three national objectives. Among the 
larger projects Olmos stands out as the largest contributor to all of 
the national goals but especially to balance-of-payments goal. 
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Table 33. Project orderings by alternative national objective 
weights 
*3 
Huanscolla Huanscolla Huanscolla Huanscolla 
Antaura Antaura Antaura El Cural 
1 
xEl Cural El Huevo La Cano El Huevo 
xEl Huevo El Cural El Cural La Cano 
La Cano La Cano Olmos Antaura 
Olmos Chococo El Huevo Olmos 
Chococo Choclacocha Chococo Chococo 
Choclacocha Olmos Choclacocha Moquegua 
Moquegua Moquegua Tumbes Choclacocha 
Tumbes Tumbes Moquegua Tumbes 
Chira Chira Chira Chira 
1 
Projects marked (x) are ranked the same. 
C. A General Strategy For Irrigation Investment 
The selection of project priorities consistent with the national 
objectives has proceeded under the implicit assumption of an unlimited 
investment budget. However, the failure to include limitations on in­
vestment spending in irrigation does not hinder the determination of 
priorities. Rather the investment constraint effectively limits the 
number of projects that can be initiated. 
Two principal questions are examined in this section: 1) what will 
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be the probable character of an investment program in irrigation es­
pecially in reference to the size and types of projects that are most 
viable and 2) what are the main resource restrictions on the invest­
ment program and what specific projects might likely be Initiated in 
the next few years? 
Five classes of irrigation project are included in the sample of 
eleven; 1) small sierra improvement projects, 2) small coastal virgin 
lands projects, 3) large coastal virgin lands projects, 4) large coastal 
combined virgin lands and land improvement projects and 5) large coastal 
land improvement projects. Each of these categories is represented by 
the following projects; 1) Ântaura, Huanscolla and Chococo, 2) El Cural, 
La Gano and El Huevo, 3) Olmos, 4) Moquegua and Tombes and 5) Choclaco-
cha and Chira. Aside from the performance of individual projects a 
clearly defined group of priorities have been determined corresponding 
to the three national objectives of increasing income, increasing employ­
ment and contributing positively to the balance-of-payments. 
The small sierra improvement projects have outperformed all other 
projects irrespective of the investment criterion chosen. There are 
apparently a large number of similar projects available for execution 
in the near future. The National Economic Development Fund has sup­
ported a large number of feasibility studies for this type of project 
and the Inter-American Development Bank is provideing loan funds for the 
construction of approximately a dozen of such projects. Certainly, as 
long as a number of well studied projects are available the previous 
analysis of priorities verifies the wisdom of this investment strategy. 
Investment in small sierra projects is consistent with several objectives. 
219 
The regulation of water provides substantial gains by increasing the 
yields per hectare and, consequently, incomes even though the new farm 
practices do not reach the relatively high levels of the coast. If a 
minimum of extension services is provided these projects can serve as 
focal points for the implementation of more advanced farming practices. 
Since the farm income in the sierra is relatively low substantial per­
centage increases in income should occur. The employment effect of 
these projects is significant. First, since the projects can be con­
structed using relatively labor intensive methods the temporary employ­
ment creation should not be ignored. A rather substantial investment 
program in sierra water resource projects will assist in redistributing 
incomes to underprivileged zones. This also contributes positively to 
reducing the tendency for imigration from the sierra to the coast. The 
balance-of-payment objective is satisfied to some degree. Most of 
Peruvian cattle output occurs in the sierra in small farm units. Hence, 
import substitution of the production of meats should be important as 
long as the quality achieves reasonably competitive levels. 
The major difficulty in basing an investment program solely on 
small sierra projects is, first, the lack of information regarding the 
total number of hectares that can be brough profitably under production 
in the near future and, second, the difficulty in selecting construction 
techniques. Currently, there is no survey available of the potential 
number of hectares that can be improved by small sierra irrigation proj­
ects. The National Economic Development Fund has contracted numerous 
feasibility studies but their quality is highly variable. The uniform 
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application of investment criteria is totally absent and some of the 
resluts are highly dubious, e.g., a project with a benefit-cost ratio 
in excess of ten. Secondly, there is an apparent tendency to use more 
capital intensive construction methods than is necessary. An effort 
should be made to avoid the use of high paid labor and machine con­
struction techniques. Local labor, preferably those who will directly 
benefit by the completion of the works, should provide a large propor­
tion of the unskilled labor needed. This is not to imply that these 
workers should receive subsistence wages but rather the payment of daily 
wages equal to those received in construction in large metropolitan areas 
can be avoided. Therefore, the small sierra projects can be placed high 
in an irrigation development strategy realizing that some reservation 
should be placed on the possibility of developing a large number of 
good projects. 
Much the same can be argued regarding the small coastal projects. 
These projects benefit by the existence of more advanced farming tech­
niques in the zone. They are, in general, more capital intensive than 
the sierra projects but also generate a higher income per hectare. 
Throughout the evaluation, the three small coastal projects are ranked 
immediately below the small sierra projects and above the larger coastal 
projects. They contribute uniformly to all three national objectives. 
As small projects they assist in minimizing the impact of irrigation in­
vestment on the balance-of-payment; they use small amounts of foreign 
exchange for construction and can be designed for export crops or import 
substitution. Since the three projects considered are new lands projects 
the government can virtually pre-determine the future land tenure systems 
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as well as establish clearly the future water rights in the zone. 
Apparently, the supply of well studied small coastal new lands 
projects is currently quite limited. This author has encountered very 
few of these projects with feasibility studies. Therefore, in the for-
seeable future, there are limited possibilities for initiating a sub­
stantial number of these projects; rather attention should be given to 
the indentification of potential projects and the preparation of feasi­
bility studies. A research program of coastal development currently 
being carried out by the National Office of Natural Resources (Oficina 
Nacional de Recursos Naturales) will permit the selection of canidate 
areas for future irrigation studies and projects. 
Below the small coastal and sierra projects are ranked the large 
coastal projects of all types. Of these five projects Olmos is con­
sistently ranked highest. This is due to two factors: first, the proj­
ect has a very favorable long-run effect on the balance-of-payments 
and, second, abundant water, the high quality of soils and optimal cli­
mate in the zone provide great flexibility in the cropping patterns and 
a high output per cultivated hectare. The future farm production of 
the area is designed to provide a high level of import substitution-at 
full output half of the project's output is dedicated to meat and milk 
production. There is general agreement among Peruvian agricultural 
technicians who are familiar with the zone that the project presents 
above average soils and climitalogical conditions. Thus, although the 
project is very capital intensive the projected value of output per 
hectare is the highest among all of the projects considered. 
Two difficulties are inherent in the execution of this project -
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high uncertainty and a very long gestation and running-in period. If 
the project were to be initiated in 1969 it would be at least 1975 
before production is initiated and approximately 1985 before full pro­
duction can be attained. These are the minimum times required assuming 
that the construction proceeds at the predicted pace. To be economi­
cally feasible a "all or none" decision is required. Since the key 
engineering component of the project is a 21 kilometer tunnel to be 
constructed over a six year period - a difficult engineering task -
a large proportion of the proposed 85,000 hectares must be brought under 
production as rapidly as possible to recover these sunk costs. The pro­
ject does not perform relatively well under the benefit-cost ratio so 
that any delay should place the project low in the rankings. An important 
resource restriction apparent for the large projects is the limited 
supply of trained technicians.^ At this stage Peru is not able to pro­
vide the number of extension agents, agronomists, engineers and econo­
mists to execute more than one large irrigation project. Since two 
relatively large projects are either under construction or in early pha­
ses of operation - Tinajones with 60,000 hectares and San Lorenzo with 
approximately 25,000 hectares - the initiation of the Olmos project 
would require a mobilization of technicians away from other projects 
and zones to the detriment of both the new and old projects. Optimally, 
one can envisage a transfer of knowledge and experience through the 
shifting of the technicians once their taek is completed with existing 
projects. 
^This idea arose from a personal conversation with a member of an 
International lending institution. 
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Finally, the medium to large coastal new lands and land improve­
ment projects are the lowest ranked projects. In fact, for the benefit-
cost ratio, the Tumbes, Moquegua and Chira projects are judged un­
feasible. This leaves the Choclacocha project which performs relatively 
well for the benefit-cost ratio - it is ranked third. But the project 
performs relatively low for the employment and balance-of-payments 
effect. This latter is largely due to the high rate of investment in 
foreign exchange. Since some doubt has been expressed about the in­
ordinate rate of foreign exchange investment, the balance-of-
payments performance of the project can likely be improved by carefully 
revising the construction costs. 
Thus, the analysis of eleven representative irrigation projects 
suggest some general priorities for irrigation investment consistent 
with three national development objectives. In the near future efforts 
should be directed to identifying and executing good small sierra and 
coastal irrigation projects. Due to the projected near term performance 
of the Peruvian economy, accompanied by continuing balance-of-payments 
difficulties, the very large capital Intensive projects should be avoided 
since they will only intensify the existing foreign exchange restrictions 
and low debt repayment capacity. The only medium size project that is 
acceptable is the Choclacocha project but it also incurs heavy foreign 
exchange costs. Therefore, the overall low level of public investment 
will require that the public sector maintain flexibility in planning 
investment by continuing with small scale investment. 
/ 4. 
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study has focused upon one of the integral steps in the 
elaboration of a national development plan - the selection of invest­
ment criteria and the establishment of investment priorities. To ex­
emplify this choice a set of agricultural projects with feasibility 
studies was selected for a detailed application of various investment 
criteria; nevertheless, the method of analysis could well serve for 
other types of agricultural projects (jungle colonization, for example) 
or industrial projects. Essentially two classes of comparison are per­
formed. The first is the comparison of the priorities generated by 
several investment criteria so as to eliminate redundancies (two similar 
criteria that give the same project priorities) and to use only those 
criteria that are related to specific Peruvian national development 
goals. As the fundamental element of project selection, the second com­
parison is the selection of the most appropriate projects (i.e., con­
sistent with the development goals) for public investment. Hence, it 
is important to know if (say) large capital intensive coastal projects 
contribute more or less to the planning goals than small less capital 
intensive coastal or sierra projects. 
In selecting and applying investment criteria to the choice of 
projects, a differentiation must be made between the conditions which 
permit their use in developed and underdeveloped economies. The theory 
of perfect competion established that the prices of inputs reflect their 
marginal productivities. It is usually assumed that in advanced econo­
mies the market conditions sufficiently approximate the "ideal" perfectly 
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competitive conditions that the prices used for project analysis are 
the same as the market prices. That is, it can be assumed that the 
market wage rate adequately reflects the opportunity cost of labor meas­
ured in real terms. In underdeveloped economies the market prices 
are imperfect measures of the opportunity cost of the principal inputs 
due to market imperfections. Rather the market prices of some factors 
must be rejected for shadow prices which measure their opportunity cost 
or marginal productivities. The principal inputs for which shadow prices 
must be used are capital, foreign exchange and labor. The market wage 
of labor is generally expected to exceed its shadow wage due to, among 
other reasons, institutionally established wages. And because of the 
relative abundance of labor the minimum subsistence wage may be less 
than its marginal productivity. In fact, in a subsistence agricultural 
economy the marginal productivity of an unskilled farm laboror may 
approach zero since the removal of one worker will have no appreciable 
effect upon output. 
The shadow exchange rate is generally less than the market rate, 
i.e., the application of a shadow rate increases the cost of imports 
expressed in units of a local currency per unit of the foreign currency. 
The principal cause for the difference in the market and shadow rates 
is the maintenance of government exchange controls reflected in foreign 
exchange rationing and officially pegged exchange rates. 
The shadow rate of interest is expected to exceed the market rate. 
The first difficulty is that frequently a developed capital market does 
not exist and capital rationing and legally established interest rates 
are imposed. Hence, for investment criteria to be applied to 
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underdeveloped economies the social pricing of factors must be accounted 
for with by the use of shadow instead of market prices. 
The basic requirements have been examined that must be satisfied 
before an investment criterion can be used for project selection. First, 
the differences between market and shadow prices must be accounted for. 
This requirement can be easily satisfied once the respective components 
of labor, capital and foreign exchange have been estimated. But this 
is a difficult step if the project feasibility studies, as is the case 
with the eleven irrigation projects considered in this study, do not give 
detailed cost estimates. Then secondary data sources are used to sepa­
rate labor and foreign exchange costs. A second requirement to be met 
by an investment criterion is that it must include the time discounting 
of projected money flows. By computing the present values (or equiva­
lent annual values) at an established discount rate, the costs and out­
puts of all projects are placed upon a comparative basis. Finally, 
the criterion must reflect a meaningful national objective by measuring 
the project performance relative to one or more scarce resources. 
The theoretical foundations of four classes of investment criteria 
have been examined. These include 1) the benefit-cost ratio, 2) the 
social marginal productivity of investment, 3) various partial criteria 
such as the output-investment ratio and 4) the reinvestment criterion. 
The benefit-cost ratio, which requires that the ratio of the present 
value of benefits to the present values of costs exceeds one, is shown 
to be derived from the equilibrium conditions of the perfectly competi­
tive model - equating price to marginal costs. The benefits, by meas­
uring the consumers valuation of output, are analogous to price and 
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the costs of the project are viewed as marginal for the economy as a 
whole. Since the analysis ii? .. the context of market imperfections, 
shadow prices are required instead of market prices. 
The social marginal productivity of investment separates the 
domestic output effect from the balance-of-payments effect. This model, 
by using social (shadow) pricing, measures project investment and selects 
projects for the investment program. To a great extent the SMP is an 
extension of the simple output-investment ratio to include the direct 
and indirect balance-of-payments effects of the projects and, conse­
quently, is used to test hypotheses regarding the relative importance 
of the two components (balance-of-payments effect and domestic income 
effect) in the ranking of projects. 
Three, frequently discussed, partial criteria are examined for use 
as project evaluation coefficients. The output-investment ratio is 
used to measure the contribution of the initial project investment to 
national output in terms of gross output, value added or net income. 
A second ratio, the labor-investment ratio, permits the selection of 
projects on the basis of their employment generation. Third, the foreign 
exchange earnings - investment ratio measures the direct foreign ex­
change contribution of the initial project investment. These partial 
criteria are adjusted for time discounting and the inclusion of shadow 
prices. 
Eleven irrigation projects are selected for the application of the 
investment criteria. These projects have been carefully selected to 
include representative projects from each major class of water resource 
development projects. The principal classes of projects and the projects 
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included in each class are as follows: small sierra projects; Ântaura, 
Huanscolla, and Chococo; small coastal new lands projects, El Cural, 
La Cano and El Huevo; large coastal land improvement projects, Choclaco-
cha; medium and large combined new land and land improvement projects, 
Chira and Moquegua; and very large coastal new lands projects, Olmos. 
These projects represent a variety of regional, production, investment 
and tenure conditions indicative of sierra and coastal zones, annual 
and permanent crops and livestock production, labor intensive and very 
capital intensive. The investment costs range from $250 to $1,000 per 
hectare and including the private on-farm investment costs from $400 
to $1,500 respectively for the small and large projects. A minimum 
gross output is attained of approximately $150 per hectare for small 
sierra projects to $450 per hectare for coastal new lands projects. A 
great difference in the investment periods among projects is evident; 
investment in the large projects is expected to occur during 10 to 15 
years and for small projects-during 2 to 5 years. Likewise, the period 
over which the projects attain full output from the initiation of invest­
ment ranges from less than 10 years for small projects to 20 years for 
large projects. 
The basic data for the application of investment criteria are found 
in the respective feasibility studies of each project but these data 
cannot be accepted at face value. They have been submitted to various 
adjustments. The project feasibility studies are adjusted for differences 
in base year prices both on the cost and output side. An index of con­
struction costs is employed to deflate the project investment costs to 
1965 prices. Since the feasibility studies have been completed, more 
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complete and reliable national and regional output and production data 
have been developed. The feasibility study output and net income esti­
mates have been revised to account for two needed corrections. The 
first is the difference in prices used in the feasibility studies and 
the base year 1965 and, secondly, the correction that permits the ad­
justment for optimistic and pessimistic output estimates of the studies. 
Once the gross output figures for each project are adjusted to the year 
1965, the net income is estimated. None of the feasibility studies 
defines clearly the components going into farm production costs and, 
thus, the consistency and comparability of the farm income estimates can­
not be relied upon. Hence, a secondary data source permitting the con­
sistent definition of production costs by region and by crop has been 
used to calculate cost coefficients per hectare and per crop. From these 
coefficients an "adjusted" net income per hectare is constructed for each 
project. In addition, value added is estimated for each project. Thus, 
five estimates of benefits are available for each project - unadjusted 
output and net income from the feasibility studies and adjusted output, 
net income and value added. 
The benefit-cost ratio is applied first to the eleven irrigation 
projects. This ratio Is the discounted present value of benefits divided 
by the discounted present value of costs where year one starts with the 
initiation of construction. The benefits in any given year are normally 
taken as net farm income less on-farm investment costs and the corres­
ponding operating, maintenance and replacement costs of the on-farm in­
vestment. The costs are defined as the public investment costs plus 
the corresponding operating, maintenance and replacement costs. 
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The first application of the benefit-cost ratio is with unadjusted 
net income and costs and adjusted net income and costs at discount rates 
of 6, 10, and 15 percent. A comparision of the ratios indicate that 
the majority are reduced with the introduction of adjusted income and 
costs. The small sierra improvement projects - Antaura, Huanscolla and 
Chococo - and the Choclacocha project improve their relative ranking by 
the resulting higher benefit-cost ratios. The overall ranking of the 
major project classes (large, small, coastal, sierra new lands and land 
improvement) are not greatly different after including the adjusted net 
income; the small coastal and sierra projects as generally ranked high 
over the larger coastal projects. 
The benefit-cost ratio (with adjusted net income) is revised using 
shadow prices at alternative discount rates. Preliminary values of the 
shadow rates include an exchange rate equal to 150 percent of the 1965 
market rate and a wage rate equal to 50 percent of the market rate. The 
ranking of small coastal and sierra projects are less affected by the 
revision than some of the larger projects. Projects, such as Olmos, 
with large foreign exchange costs and small labor costs, decline sig­
nificantly in the ranking following the inclusion of shadow prices. The 
smaller projects characterized by minimal foreign exchange investment 
costs and labor intensive construction techniques are generally favored 
by the use of shadow prices. The benefit-cost ratios of medium sised 
projects, such as Moquegua, Chira and Tumbes are unaffected. The 
Choclacocha project - a large coastal land improvement project - is also 
unaffected by shadow pricing. Thus, the overall effect of the tentative 
estimates of costs and income valued at shadow prices is to consolidate 
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the already high ranking of the small coastal and sierra projects. 
The internal rate of return is compared with the benefit-cost 
ratio and no difference is found in the project rankings. As is demon­
strated both criteria will reject the same projects once a minimum 
acceptable rate of return (equal to the discount rate) is established; 
likewise, both criteria accept the same projects. Theoretically, the 
acceptable projects may be ranked differently by the two criteria. 
with low operating costs are generally favored by the benefit-
cost ratio. But for the relatively homogeneous irrigation projects the 
ranking generated by the two criteria are, in practice, the same. 
The social marginal productivity of investment (SMP) is applied 
to the irrigation projects because of the feature of separating out the 
balance-of-payments effect from the total national income effect. The 
SMP, as formulated by Chenery, is defined as the annual increment in 
national income and the direct and indirect balance-of-payments effects 
per unit of the project investment. A difficulty in applying this ratio 
to irrigation projects is that time discounting of output and invest­
ment is not accounted for in the original formulation. Hence, the SMP 
has been revised to include discounting of costs and returns. 
The balance-of-payments effect of the SMP is divided into three 
components; 1) the direct and indirect investment effect which is always 
negative; 2) the direct operating effect which may be negative or posi­
tive, although it is generally positive for the irrigation projects; and 
3) the indirect operating effect which is usually negative. For the 
eleven projects some shifts in priorities are caused by the inclusion 
of the total balance-of-payments effect. An example is the Choclacocha 
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project which is ranked high by the ratio of domestic income to invest­
ment but declines in the ranking because of a small balance-of-payments 
effect relative to the other projects. 
Two applications of the SMP have been made - one without dis­
counting using annual maximum project output and total investment and 
one with discounted output and Investment. The resulting shifts in the 
priorities are not surprising - the large projects with heavy investment, 
long gestation periods and long periods to reach full output decline 
in the ranking due to the inclusion of discounting. The Olmos and 
Choclacocha projects are notably affected by the inclusion of discounting. 
In fact, all of the medium and large coastal projects are ranked below 
the small sierra and coastal projects for the discounted SMP. 
Several partial criteria have been used to establish project 
priorities. Alternative forms of the output-investment ratio are com­
pared. Three definitions of output are gross production, income and 
value added, and two definitions of investment are used - one with initial 
Investment and other with initial investment plus its operating, main­
tenance and replacement costs. In addition, each ratio is computed, 
first, without discounting and secondly, as the discounted present value 
of output and investment. The priorities generated by the alternative 
forms are not substantially different. The inclusion of discounting ad­
versely affects the ranking of the large projects and some projects 
(Choclacocha, for example) change ranking when substituting net income 
for gross output. But, in general, the choice of the output measure does 
not alter the project ranking - only the use of time discounting changes 
the priorities. The net-income - investment ratio with shadow prices 
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ranks the small sierra and coastal above the medium and large coastal 
projects. These latter projects are headed by Choclacocha and Olmos. 
Two types of ratios are made use of to measure the foreign exchange 
effucts oC the projects. The output in foreign exchange-total invest­
ment ratio, discounted and undiscounted, measures the direct balance-of-
payments effect of the investment. The discounting of costs and returns 
does not modify the position of the projects in the rankings. The small 
coastal and sierra projects sustain a high ranking. The only project 
of size with a relatively large direct foreign exchange effect is the 
Olmos project which is strongly oriented to import substitution and ex­
port promotion. The second ratio is the output in foreign exchange-
investmcnt in foreign exchange ratio which measures the annual recupera­
tion ol: the initial foreign exchange investment costs. The larger capital 
intensive projects have lower ratios because of the high proportion of 
foreign exchange investment costs. The final ranking for this criterion 
the small sierra projects are placed first followed by the small coastal 
projects, the large capital intensive projects and, finally, the medium 
sized coastal projects, the large capital intensive project and, finally, 
the medium sized coastal land improvement projects. 
The lalîor re(|iiired by each project Is measured by a simple partial 
criterion - the labor cost-investment ratio. Again the small coastal 
projects are ranked high. Some medium sized projects, oriented to labor 
intensive permanent crops, perform well for the employment effect. 
Tlirougliout the application of the investment criteria, shadow wage 
and exchange rates equal to 50 percent and 150 percent of the market 
prices have been introduced. Since the data necessary to conduct the 
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detailed programming studies for the estimation of the shadow prices 
for capital, foreign exchange and unskilled labor are lacking, a sensi­
tivity analysis of the benefit-cost ratio to various values of the 
shadow prices is presented. First, the systematic variation in the 
discount rate (holding the wage and exchange rates at market values) 
demonstrates that the benefit-cost ratio is highly sensitive to this 
rate. The relative rankings are also highly sensitive to the discount 
rate. At a low rate all projects are feasible and as the rate is in­
creased the benefit-cost ratios decline - the more capital intensive 
projects also decline in the ranking. The benefit-cost ratios of all 
projects are favorably affected by the increased shadow exchange rate, 
but in different degrees. But once the shadow rate passes 150 percent 
of the market rate the relative project rankings are not altered. Hence, 
the moderate exchange rate adjustment used throughout this study is as 
equally justified as an even larger rate adjustment. Â similar result 
is found for the variation in the shadow wage rate - below the rate of 
50 percent of the market wage the relative project ordering remains un­
affected. A shadow price of zero yields the same priorities. 
An Important conclusion is drawn from the estimation of shadow 
prices in the case in which all prices are varied simultaneously. With 
moderate shadow wage and exchange rates (50 and 150 percent, respectively, 
of market rates.) the choice of a discount rate between 6 and 15 percent 
does not alter substantially the project priorities. Hence, the project 
planner is relieved of the necessity of making a precise estimate of the 
discount rate (the most difficult to justify theoretically) and can con­
centrate on estimating the shadow wage and exchange rates. In the case 
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of the Irrigation projects the variation in the latter two rates beyond 
moderate values did not effect the project orderings. 
Three major national economic objectives have been discussed and 
related to the investment criteria. The objective of increasing national 
income is measured by three criteria - the benefit-cost ratio, the SMP 
and the output-investment ratio. Since the priorities established by 
each criterion are practically the same, a mean ranking of the three 
determines the respective priorities corresponding to the income ob­
jective. For this single national objective, the small sierra and coast­
al projects are ranked the highest and the only project of size to be 
ranked high is Choclacocha. The national objective of balance-of-pay-
ments equilibrium is represented by the balance-of-payiiients effect of 
the SMP and the output in foreign exchange-investment ratio. A mean 
ranking of the similar priorities given by each criterion, yields a 
single ranking corresponding to the balance-of-payments objective. The 
ranking shows the same familiar pattern of high ranked small projects 
with the exception of the Olmos project which is ranked fourth. Using 
the labor-investment ratio to establish the priorities for the national 
employment objective completes the process of relating priorities to 
national objectives. 
The final step in determining the set of irrigation priorities is 
to weigh the priorities selected for each objective. Several sets of 
weights are applied including the use of equal weights on all three 
objectives and a weight on each objective equal to twice the average 
weight on the remaining objectives. A final set of irrigation project 
priorities results; the small sierra and coastal projects are ranked 
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the highest followed by the large and medium sized coastal projects. 
Of the latter group, the Choclacocha and Olmos projects generally 
perform the best. These priorities are established irrespective of the 
selection of the national objective weighting scheme. Henc^, a Peruvian 
irrigation investment program, formulated on a consistent basis with the 
major national economic objectives, should emphasize investment in small 
coastal and sierra projects over large capital intensive coastal projects. 
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IX. APPENDIX A 
Table A 1. Unadjusted and adjusted gross production, net income and 
value added 0 L M 0 S irrigation project at full output 
Product 
Cultivated 
hectares 
No. 
Gross production 
unadjusted adjusted 
Cotton 22737 23.9 13089 10400 
Oil seeds 20144 21.2 10798 10450 
Rice 6825 7.2 14300 11800 
Maize 4331 4.6 18702 8000 
Oranges 2600 2.7 33731 30000 
Lemons 1000 1.1 28600 28600 
Bananas 2800 2.9 31607 16000 
Avocado 1387 1.5 35977 36400 
Mango 700 0.7 19000 36000 
Pineapple 300 0.4 24333 24333 
Vegetables 4097 4.3 38028 20000 
Repeat 8200 8.6 8488 8000 
Livestock 19830 20.9 44170 38825 
TOTAL 94951 100.0 21816 18200 
2 
Poultry 173.4 173.4 
2 
TOTAL 2243.7 1902.2 
1965 soles per hectare. 
Millions of soles. 
Table A 2. Unadjusted and adjusted gross production, net income^ and value added -
C H O  C L A C O C H A  i r r i g a t i o n  p r o j e c t  a t  f u l l  o u t p u t  
Cultivated Gross production Direct production costs UnaJ- Ad-
hectares justed justed Value 
unadjusted adjusted unadjusted adjusted net net added 
Product No. % project project % income income % s/. 
Cotton 12901 20.7 16799 10449 12809 65 6792 3990 3657 65 6792 
Alfalfa 4218 6.8 14913 11970 11601 50 5985 3312 5985 79 5985 
Forage 13957 22.4 2174 2250 1220 50 1125 954 1125 56 1260 
Sorgum gr 1356 2.2 6519 7000 3397 55 3850 3122 3150 68 4760 
Com gr 5566 8.9 14872 9360 7653 55 5148 7219 4212 64 5990 
Beans dry 2972 4.8 13041 13765 4767 50 6883 8274 6882 79 10874 
Peanut 1238 2.0 9223 6671 5304 63 4203 3919 2468 68 4536 
Barley 1605 2.6 5992 1800 3423 66 1188 2169 612 66 1188 
Palta 1778 2.8 30237 17400 18164 60 10440 12073 6960 73 12702 
Citrics 1837 2.9 26054 28500 14819 57 16245 11235 12255 71 20235 
Dates 1483 2.4 31680 31680 17962 57 18058 13718 13622 75 23760 
Olive 1569 2.5 26774 47500 19649 50 23750 7126 23750 65 30875 
0. fruits 718 1.1 23402 25200 10845 42 10584 12557 14616 77 19404 
Grapes 1634 2.6 19824 25192 12283 42 10581 7541 14611 72 18138 
Pepper 1160 1.9 14361 21000 6878 66 13860 7483 7140 77 16170 
Beans 1020 1.6 10352 13765 4305 57 7846 6047 5919 79 10874 
Swt. corn 1020 1.6 10698 9360 5997 65 6084 4701 3276 74 6926 
Vegetable 809 1.3 17607 21000 13451 46 9660 4156 11340 67 14070 
^Soles per hectare . 
Table A 2. (continued) 
Cultivated Gross production Direct production costs Unad- Ad-
hectares justed justed Value 
unadjusted adjusted unadjusted adjusted net net added 
Product No^ % project project % income income % S/. 
Potato 455 0. ,7 24171 24450 11635 58 14181 12536 10269 68 16626 
Tubers 1020 1. ,6 21771 24450 9350 58 14181 12421 10269 89 21761 
Tomato 1725 2. 8 25840 16000 13860 46 7360 11980 8640 79 12640 
0. vegetable 1270 2. ,0 21139 21000 6820 46 9660 14319 11340 83 17430 
Vinedos 1130 1. 8 23749 23749 7318 31 7362 16431 16387 87 20662 
TOTAL 62441 100. 0 14163 12402 8560 54 6705 5603 5697 70 8660 
TOTAL^ 884.4 774.4 534.5 418.7 349.9 355.7 540. 
2 
Millions of soles. 
Table A 3. Unadjusted and adjusted gross production, net income^ and value added - T U M B E S, 
Stage I, irrigation project at full output 
Cultivated Gross production Direct production Unad- Ad-
hectares costs justed justed Value 
unadjusted adjusted unadjusted adjusted net net added 
Product No. % proiect proiect % income income % s/. 
Fruit trees 880 9.1 35150 35191 14505 54 19003 20645 16188 76 26745 
Bananas 880 9.1 23011 12910 8009 70 9037 15002 3873 67 8650 
Vegetables^ 1200 12.3 17834 17471 8013 60 10483 9821 6988 59 10308 
Irr. pasture 2550 26.2 10498 9890 5694 48 4747 4804 5145 79 7813 
Com 1135 11.7 8421 4350 3968 67 2914 4453 1436 65 2828 
Swt. potato 710 7.3 16015 6330 4986 68 4304 11029 2026 60 3798 
Yuca 630 6.5 16256 9265 4984 48 4447 11272 4818 82 7597 
Soy beans 500 5.1 4920 5089 2498 51 2595 2422 2494 65 3308 
Peanuts 630 6.5 11805 10120 4489 63 6376 7316 3744 80 8096 
Rice 230 2.4 14752 10690 7000 67 7162 7752 3528 71 7590 
Palm trees 290 3.0 22000 22000 8000 36 8000 14000 14000 65 14300 
Barley 80 0.8 5700 1566 3375 84 1315 2325 251 60 940 
TOTAL 9715 100.0 15526 12537 6533 56 6998 8993 5539 71 8951 
TOTAL^ 9715 150.8 121.8 87.4 53.8 87.0 
^Soles per hectare . 
2 Tomatos. 
3 
Millions of soles • 
Table A 4. Unadjusted and adjusted gross production, net income^ and value added - T U M B E S, 
Stage II, irrigation project at full output 
Cultivated Gross production Direct production costs Unad- Ad-
hectares justed justed Value 
unadjusted adjusted unadjusted adjusted net net added 
Product No. % project proiect % income income % S/. 
Fruit trees 560 3.6 34516 35191 14000 54 19003 20516 16188 76 26745 
Bananas 550 3.5 22484 12910 8000 70 9037 14484 3873 67 8650 
Vegetables 1630 10.5 17610 17471 7990 60 10483 9620 6988 59 10308 
Irr. pasture 7540 48.6 10085 9890 5445 48 4747 4640 5143 79 7813 
Com 735 4.7 8027 4350 4005 67 2914 4022 1436 65 2828 
Swt. potato 750 4.8 15961 6330 5007 68 4304 10954 2026 60 3798 
Yucca 535 3.5 16533 9265 5009 48 4447 11524 4818 82 7597 
Soy beans 235 1.5 4736 5089 2502 53 2697 2234 2392 65 3308 
Peanuts 490 3.2 11400 10120 4510 63 6376 6890 4744 80 8096 
Rice 1425 9.2 14948 10690 7000 67 7162 7948 3528 71 7590 
Palm trees 825 5.3 21938 21938 7980 36 8117 13958 13821 65 14260 
Barley 255 1.6 6655 1566 3176 84 1315 3479 251 60 940 
TOTAL 15530 100.0 13582 11764 6173 53 6262 7410 5502 72 8504 
TOTAL? 15530 126 210.9 182.7 115.1 85.5 132.1 
^Soles per hectare . 
^Millions of soles . 
Table A 5. Unadjusted and adjusted gross production, net income^ and value added -
M O Q U E G U A  ( M o q .  s e c t o r )  i r r i g a t i o n  p r o j e c t  a t  f u l l  o u t p u t  
Cultivated Gross production Direct production costs Unad- Ad-
hectares justed justed Value 
unadjusted adjusted unadjusted adjusted net net added 
Product No. I project project % income income % S/. 
Alfalfa 900 21. 5 9720 14680 5230 48 7046 4490 7634 79 11598 
Com 100 2. 4 8800 5916 5790 65 3845 3010 2071 67 3964 
Barley 200 4. 8 6600 4500 4695 66 2970 1905 1530 66 2970 
Wheat 200 4. 8 6600 5643 4690 55 3104 1910 2539 64 3612 
Potato 100 2. 4 18000 22239 12510 51 11342 5490 10897 67 14900 
Olive 370 8. 9 45000 39870 10681 50 19935 34319 19935 83 33092 
Grape 1250 30. 0 16000 16166 8300 42 6790 7700 9376 90 14549 
0. fruits 850 20. 0 42680 41350 11734 70 28945 30946 12405 45 18608 
Various 200 4. 8 11900 11900 6280 53 6280 5620 5620 66 7854 
TOTAL 4170 100. 0 21450 21724 8150 12188 13283 9535 68 14745 
TOTAL^ 4170 114 89.5 90.6 55.4 39.8 61.5 
Soles per hectare. 
^Millions of soles. 
Table A 6. Unadjusted and adjusted gross production, net income^ and value added -
M O Q U E G U A  ( I L O )  i r r i g a t i o n  p r o j e c t  a t  f u l l  o u t p u t  
Cultivated Gross production Direct production costs Unad- Ad-
hectares justed justed Value 
unadjusted adjusted unadjusted adjusted net net added 
Product No. % project project 7. income income % s / .  
Alfalfa 1474 37 .1 9720 14680 5197 48 7046 4523 7634 79 11597 
Corn 300 7 .5 8800 5916 5693 65 3845 3107 2071 67 3964 
Wheat 436 11 .0 6600 5643 4612 55 3102 1988 2539 64 3612 
Potato 458 11 .5 1800 22239 12511 51 11342 5489 10897 67 14900 
Fruits 600 15 .1 33762 41350 15515 70 28945 18247 12405 45 18608 
Others 563 14 .2 11900 11900 6280 53 6280 5620 5620 66 7854 
F.c. 3  143 3 .6 11900 11900 6820 53 6820 5620 5620 66 7854 
TOTAL 3974 100 .0 14278 17430 7762 58 10037 6517 7393 63 6517 
TOTAL^ 3974 100 56.7 69.3 25.9 29.4 43.4 
^Soles per hectare. 
^Oranges . 
^Family consumption • 
^Millions of soles 
Table A-7. Unadjusted and adjusted gross production, net income^ and value added -
C H I R A  V A L L E Y  ( P i r u a  C )  i r r i g a t i o n  p r o j e c t  a t  f u l l  o u t p u t  
Cultivated Gross production Direct production costs Unad- Ad-
hectares justed justed Value 
unadjusted adjusted unadjusted adjusted net net added 
Product No. project project % income income % s/. 
Cotton 14810 24. 5 15200 8352 12250 58 4844 2950 3508 74 6180 
Rice 3346 5. 5 9600 11760 8000 67 7879 1600 3881 71 8350 
Corn 3133 5. 2 13354 3533 7650 55 1943 5704 1590 60 2120 
Forage 13314 22. 1 2020 2020 1220 60 1212 800 808 77 1555 
Beans 4806 8. 0 5040 2250 4000 80 1800 1040 450 50 1125 
Alfalfa 4877 8. 1 14600 5400 11600 48 2592 3000 2808 79 4266 
Bananas 1673 2. 8 28000 13200 17000 70 9240 11000 3960 67 8844 
Dates 1673 2. 8 33000 33000 18100 55 18150 14900 14850 65 21450 
Citris 3774 6. 2 27200 30000 15000 70 21000 12200 9000 45 13500 
0. fruits 3062 5. 1 17612 20900 10850 70 14630 6762 6270 45 9405 
Vegetable 5874 9. 7 15470 14300 8500 60 8580 6970 5720 59 8437 
TOTAL 60342 100. 0 12772 9547 8659 63 5990 4113 3557 61 5846 
TOTAL^ 60342 770.7 576.1 248.2 214.6 352.8 
^Soles per hectare. 
^Millions of soles. 
Table A 8. Unadjusted and adjusted gross production, net income^ and value added -
EL G U R A L, irrigation project at full output 
Cultivated Gross production Direct production Unad­ Ad­
hectares costs justed justed Value 
unadjusted adjusted unadjusted adjusted net ne added 
Product No. % project project % income income % S/. 
Orchards 645 18.0 37465 37930 9519 75 28448 27937 9482 52 19724 
Alfalfa 1615 45.0 17870 17600 9387 48 8448 8483 9152 79 13904 
Com 265 7.4 8925 7200 4963 65 4680 3962 2520 67 4824 
Grains 265 7.4 7057 •6160 4491 55 3388 2566 2772 64 3942 
Potatos 265 7.4 20019 24544 11227 51 12517 8792 12027 67 16444 
Vegetables 530 14.8 24933 22319 12744 46 10267 12189 12052 70 15623 
TOTAL 3585 100.0 21138 20856 9354 57.3 11965 11782 8891 67 13985 
T0TAL2 75.8 74.8 33.5 42.9 42.2 31.9 50.1 
Soles per hectare 
Millions of soles. 
Table A 9. Unadjusted and adjusted gross production, net income^ and value added -
EL H U E V 0, irrigation project at full output 
Cultivated Gross production Direct production costs Unad- Ad 
hectares justed justed Value 
unadjusted adjusted unadjusted adjusted net net added 
Product No. % project project % income income % S/. 
Orchards 625 25. 5 28832 28500 8503 70 19950 20329 8550 52 14820 
Alfalfa 1065 43, .5 15408 17600 7164 48 8448 8244 9152 79 13904 
Vegetables 250 10. 2 8520 22319 10000 46 10267 8520 12052 70 15623 
Beans 250 10. ,2 7600 6800 4200 52 3536 3400 3264 70 4760 
Corn 130 5. ,3 7000 7200 4462 65 4680 2538 2520 67 4824 
Swt. potatos 70 2. ,9 14714 11620 6000 78 9064 8714 2556 78 9064 
Potato 60 2. ,4 19500 24544 11000 51 12517 8500 12027 67 16444 
TOTAL 2450 100. 0 17985 19201 7407 57 10981 10534 8220 67 12820 
TOIAL^ . 44.1 47.0 18.1 26.9 25.8 20.1 3.14 
^Soles per hectare. 
^Millions of soles. 
Table A 10. Unadjusted and adjusted gross production, net income^ and value added 
A N T A U R A, irrigation project at full output 
Cultivated Gross production Direct production cost Unad- Ad­
hectares justed justed Value 
unadjusted adjusted unadjusted adjusted net net added 
Produc t  No .  % pro j ec t  p ro j ec t  % i ncome  income  % f5/-
Irr. pasture 610 39. 7 11890 12350 8410 48 5928 3480 6422 79 9757 
Com 185 12. 1 5460 4927 3784 65 3203 1676 1724 67 3301 
Wheat 190 12. 3 5610 5037 3579 55 2770 2031 2267 64 3224 
Potato 180 11. 7 17810 15498 12556 51 7904 5254 7594 67 10384 
Barley 185 12. 1 5730 3857 3595 56 2160 2135 1697 66 2546 
Vegetable 185 12. 1 14160 18490 11000 46 8505 3160 11124 70 12943 
TOTAL or 
average 
TOTAL^ 
1535 100.0 10560 
1535 131 16210 
10636 
16326 
7472 50 5297 3088 
4740 
5339 
8195 
73 7759 
11910 
^Soles per hectare . 
^Thousands of soles. 
Table A 11. Unadjusted and adjusted gross production, net income and value added -
H U A N S C O L L A ,  i r r i g a t i o n  p r o j e c t  a t  f u l l  o u t p u t  
Cultivated Gross production Direct production costs Unad­ Ad­
hectares justed justed Value 
unadjusted adjusted unadjusted adjusted net net added 
Product No. % roject project % income income % s/. 
Irr. pasture 510 42. 7 9333 12350 5490 48 5928 3843 6422 79 9757 
Corn 140 11. 7 5714 4927 3536 65 3203 2178 1724 67 3301 
Wheat 140 11. 7 6500 5037 3536 55 2770 2964 2267 64 3224 
Potato 135 11. 3 13780 15498 8407 51 7904 5373 7594 67 10384 
Barley 135 11. 3 5074 3857 3000 66 2546 2074 1311 66 2546 
Vegetable 135 11. 3 11850 10000 7481 46 4600 4369 5400 70 7000 
TOTAL 1195 100. 0 8883 9752 5306 50 4826 3577 4926 72 7182 
TOTAL^ 1195 129 10615 11654 6341 5767 4275 5887 8582 
^Soles per hectare. 
^Thousands of soles. 
Table A 12. Unadjusted and adjusted gross production, net income^ and value added 
C H 0 C 0 C 0, irrigation project at full output 
Cultivated Gross production Direct production costs Unad- Ad-
hectares justed justed Value 
unadjusted adjusted unadjusted adjusted net net added 
Product No. % project project % income income % Si. 
Fruit trees 80 4. 7 16500 20945 11500 70 14662 5000 6283 52 10891 
Irr. pasture 580 33. ,8 9207 12350 5759 48 5928 3448 4569 79 9757 
Corn 150 8. ,7 5700 4927 3400 65 3203 2300 1577 67 3301 
Wheat 255 14. 9 6471 5037 3921 55 2770 2550 1713 64 3224 
Potato 245 14. 3 13735 15498 8306 51 7904 5429 5734 67 10384 
Barley 245 14. ,3 5020 3857 2980 56 2160 2040 1234 66 2546 
Vegetables 160 9. 3 11688 10000 7125 46 4600 4653 4700 70 7000 
TOTAL 1715 100. 0 9114 10193 5645 62 5251 3469 4942 69 7077 
TOTAL^ 1715 112 15631 17481 5949 8476 12137 
Igoles per hectare. 
^Thousands of soles. 
Table A 13. Unadjusted and adjusted gross production, net income^ and value added -
LA C A N 0, irrigation project at full output 
Cultivated Gross production Direct production costs Unad- Ad-
hectares justed justed 
unadjusted adjusted unadjusted adjusted net. net added 
Product No. 7o project project income income % S/. 
Alfalfa 1180 46, .7 16305 17600 7000 48 8448 9305 9152 79 13904 
Orchards 430 17, .0 26895 28500 9000 66 18810 17895 9690 52 14820 
Vegetables 215 8. ,5 18884 22319 10675 46 10267 8209 12052 70 15623 
Grains 155 6, .1 6194 6160 3581 55 3388 2613 2772 64 3942 
Forage 160 6. ,3 5844 5700 3313 48 2736 2531 2964 79 4503 
Corn (feed) 160 6. ,3 7438 7200 3813 65 4680 3625 2520 67 4824 
Com (forage) 160 6. ,3 7469 7200 3125 65 4680 4344 2520 67 4824 
Potatos 35 1. ,4 19571 24544 11000 51 12517 8571 12027 67 5700 
Garden crops 35 1. ,4 8143 8143 4572 44 3583 3571 4560 70 5700 
TOTAL 2530 100 15856 17061 6789 54 9224 9071 7851 69 11783 
Project^ 2120 40.1 43.2 17.2 23.3 22.9 19.9 29.8 
ISoles per hectare. 
^Percent of adjusted gross production. 
3 
Geographical area in hectares and output and costs in millions of soles. 
Table A 14. Unadjusted and adjusted gross production, net income^ and value added -
C H A N T A C O  Y  H U A R I C A N C H I ,  i r r i g a t i o n  p r o j e c t  a t  f u l l  o u t p u t  
Cultivated Gross production Direct production 
hectares costs. Unadjusted Adjusted Value 
unadjusted adjusted unadjusted adjusted net net added 
Product No. % project project % income income % s/. 
Avocado 210 14. 3 24124 21260 8320 38 8079 15804 13181 82 17433 
Alfalfa 705 47. 9 13000 4500 7390 48 2160 5610 2340 79 3555 
Leguminosis 83 5. 6 8494 8494 4980 59 5011 3514 3483 50 4247 
Potato 145 9. 9 25503 12285 10990 51 6265 14513 6020 64 7862 
Corn 164 11. 1 6598 4338 5300 67 2906 1298 1432 65 2820 
Wheat 165 11. 2 4841 2000 3370 72 1440 1471 560 64 1280 
TOTAL 1472 100. 0 13957 7198 7062 50 3575 6890 3623 79 5668 
TOTAL^ 1472 20545 10595 10142 5333 8343 
^Soles per hectare. 
O 
Thousands of soles. 
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X. APPEkiBIX B 
Key to notation. Appendix B: 
t year 
Xt unadjusted gross output 
Cxt 
= 
unadjusted production costs 
a%t = adjusted gross output 
a^xt adjusted production ccsts 
a^t = adjusted value added 
Ct 
= 
undeflated construction costs 
aCt = deflated construction costs, 1965 prices 
Iat+0 at= undeflated on-farm investment costs and operating costs 
Bt - - Gxt - ^at - Oat 
a®t = a^t - a^xt - a^at - a®at 
Table B 1. Unadjusted and adjusted cost and output 
Year ^ 
t Xj. Cjjj. Local Foreign Total 
currency currency 
1 
2 
3 
4 
-5 
- - -
- - -
---
0 
7 85.3 45.4 39.9 72.5 
8 168.4 81.9 86.5 143.1 
9 268.4 122.7 145.7 228.5 
10 374.9 162.1 212.8 319.7 
11 535.4 204.0 331.4 458.5 
12 704.9 244.2 460.7 605.0 
13 887.4 283.2 604.2 762.5 
14 1089.9 327.2 762.7 933.5 
15 1313.9 375.1 938.8 1130.5 
16 1505.7 411.9 1093.8 1253.5 
17 1675.9 475.4 1200.5 1403.0 
18 1826.8 528.5 1298.3 1535.8 
19 2008.2 594.1 1414.1 1695.2 
20 2060.7 592.0 1468.7 1741.4 
21 2107.1 611.4 1495.7 1782.1 
22 2129.8 620.0 1509.8 1802.1 
23 2161.3 653.2 1508.1 1829.8 
24 2186.4 680.8 1505.6 1851.8 
25 2178.9 689.3 1489.6 1845.3 
26 2191.0 715.5 1475.5 1855,9 
, 0 L M 0 S , irrigation project 
Labor Foreign Others Total X q 
currency 
17.9 45.4 27.1 43.5 
34.3 81.9 61.2 92.9 
60.8 122.7 105.8 161.2 
86.0 162.1 157.6 35.7 
103.7 204.0 254.5 347.3 
122.3 244.2 360.8 467.8 
145.1 283.2 479.3 605.0 
170.2 327.2 606.3 743.6 
193.2 375.1 755.4 919.7 
218.1 411.9 841.6 1031.8 
262.8 475.4 927.6 1124.4 
294.6 528.5 1007.3 1266.9 
331.3 594.1 1101.1 1394.9 
336.6 592.0 1149.4 1445.3 
342.2 611.4 1170.7 1472.6 
349.3 620.0 1182.1 1490.3 
354.6 653.2 1176.6 1493.2 
358.4 680.8 1171.0 1494.0 
359.6 689.3 1156.0 1481.2 
361.5 715.5 1140.4 1470.8 
Table B 1. (continued) 
Year a][t 
t Cjjj. *t"^xt Local Foreign Total 
. currency currency 
27 2208.5 756.9 1415.6 1871.3 
28 2210.6 768.7 1441.9 1873.1 
29 2236.5 801.8 1434.7 1895.9 
30 2245.5 819.0 1426.5 1903.8 
31 2244.3 819.8 1434.5 1902.8 
32 2243.7 820.1 1423.6 1902.2 
a^xt 
Labor Foreign Others Total a^t'a^xt a^t 
currency 
396.5 756.9 1114.4 1480.2 
398.3 768.7 1104.4 1473.5 
399.7 801.8 1094.1 1468.6 
400.9 819.0 1094.8 1462.6 
401.7 819.8 1083.0 1461.6 
402.0 820.1 1082.1 1461.1 
Table B 1. (continued) 
Year Labor Foreign Others Total 
t a^t currency 
1 31.2 11.8 1.4 20.0 33.2 
2 88.5 33.4 24.7 35.9 94.0 
3 102.5 38.6 28.6 41.7 108.9 
4 231.3 70.0 73.4 102.2 245.6 
5 372.1 113.2 116.1 165.8 395.1 
6 489.0 139.4 157.5 222.3 519.2 
7 288.9 63.6 91.9 141.8 306.7 
8 341.6 81.6 112.6 154.7 362.7 
9 209.1 52.3 56.8 94.1 222.0 
10 230.6 57.4 62.1 102.5 244.8 
11 254.6 64.6 67.8 111.0 270.2 
12 243.9 57.1 65.1 108.3 259.0 
13 341.1 86.3 91.1 148.8 362.2 
14 283.3 76.4 72.6 111.3 301.8 
15 246.5 53.2 61.2 103.9 260.7 
16 221.9 51.4 51.9 84.9 235.6 
17 225.7 52.9 51.7 83.6 239.6 
18 122.2 19.2 21.1 35.1 129.8 
19 107.1 19.3 14.8 22.2 113.7 
20 58.3 0.7 1.1 2.1 61.9 
21 58.5 0.6 1.0 1.9 62.2 
22 59.0 0.6 1.0 1.9 62.7 
23 59.0 0.6 0.9 1.5 62.7 
24 59.5 0.6 0.9 1.5 63.2 
25 60.0 0.6 0.9 1.5 63.7 
26 60.0 0.5 0.8 1.4 63.7 
a at + a^at 
+0^j. Labor Foreign Others Total 
I currency 
21.9 20.6 21.9 20.6 
59.2 55.8 59.2 55.8 
115.7 109.0 75.8 81.9 
142.4 134.1 55.9 72.9 
152.9 144.0 7.2 38.2 
163.6 154.1 .49.2 3.5 
185.1 174.4 146.3 80.1 
181.7 171.2 279.0 189.6 
188.1 177.2 416.1 108.7 
193.4 182.2 569.3 719.1 
226.1 213.0 712.7 542.4 
239.0 225.1 854.8 616.5 
226.9 213.7 973.6 713.9 
223.5 210.5 1074.4 796.8 
153.2 144.3 1260.9 956.8 
117.5 110.7 1351.2 1038.7 
104.2 98.2 1391.5 1072.5 
78.0 73.5 1431.8 1108.6 
95.3 89.8 1412.8 1096.8 
81.8 77.1 1423.8 1093.9 
84.3 79.4 1405.3 1076.6 
82.5 77.7 1393.0 1062.7 
Table B 1. (continued) 
a^t 
Year Labor Foreign Others Total 
t at currency 
27 60.0 61.0 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 60.0 61.0 
a^at a^at 
Og^Labor Foreign Others Total 
currency 
83.0 78.2 1368.6 1036.2 
59.1 55.7 1382.8 1048.7 
54.6 51.4 1380.1 1042.7 
51.9 48.9 1374.6 1035.9 
74.8 70.5 1349.7 1012.5 
74.4 70.1 1349.2 107.2.0 
77.1 72.6 1346.5 1009.5 
81.4 76.7 1342.2 1005.4 
82.0 77.2 1341.6 1004.9 
61.4 57.8 1362.2 1024.3 
68.3 64.3 1355.3 1017.8 
78.3 73.8 1345.3 1008.3 
142.7 134.4 1280.9 947.7 
139.9 131.8 1283.7 950.3 
148.2 139.6 1275.4 942.5 
148.8 140.2 1274.8 941.9 
147.7 139.1 1275.9 943.0 
119.6 112.7 1304.0 969.4 
115.6 108.9 1308.0 973.2 
121.2 114.2 1302.4 967.9 
150.0 142.1 1272.7 940.0 
151.6 142.8 1272.0 939.3 
159.7 150.4 1263.9 931.7 
162.5 153.1 1261.1 929.0 
162.4 153.0 1261.2 929.1 
97.1 91.5 1326.5 990.6 
Table B 1. (continued) 
^ t a^at a^at 
Labor Foreign Others Total 1^^.+Ogj. Labor Foreign Others Total Bj. ^Bj. 
a t currency currency 
53 60.0 61.0 73.3 69.0 1350.3 1013.1 
54 64.9 61.1 1358.7 1021.0 
55 85.0 80.1 1338.6 1002.0 
56 80.3 75.6 1343.3 1006.5 
57 81.9 77.1 1341.7 1005.0 
58 80.1 75.5 1343.5 1006.6 
59 78.7 74.1 1344.9 1008.0 
60 57.5 54.2 1366.1 1027.9 
61 53.2 50.1 1370.4 1032.0 
62 60.0 61.0 (732.1) (689.6) 691.5 1771.7 
Table B 2. Unadjusted and adjusted cost and output data, GHOCLACOCHA irrigation project 
a^t a^xt 
Year Local Foreign Total Labor Foreign Others Total 
t t xt t' xt currency currency a^t'a^t a^t 
1 
2 
" III II." 
3 122.4 71.1 51.3 65.8 29.6 95.4 15.0 6.0 21.9 42.9 52.5 66.5 
4 244.8 142,2 102.6 131.6 59.2 190.8 30.1 12.0 43.8 85.9 104.5 133.0 
5 367.1 213.3 153.8 197.4 88.7 286.1 45.0 18.0 65.7 128.7 157.4 199.4 
6 489.5 284.4 205.1 263.2 118.3 381.5 60.1 24.0 87.6 171.7 209.8 265.9 
7 611.9 355.5 256.4 329.0 147.9 476.9 75.1 30.0 109.5 214.6 262.3 332.4 
)3 611.9 355.5 256.4 329.0 147.9 476.9 75.1 30.0 109.5 214.6 262.3 332.4 
Table B 2. (continued) 
Year a^t a^at a®at 
G 
t 
Labor Foreign 
currency 
Others Total 
°at 
Labor Foreign Others 
currency 
Total 
Bt a^t 
1 219.9 74.3 129.5 16.1 219.9 175.4 N.A. N.A. N.A. 175.4 -175.4 -175.4 
2 227.9 77.0 134.2 16.7 227.9 175.4 175.4 -175.4 -175.4 
3 438.9 148.3 258.4 32.2 438.9 175.4 175.4 -118.2 -122.9 
4 25.2 — — — — 25.2 25.2 7.6 7.6 106.3 96.9 
5 8.0 8.0 163.5 149.4 
6 8.0 8.0 220.6 201.8 
7 8.0 8.0 277.8 254.3 
3 25.2 25.2 25.2 8.0 8.0 277.8 254.3 
Table B 3. Unadjusted and adjusted cost and output data, MOQUEGUA irrigation project 
Year 
t *t Cxt 
Local 
currency 
Foreign Total 
currency 
Labor Foreign 
currency 
Others Total 
1 
2 
3 
4 7.8 15.0 5.8 20.8 4.8 1.2 6.0 12.0 8.8 13.0 
5 22.0 32.2 11.2 43.4 10.3 2.8 11.3 24.4 19.0 27.7 
t 21.7 31.6 11.2 42.8- 10.2 2.8 11.0 24.0 18.8 27.3 
7 23.6 33.7 11.7 45.4 10.7 3.0 11.7 25.4 20.0 29.0 
8 31.8 44.2 15.2 59.4 14.2 3.9 15.0 33.1 26.3 38.0 
9 38.8 53.5 18.3 71.8 17.1 4.8 18.1 40.0 31.8 46.1 
10 45.4 62.5 21.4 83.9 19.9 5.6 21.2 46.; 37.2 53.8 
11 52.0 71.3 24.4 95.7 22.8 6.4 24.0 53.2 42.5 61.4 
12 59.4 81.8 28.0 109.8 26.1 7.2 27.8 61.1 48.7 70.4 
13 62.4 85.8 29.4 115.2 27.4 7.6 29.1 64.1 51.1 73.9 
14 65.5 89.7 30.6 120.3 28.7 8.0 30.2 66.9 53.4 77.2 
53 65.5 89.7 30.6 120.3 28.7 8.0 30.2 66.9 53.4 77.2 
Table B 3. (continued) 
a^t a^at + a^at 
Year 
c 
Labor Foreign Others Total lat + Oat Labor Foreign Others Total h 
fc t currency currency 
1 113.6 26.1 45.4 42.1 113.6 N.A. N.A. N.A. ... -13.2 -13.2 
2 83.0 19.1 33.7 30.2 83.0 13.2 13.2 -13.2 -13.2 
3 93.4 21.5 38.9 33.0 93.4 13.2 13.2 7.8 8.8 
4 2.5 2.5 2.5 22.0 19.0 
5 21.7 18.8 
6 23.6 20.0 
7 31.8 26.3 
8 38.8 31.8 
9 45.4 37.2 
10 52.0 42.5 
11 59.4 48.7 
12 62.4 51.1 
13 65.5 53.4 
14 65.5 53.4 
53 2.5 2.5 2.5 65.5 53.4 
Table B 4. Unadjusted and adjusted cost and output data, T U M B E S irrigation project 
a^t a^xt 
Year 
t \ 
C X C-
xt t xt 
Local Foreign 
currency currency 
Total Labo Foreign 
currency 
Others Total 
a^t'a^xt a\ 
1 
2 11.3 10.0 3.4 13.4 3.4 0.9 3.5 7.8 5.6 9.7 
3 22.0 19.5 6.5 26.0 6.5 1.7 6.8 15.0 11.0 18.8 
4 33.4 29.5 9.9 39.4 9.8 2.6 10.4 22.8 16.6 28.4 
5 44.7 39.6 13.2 52.8 13.2 3.6 13.8 30.6 22.2 38.1 
6 55.4 48.9 16.4 65.3 16.3 4.4 17.1 37.8 27.5 47.2 
7 80.6 70.5 30.0 100.5 24.2 6.6 26.5 57.3 43.2 72.6 
8 93.4 81.1 39.6 120.7 28.4 7.9 31.9 68.2 52.5 87.1 
9 107.2 92.5 49.9 142.4 33.0 9.3 37.6 79.9 62.5 102.9 
10 120.0 103.0 59.4 162.4 37.2 10.5 43.0 90.7 71.7 117,4 
11 133.9 114.4 69.7 184.1 41.8 11.9 48.7 102.4 81,7 133.2 
12 146.7 125.0 79.3 204.3 46.0 13.1 54.2 113.3 91.0 147.8 
13 160.6 136.4 89.6 226.0 50.6 14.5 59.9 125.0 101.0 163.5 
14 173.4 146.9 99.0 246.1 54.8 15.8 65.2 135.8 110.3 178.1 
57 173.4 146.9 99.0 246.1 54.8 15.8 65.2 135.8 110.3 178.1 
Table B 4. (continued) 
Labor Foreign Others Total lat + Oat Lcbor Foreign Others Total Bj. ^Bj. 
t ^t currency currency 
1 61.5 13.5 17.5 30.5 61.5 4.9 N.A. N.A. N.A. 4.9 -4.9 -4.9 
2 66.8 14.1 13.8 38.9 66.8 8.1 8.1 3.2 -2.5 
3 39.9 9.5 10.1 20.3 39.9 11.2 11.2 7.8 -3.2 
4 27.9 6.4 6.1 15.4 27.9 9.3 9.3 24.1 7.3 
5 192.7 54.1 43.5 95.1 192.7 9.3 9.3 35.4 12.9 
6 226.5 62.4 53.2 110.9 226.5 9.3 9.3 46.1 18.2 
7 105.2 25.9 14.7 64.6 105.2 9.3 9.3 71.3 33.9 
8 19.0 — — — — — 19.0 19.0 10.3 10.3 83.1 42.2 
9 19.0 — — — — — 19.0 19.0 10.3 10.3 96.9 52.2 
10 109.7 61.4 
11 123.6 71.4 
12 136.4 80.7 
13 150.3 90.7 
14 163.1 100.0 
57 19.0 19.0 19.0 10.3 10.3 163.1 100.0 
Table B 5. Unadjusted and adjusted cost and output data, C H I R A irrigation project 
a^t a^xt 
Year 
t *t 
4J 1 Local 
currency 
Foreign Total 
currency 
Labor Foreign 
currency 
Others Total 
a^t'a^xt aVt 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 25.8 27.0 9.0 36.0 6.0 1.8 6.8 14.6 21.4 23.5 
6 51.7 53.9 18.0 71.9 11.9 3.5 13.6 29.0 42.9 47.1 
7 77.5 80.8 27.1 107.9 17.9 5.2 20.5 43.6 64.3 70.6 
8 103.3 107.7 36.1 143.8 23.8 7.0 27.3 58.1 85.7 94.2 
9 129.2 134.7 45.1 1 9.8 29.8 8.7 34.2 72.7 107.1 117.7 
10 155.0 161.6 54.1 215.7 35.7 10.5 40.9 87.1 128.6 141.2 
11 180.8 188.6 63.1 251.7 41.7 12.2 47.8 101.7 150.0 164.8 
12 206.7 215.5 72.1 287.6 47.6 13.9 54.7 116.2 171.4 188.3 
13 
54 206.7 215.5 72.1 287.6 47.6 13.9 54.7 116.2 171.4 188.3 
Table B S. (continued) 
9 
aÇt a^at+ a^at 
Labor Foreign Others Total + 0^^ Labor Foreign Others Total ^Bj. 
currency currency 
1 180.7 29.6 80.1 38.5 148.2 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
2 478.9 78.5 225.0 89.2 392.7 ---- --- --- ---
3 351.6 57.7 162.5 68.1 288.3 293.6 240.8 -293.6 -293.6 
4 309.4 50.7 138.9 64.1 253.7 293.6 240.8 -293.6 -293.6 
5 15.6 15.6 15.6 25.8 21.4 
6 
7 
8 103.3 85.7 
51.7 42.9 
77.5 64.3 
129.2 107.1 
10 155.0 128.6 
11 180.8 150.0 
12 206.7 171.4 
54 15.6 --- --- 15.6 15.6 --- --- --- --- --- 206.7 171.4 
Table B 6. Unadjusted and adjusted cost and output data, EL C U R A L irrigation project 
a^t a^t 
Year 
t *t Cxt 
Local 
currency 
Foreign Total 
currency 
Labor Foreign 
currency 
Others Total 
a*t"a^xt aVt 
1 — 
2 10.6 4.6 6.0 7.1 3.4 10.5 1.9 0.9 3.2 6.0 4.5 7.0 
3 22.0 9.9 12.1 14.7 7.0 21.7 4.0 1.8 6.6 12.4 9.3 14.5 
4 32.6 14.5 18.1 21.8 10.4 32.2 5.9 2.7 9.8 18.4 13.7 21.5 
5 43.2 19.1 24.1 28.8 13.8 42.6 7.8 3.6 13.1 24.5 18.2 28.6 
6 53.8 23.6 30.2 35.9 17.2 53.1 9.7 4.5 16.3 30.5 22.7 35.6 
7 65.2 29.0 36.2 43.5 20.8 64.3 11.8 5.4 19.7 36.9 27.4 43.1 
8 75.8 33.6 42.2 50.6 24.2 74.8 13.7 6.3 22.9 42.9 31.9 50.1 
51 75.8 33.6 42.2 50.6 24.2 74.8 13.7 6.3 22.9 42.9 31.9 50.1 
Table B 6. (continued) 
a^t aîat aOat 
Q Labor Foreign Others Total Labor Foreign Others Total 
t currency at"*" ^ at currency ®t a®t 
1 103.0 33.0 23.8 46.2 103.0 7.4 N.A. N.A. N.A. 7.4 -7.4 -7.4 
2 4.9 — — — — — — — — 4.9 7.6 7.6 -1.6 -3.1 
3 5.7 — — — — — — — " — 5.7 0.3 0.3 11.8 9.0 
4 ' 0.5 0.5 17.6 13.2 
5 23.6 17.7 
6 29.7 22.2 
7 35.7 26.9 
8 41.7 31.4 
51 5.7 5.7 0.5 0.5 41.7 31.4 
Table B 7. Unadjusted and adjusted cost and output data, LA C A N 0 irrigation project 
a*t a^xt 
fear 
t Xt 
4J a Local 
currency 
Foreign Total 
currency 
Labor Foreign 
currency 
Others Total 
aXfa^xt aVt 
1 
2 3.3 3.6 2.5 6.1 1.1 0.5 1.7 3.3 2.8 4.2 
3 6.6 7.3 5.3 12.6 2.2 0.9 3.7 6.8 5.8 8.6 
4 9.8 10.8 7.8 18.6 3.2 1.4 5.4 10.0 8.6 12.8 
5 13.1 14.3 10.3 24.6 4.3 1.8 7.2 13.3 11.3 17.0 
6 , 16.4 17.8 12.8 30.6 5.3 2.3 8.9 16.5 14.2 21.2 
7 19.7 21.7 15.5 37.2 6.4 2.7 10.9 20.0 17.2 25.6 
8 23.0 25.2 18.0 43.2 7.5 3.2 12.6 23.3 19.9 29.8 
51 23.0 25.2 18.0 43.2 7.5 3.2 12.6 23.3 19.9 29.8 
Table B 7. (continued) 
a^t a^at +aOat 
Year Labor Foreign Others Total 
lat "^at 
Labor Foreign Others Total 
Bt aBt t ^t currency currency 
1 87. 4 35.9 9.6 41.9 87.4 5.4 N.A. N.A. N.A. 5.4 -5.4 -5.4 
2 1. 1 — — — — — — 1.1 5.6 5.6 -2.3 -2.8 
3 0.5 0.5 6.1 5.3 
4 0.8 0.8 9.0 7.8 
5 12.3 10.5 
6 15.6 13.3 
7 18.9 16.3 
8 22.2 19.1 
51 1. 1 1.1 0.3 0.8 22.2 19.1 
Table B 8. Unadjusted and adjusted cost and output data, EL H U E V 0 irrigation project 
^t ^xt 
'ear 
t ^xt Xt-Cxt 
Local 
currency 
Foreign 
currency 
Total Labor Foreign Others 
currency 
rotal 
a^t"a^xt. aV, 
1 — 
2 6.2 2.5 3.7 4.4 2.2 6.6 1.2 0.6 2.0 3.8 2.8 4.4 
3 12.8 4.9 7.9 9.0 4.6 13.6 2.5 1.2 4.1 7.8 5.8 9.1 
4 19.0 7.9 11.1 13.4 6.8 20.2 3.7 1.8 6.1 11.6 8.6 13.5 
5 25.2 10.4 14.8 17.8 9.0 26.8 4.9 2.3 8.1 15.3 11.5 17.9 
6 31.3 12.8 18.5 22.2 11.2 33.4 6.1 2.9 10.1 19.1 14.3 22.3 
7 37.9 15.7 22.2 26.8 13.6 40.4 7.4 3.6 1,2.1 23.1 17.3 27.0 
8 44.1 18.2 25.9 31.2 15.8 47.0 8.6 4.1 14.2 26.9 20.1 31.4 
51 44.1 18.2 25.9 31.2 15.8 47.0 8.6 4.1 14.2 26.9 20.1 31.4 
Table B 8. (continued) 
^t lat + a^at 
Year 
t 
Labor Foreign 
currency 
Others Total 
Iat+ Oat 
Labor Foreign 
currency 
Others Total 
Bt a^t 
1 79.9 31.9 9.1 38.8 79.9 4.4 N.A. N.A. N.A. 4.4 -4.4 -4.4 
2 1.5 1.5 1.5 4.5 4.5 -0.8 -1.7 
3 1.7 1.7 1.7 0.2. 0.2 7.7 5.6 
4 1.9 1.9 1.9 0.3 0.3 10.a 8.3 
5 14.5 11.2 
6 18.2 14.0 
7 21.9 17.0 
8 25.6 19,8 
51 1.9 1.9 1.9 0.3 
• 
0.3 25.6 19.8 
Table B 9. Unadjusted and adjusted cost and output data, A N T A U R A irrigation project 
a^t a^xt 
Year 
t *t Cxt ^t-Cxt 
Local 
currency 
Foreign Total 
currency 
Labor Foreign Others 
currency 
Total 
a^t"a^xt a^t 
1 ---
2 ---
3 1540 1138 402 891 672 1563 155 52 263 470 1093 1157 
4 3080 2276 804 1782 1344 3126 310 103 527 940 2186 2313 
5 4620 3414 1206 2673 2017 4690 466 155 790 1411 3279 3470 
6 6160 4552 1608 3564 2689 6523 621 207 1053 1881 4372 4626 
7 7700 5690 2010 4455 3361 7816 776 259 1316 2351 5465 5783 
52 7700 5690 2010 4455 3361 7816 776 259 1316 2351 5465 5783 
Table B 9. (continued) 
a£t alat + a^at 
Year ^ Labor Foreign Others Total ^ ^ Labor Foreign Others Total ^ ^ 
t t currency 8t at currency t at 
1 2826 2092 540 3020 5652 — N.A. N.A. N.A. 
2 4643 3436 944 4906 9286 1317 
3 110 ... 220 220 1417 
4 100 
5 
6 
7 
1317 -1317 -1317 
1417 -1015 - 324 
100 704 2086 
1106 3179 
1508 4272 
1910 5365 
220 220 100 --- --- --- 100 1910 5365 
Table B 10. Unadjusted and adjusted cost and output data, HUANSCOLLA irrigation project 
a^t afxt 
Year^g g ^ Local Foreign Total Labor Foreign Others Total 
t t xt t" xt currency currency currency a^t'a^t a^t 
3 2884 1823 1061 1646 1581 3227 536 163 915 1634 1593 2418 
4 5856 3702 2154 3342 3210 6552 1128 332 1858 3318 3234 4908 
5 8740 5525 3215 4987 4792 9779 1684 495 2773 4952 4827 7326 
to 
«0 
52 8740 5525 3215 4987 4792 9779 1684 495 2773 4952 4827 7326 
Table B 10. (continued) 
a^t a^at + a^at 
Year- Labor Foreign Others Total _ Labor Foreign Others Total 
t t currency at at currency t a t 
1 5113 1892 117 3104 5113 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
2 8678 3211 376 5091 8678 1200 1200 -1200 -1200 
3 215 - 215 215 1300 1300 - 239 293 
4 150 150 2004 3084 
5 200 200 3015 4627 
52 215 215 215 200 
Table B 11. Unadjusted and adjusted cost and output data, C H 0 C 0 C 0 irrigation project 
a^t a^xt 
Year Loccl. Foreign Total Labor Foreign Others Total x - C V 
t t xt t" xt currency currency currency a t"a xt at 
1 
2 III I" ::: III III III 
3 2023 1282 741 1412 981 2393 390 115 642 1147 1246 1666 
4 4046 2564 1482 2824 1962 4786 780 229 1285 2294 2492 3333 
5 6070 3848 2222 4236 2944 7180 1170 344 1927 3441 3739 4999 
6 8093 5130 2963 5648 3925 9573 1560 459 2569 4588 4985 6666 
7 10116 6412 3704 7060 4906 11966 1950 574 3211 5735 6231 8332 
52 10116 6412 3704 7060 4906 11966 1950 574 3211 5735 6231 8332 
Table B 11. (continued) 
a^t a^at a®at 
Year Labor Foreign Others Total Labor Foreign Others Total 
t ^t currency at ^at currency t at 
1 9891 3857 733 5301 9891 N.A. N.A. N.A. _ _ _  
2 18448 7195 1641 9612 18448 2140 2140 -2140 -2140 
3 160 160 160 2240 2240 -1499 - 944 
4 150 150 1332 2342 
5 200 200 2022 3539 
6 2763 4785 
7 3504 6031 
52 160 160 160 200 200 3504 6031 
K> 
ai N) 
